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"NATIONAL SECURITY" AS AN AMBIGUOUS SYMBOL

STATESMEN, publicists and scholars who wish to be considered realists, as many do today, are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they advocate is dictated by the national interest, more specifically by the national security interest. It is not surprising that this should be so. Today any reference to the pursuit of security is likely to ring a sympathetic chord.

However, when political formulas such as "national interest" or "national security" gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.

In a very vague and general way "national interest" does suggest a direction of policy which can be distinguished from several others which may present themselves as alternatives. It indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole. It emphasizes that the policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation. But beyond this, it has very little meaning.

When Charles Beard's study of *The Idea of National Interest* was published in the early years of the New Deal and under the

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impact of the Great Depression, the lines were drawn differently than they are today. The question at that time was whether American foreign policy, then largely economic in scope and motivation, was aimed not at promoting the welfare interests of the nation as a whole but instead at satisfying the material interests of powerful sub-national interest or pressure groups. While it was found hard to define what was in the interest of national welfare or to discover standards by which to measure it, there could be no doubt as to what people had in mind: they desired to see national policy makers rise above the narrow and special economic interests of parts of the nation to focus their attention on the more inclusive interests of the whole.

Today, the alternative to a policy of the national interest to which people refer is of a different character. They fear policy makers may be unduly concerned with the "interests of all of mankind". They see them sacrificing the less inclusive national community to the wider but in their opinion chimeric world community. The issue, then, is not one of transcending narrow group selfishness, as it was at the time of Beard's discussion, but rather one of according more exclusive devotion to the narrower cause of the national self.

There is another difference between the current and the earlier debate. While it would be wrong to say that the economic interest has ceased to attract attention, it is overshadowed today by the national security interest. Even in the recent debates on the St. Lawrence Seaway, clearly in the first instance an economic enterprise, the defenders of the project, when seeking to impress their listeners with the "national interest" involved, spoke mainly of the value of the Seaway for military defense in wartime while some opponents stressed its vulnerability to attack.

The change from a welfare to a security interpretation of the symbol "national interest" is understandable. Today we are living under the impact of cold war and threats of external aggression rather than of depression and social reform. As a result, the formula of the national interest has come to be practically synonymous with the formula of national security. Unless explicitly denied, spokesmen for a policy which would

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take the national interest as its guide can be assumed to mean that priority shall be given to measures of security, a term to be analyzed.[1] The question is raised, therefore, whether this seemingly more precise formula of national security offers statesmen a meaningful guide for action. Can they be expected to know what it means? Can policies be distinguished and judged on the ground that they do or do not serve this interest?

The term national security, like national interest, is well enough established in the political discourse of international relations to designate an objective of policy distinguishable from others. We know roughly what people have in mind if they complain that their government is neglecting national security or demanding excessive sacrifices for the sake of enhancing it. Usually those who raise the cry for a policy oriented exclusively toward this interest are afraid their country underestimates the external dangers facing it or is being diverted into idealistic channels unmindful of these dangers. Moreover, the symbol suggests protection through power and therefore figures more frequently in the speech of those who believe in reliance on national power than of those who place their confidence in model behavior, international coöperation, or the United Nations to carry their country safely through the tempests of international conflict. For these reasons it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford.

The demand for a policy of national security is primarily normative in character. It is supposed to indicate what the

[1] Hans Morgenthau's *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York, 1951) is the most explicit and impassioned recent plea for an American foreign policy which shall follow "but one guiding star—the National Interest". While Morgenthau is not equally explicit in regard to the meaning he attaches to the symbol "national interest", it becomes clear in the few pages devoted to an exposition of this "perennial" interest that the author is thinking in terms of the national security interest, and specifically of security based on power. The United States, he says, is interested in three things: a unique position as a predominant Power without rival in the Western Hemisphere and the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe as well as in Asia, demands which make sense only in the context of a quest for security through power.

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policy of a nation should be in order to be either expedient—a rational means toward an accepted end—or moral, the best or least evil course of action. The value judgments implicit in these normative exhortations will be discussed.

Before doing so, attention should be drawn to an assertion of fact which is implicit if not explicit in most appeals for a policy guided by national security. Such appeals usually assume that nations in fact have made security their goal except when idealism or utopianism of their leaders has led them to stray from the traditional path. If such conformity of behavior actually existed, it would be proper to infer that a country deviating from the established pattern of conduct would risk being penalized. This would greatly strengthen the normative arguments. The trouble with the contention of fact, however, is that the term "security" covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.

Security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. In Walter Lippmann's words, a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.[2] What this definition implies is that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accord with common usage of the term.

Security is a value, then, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure.[3] It has much in common, in this respect, with power or wealth, two other values of great importance in international affairs. But while wealth measures the amount of a nation's material

[2] Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy* (Boston, 1943), p. 51.

[3] This explains why some nations which would seem to fall into the category of *status quo* Powers *par excellence* may nevertheless be dissatisfied and act very much like "imperialist" Powers, as Morgenthau calls nations with acquisitive goals. They are dissatisfied with the degree of security which they enjoy under the *status quo* and are out to enhance it. France's occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 illustrates this type of behavior. Because the demand for more security may induce a *status quo* Power even to resort to the use of violence as a means of attaining more security, there is reason to beware of the easy and often self-righteous assumption that nations which desire to preserve the *status quo* are necessarily "peace-loving".

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possessions, and power its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. In both respects a nation's security can run a wide gamut from almost complete insecurity or sense of insecurity at one pole, to almost complete security or absence of fear at the other.[4]

The possible discrepancy between the objective and subjective connotation of the term is significant in international relations despite the fact that the chance of future attack never can be measured "objectively"; it must always remain a matter of subjective evaluation and speculation. However, when the French after World War I insisted that they were entitled to additional guarantees of security because of the exceptionally dangerous situation which France was said to be facing, other Powers in the League expressed the view that rather than to submit to what might be French hysterical apprehension the relative security of France should be objectively evaluated. It is a well-known fact that nations, and groups within nations, differ widely in their reaction to one and the same external situation. Some tend to exaggerate the danger while others underestimate it. With hindsight it is sometimes possible to tell exactly how far they deviated from a rational reaction to the actual or objective state of danger existing at the time. Even if for no other reasons, this difference in the reaction to similar threats suffices to make it probable that nations will differ in their efforts to obtain more security. Some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their

[4] Security and power would be synonymous terms if security could be attained only through the accumulation of power, which will be shown not to be the case. The fear of attack—security in the subjective sense—is also not proportionate to the relative power position of a nation. Why, otherwise, would some weak and exposed nations consider themselves more secure today than does the United States?

Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), defining security as "high value expectancy" stress the subjective and speculative character of security by using the term "expectancy"; the use of the term "high", while indicating no definite level, would seem to imply that the security-seeker aims at a position in which the events he expects—here the continued unmolested enjoyment of his possessions—have considerably more than an even chance of materializing.

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modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers. Although this is not the place to set up hypotheses on the factors which account for one or the other attitude, investigation might confirm the hunch that those nations tend to be most sensitive to threats which have either experienced attacks in the recent past or, having passed through a prolonged period of an exceptionally high degree of security, suddenly find themselves thrust into a situation of danger.[5] Probably national efforts to achieve greater security would also prove, in part at least, to be a function of the power and opportunity which nations possess of reducing danger by their own efforts.[6]

Another and even stronger reason why nations must be expected not to act uniformly is that they are not all or constantly faced with the same degree of danger. For purposes of a working hypothesis, theorists may find it useful at times to postulate conditions wherein all states are enemies—provided they are not allied against others—and wherein all, therefore, are

[5] The United States offers a good illustration and may be typical in this respect. For a long time this country was beyond the reach of any enemy attack that could be considered probable. During that period, then, it could afford to dismiss any serious preoccupation with security. Events proved that it was no worse off for having done so. However, after this happy condition had ceased to exist, government and people alike showed a lag in their awareness of the change. When Nicholas J. Spykman raised his voice in the years before World War II to advocate a broader security outlook than was indicated by the symbol "Western Hemisphere Defense" and a greater appreciation of the rôle of defensive military power, he was dealing with this lag and with the dangers implied in it. If Hans Morgenthau and others raise their warning voices today, seemingly treading in Spykman's footsteps, they are addressing a nation which after a new relapse into wishful thinking in 1945 has been radically disillusioned and may now be swinging toward excessive security apprehensions.

[6] Terms such as "degree" or "level" of security are not intended to indicate merely quantitative differences. Nations may also differ in respect to the breadth of their security perspective as when American leaders at Yalta were so preoccupied with security against the then enemy countries of the United States that they failed or refused to consider future American security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The differences may apply, instead, to the time range for which security is sought as when the British at Versailles were ready to offer France short-run security guarantees while the French with more foresight insisted that the "German danger" would not become acute for some ten years.

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equally in danger of attack.[7] But, while it may be true in the living world, too, that no sovereign nation can be absolutely safe from future attack, nobody can reasonably contend that Canada, for example, is threatened today to the same extent as countries like Iran or Yugoslavia, or that the British had as much reason to be concerned about the French air force in the twenties as about Hitler's *Luftwaffe* in the thirties.

This point, however, should not be overstressed. There can be no quarrel with the generalization that most nations, most of the time—the great Powers particularly—have shown, and had reason to show, an active concern about some lack of security and have been prepared to make sacrifices for its enhancement. Danger and the awareness of it have been, and continue to be, sufficiently widespread to guarantee some uniformity in this respect. But a generalization which leaves room both for the frantic kind of struggle for more security which characterized French policy at times and for the neglect of security apparent in American foreign policy after the close of both World Wars throws little light on the behavior of nations. The demand for conformity would have meaning only if it could be said—as it could under the conditions postulated in the working hypothesis of pure power politics—that nations normally subordinate all other values to the maximization of their security, which, however, is obviously not the case.

There have been many instances of struggles for more security taking the form of an unrestrained race for armaments, alliances, strategic boundaries and the like; but one need only recall the many heated parliamentary debates on arms appropriations to realize how uncertain has been the extent to which people will consent to sacrifice for additional increments of security. Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits or the sheer discomfort involved has militated effectively against further effort. It may be worth noting in

[7] For a discussion of this working hypothesis—as part of the "pure power" hypothesis—see my article on "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference" in *World Politics*, vol. IV, No. 1, October 1951.

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this connection that there seems to be no case in history in which a country started a preventive war on the grounds of security—unless Hitler's wanton attack on his neighbors be allowed to qualify as such—although there must have been circumstances where additional security could have been obtained by war and although so many wars have been launched for the enhancement of other values. Of course, where security serves only as a cloak for other more enticing demands, nations or ambitious leaders may consider no price for it too high. This is one of the reasons why very high security aspirations tend to make a nation suspect of hiding more aggressive aims.

Instead of expecting a uniform drive for enhanced or maximum security, a different hypothesis may offer a more promising lead. Efforts for security are bound to be experienced as a burden; security after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity, a negative value so to speak. As a consequence, nations will be inclined to minimize these efforts, keeping them at the lowest level which will provide them with what they consider adequate protection. This level will often be lower than what statesmen, military leaders or other particularly security-minded participants in the decision-making process believe it should be. In any case, together with the extent of the external threats, numerous domestic factors such as national character, tradition, preferences and prejudices will influence the level of security which a nation chooses to make its target.

It might be objected that in the long run nations are not so free to choose the amount of effort they will put into security. Are they not under a kind of compulsion to spare no effort provided they wish to survive? This objection again would make sense only if the hypothesis of pure power politics were a realistic image of actual world affairs. In fact, however, a glance at history will suffice to show that survival has only exceptionally been at stake, particularly for the major Powers. If nations were not concerned with the protection of values other than their survival as independent states, most of them, most of the time, would not have had to be seriously worried about their

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security, despite what manipulators of public opinion engaged in mustering greater security efforts may have said to the contrary. What "compulsion" there is, then, is a function not merely of the will of others, real or imagined, to destroy the nation's independence but of national desires and ambitions to retain a wealth of other values such as rank, respect, material possessions and special privileges. It would seem to be a fair guess that the efforts for security by a particular nation will tend to vary, other things being equal, with the range of values for which protection is being sought.

In respect to this range there may seem to exist a considerable degree of uniformity. All over the world today peoples are making sacrifices to protect and preserve what to them appear as the minimum national core values, national independence and territorial integrity. But there is deviation in two directions. Some nations seek protection for more marginal values as well. There was a time when United States policy could afford to be concerned mainly with the protection of the foreign investments or markets of its nationals, its "core values" being out of danger, or when Britain was extending its national self to include large and only vaguely circumscribed "regions of special interest". It is a well-known and portentous phenomenon that bases, security zones and the like may be demanded and acquired for the purpose of protecting values acquired earlier; and they then become new national values requiring protection themselves. Pushed to its logical conclusion, such spatial extension of the range of values does not stop short of world domination.

A deviation in the opposite direction of a compression of the range of core values is hardly exceptional in our days either. There is little indication that Britain is bolstering the security of Hong Kong although colonies were once considered part of the national territory. The Czechs lifted no finger to protect their independence against the Soviet Union and many West Europeans are arguing today that rearmament has become too destructive of values they cherish to be justified even when national independence is obviously at stake.

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The lack of uniformity does not end here. A policy is not characterized by its goal, in this case security, alone. In order to become imitable, the means by which the goal is pursued must be taken into account as well. Thus, if two nations were both endeavoring to maximize their security but one were placing all its reliance on armaments and alliances, the other on meticulous neutrality, a policy maker seeking to emulate their behavior would be at a loss where to turn. Those who call for a policy guided by national security are not likely to be unaware of this fact, but they take for granted that they will be understood to mean a security policy based on power, and on military power at that. Were it not so, they would be hard put to prove that their government was not already doing its best for security, though it was seeking to enhance it by such means as international coöperation or by the negotiation of compromise agreements—means which in one instance may be totally ineffective or utopian but which in others may have considerable protective value.

It is understandable why it should so readily be assumed that a quest for security must necessarily translate itself into a quest for coercive power. In view of the fact that security is being sought against external violence—coupled perhaps with internal subversive violence—it seems plausible at first sight that the response should consist in an accumulation of the same kind of force for the purpose of resisting an attack or of deterring a would-be attacker. The most casual reading of history and of contemporary experience, moreover, suffices to confirm the view that such resort to " power of resistance " has been the rule with nations grappling with serious threats to their security, however much the specific form of this power and its extent may differ. Why otherwise would so many nations which have no acquisitive designs maintain costly armaments? Why did Denmark with her state of complete disarmament remain an exception even among the small Powers?

But again, the generalization that nations seeking security usually place great reliance on coercive power does not carry one far. The issue is not whether there is regularly some such

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reliance but whether there are no significant differences between nations concerning their over-all choice of the means upon which they place their trust. The controversies concerning the best road to future security that are so typical of coalition partners at the close of victorious wars throw light on this question. France in 1919 and all the Allies in 1945 believed that protection against another German attack could be gained only by means of continued military superiority based on German military impotence. President Wilson in 1919 and many observers in 1945 were equally convinced, however, that more hope for security lay in a conciliatory and fair treatment of the defeated enemy, which would rob him of future incentives to renew his attack. While this is not the place to decide which side was right, one cannot help drawing the conclusion that, in the matter of means, the roads which are open may lead in diametrically opposed directions.[8] The choice in every instance will depend on a multitude of variables, including ideological and moral convictions, expectations concerning the psychological and political developments in the camp of the opponent, and inclinations of individual policy makers.[9]

After all that has been said little is left of the sweeping generalization that in actual practice nations, guided by their national security interest, tend to pursue a uniform and there-

[8] Myres S. McDougal ("Law and Peace" in the *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 46, No. 1, January 1952, pp. 102 *et seq.*) rightly criticizes Hans Morgenthau (and George Kennan for what Kennan himself wrongly believes to be his own point of view in the matter; see fn. 15 *infra*) for his failure to appreciate the rôle which non-power methods, such as legal procedures and moral appeals, may at times successfully play in the pursuit of security. But it is surprising how little aware McDougal appears to be of the disappointing modesty of the contributions which these "other means" have actually made to the enhancement of security and the quite insignificant contributions they have made to the promotion of changes of the *status quo*. This latter failure signifies that they have been unable to remove the main causes of the attacks which security-minded peoples rightly fear.

[9] On the problem of security policy (*Sicherheitspolitik*) with special reference to "collective security" see the comprehensive and illuminating study of Heinrich Rogge, "Kollektivsicherheit Buendnispolitik Voelkerbund", *Theorie der nationalen und internationalen Sicherheit* (Berlin, 1937), which deserves attention despite the fact that it was written and published in Nazi Germany and bears a distinctly "revisionist" slant.

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fore imitable policy of security. Instead, there are numerous reasons why they should differ widely in this respect, with some standing close to the pole of complete indifference to security or complete reliance on nonmilitary means, others close to the pole of insistence on absolute security or of complete reliance on coercive power. It should be added that there exists still another category of nations which cannot be placed within the continuum connecting these poles because they regard security of any degree as an insufficient goal; instead they seek to acquire new values even at the price of greater insecurity. In this category must be placed not only the " mad Caesars ", who are out for conquest and glory at any price, but also idealistic statesmen who would plunge their country into war for the sake of spreading the benefits of their ideology, for example, of liberating enslaved peoples.

The actual behavior of nations, past and present, does not affect the normative proposition, to which we shall now turn our attention. According to this proposition nations are called upon to give priority to national security and thus to consent to any sacrifice of value which will provide an additional increment of security. It may be expedient, moral or both for nations to do so even if they should have failed to heed such advice in the past and for the most part are not living up to it today.

The first question, then, is whether some definable security policy can be said to be generally expedient. Because the choice of goals is not a matter of expediency, it would seem to make no sense to ask whether it is expedient for nations to be concerned with the goal of security itself; only the means used to this end, so it would seem, can be judged as to their fitness—their instrumental rationality—to promote security. Yet, this is not so. Security, like other aims, may be an intermediate rather than an ultimate goal, in which case it can be judged as a means to these more ultimate ends.

Traditionally, the protection and preservation of national core values have been considered ends in themselves, at least by those who followed in the footsteps of Machiavelli or, for other

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reasons of political philosophy, placed the prince, state or nation at the pinnacle of their hierarchy of values. Those who do so today will be shocked at the mere suggestion that national security should have to be justified in terms of higher values which it is expected to serve. But there is a large and perhaps growing current of opinion—as a matter of fact influential in this country for a long time—which adheres to this idea. We condemn Nazis and Communists for defending their own totalitarian countries instead of helping to free their people from tyranny; we enlist support for armaments, here and in Allied countries, not so much on the grounds that they will protect national security but that by enhancing such security they will serve to protect ultimate human values like individual liberty. Again, opposition in Europe and Asia to military security measures is based in part on the contention that it would help little to make national core values secure, if in the process the liberties and the social welfare of the people had to be sacrificed; the prevention of Russian conquest, some insist, is useless, if in the course of a war of defense a large part of the people were to be exterminated and most cities destroyed.[10]

While excellent arguments can be made to support the thesis that the preservation of the national independence of this country is worth almost any price as long as no alternative community is available which could assure the same degree of order, justice, peace or individual liberty, it becomes necessary to provide such arguments whenever national security as a value in itself is being questioned. The answer cannot be taken for granted.

But turning away now from the expediency of security as an intermediate goal we must ask whether, aside from any moral considerations which will be discussed later, a specific level of

[10] Raymond Dennett goes further in making the generalization that, "if economic pressures become great enough, almost any government, when put to the final test, will moderate or abandon a political association" (such as the alliance system of the United States with its usefulness to national security) "if only an alteration of policy seems to offer the possibility of maintaining or achieving living standards adequate enough to permit the regime to survive." "Danger Spots in the Pattern of American Security", in *World Politics*, vol. IV, No. 4, July 1952, p. 449.

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security and specific means of attaining it can claim to be generally expedient.

When one sets out to define in terms of expediency the level of security to which a nation should aspire, one might be tempted to assume that the sky is the limit. Is not insecurity of any kind an evil from which any rational policy maker would want to rescue his country? Yet, there are obvious reasons why this is not so.

In the first place, every increment of security must be paid by additional sacrifices of other values usually of a kind more exacting than the mere expenditure of precious time on the part of policy makers. At a certain point, then, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it. As in the case of economic value comparisons and preferences, there is frequently disagreement among different layers of policy makers as to where the line should be drawn. This is true particularly because absolute security is out of the question unless a country is capable of world domination, in which case, however, the insecurities and fears would be "internalized" and probably magnified. Because nations must "live dangerously", then, to some extent, whatever they consent to do about it, a modicum of additional but only relative security may easily become unattractive to those who have to bear the chief burden. Nothing renders the task of statesmen in a democracy more difficult than the reluctance of the people to follow them very far along the road to high and costly security levels.

In the second place, national security policies when based on the accumulation of power have a way of defeating themselves if the target level is set too high. This is due to the fact that "power of resistance" cannot be unmistakably distinguished from "power of aggression". What a country does to bolster its own security through power can be interpreted by others, therefore, as a threat to their security. If this occurs, the vicious circle of what John Herz has described as the "security dilemma" sets in: the efforts of one side provoke countermeasures by the other which in turn tend to wipe out the gains of

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the first. Theoretically there seems to be no escape from this frustrating consequence; in practice, however, there are ways to convince those who might feel threatened that the accumulation of power is not intended and will never be used for attack.[11] The chief way is that of keeping the target level within moderate bounds and of avoiding placing oneself in a position where it has to be raised suddenly and drastically. The desire to escape from this vicious circle presupposes a security policy of much self-restraint and moderation, especially in the choice of the target level.[12] It can never be expedient to pursue a security policy which by the fact of provocation or incentive to others fails to increase the nation's relative power position and capability of resistance.

The question of what means are expedient for the purpose of enhancing security raises even more thorny problems. Policy makers must decide how to distribute their reliance on whatever means are available to them and, particularly, how far to push the accumulation of coercive power. No attempt can be made here to decide what the choice should be in order to be expedient. Obviously, there can be no general answer which would meet the requirements of every case. The answer depends on the circumstances. A weak country may have no better means at its disposal than to prove to stronger neighbors that its strict neutrality can be trusted. Potentially strong countries may have a chance to deter an aggressor by creating "positions of strength". In some instances they may have no other way of saving themselves; while in others even they may find it more expedient to supplement such a policy, if not to

[11] Not everyone agrees that this can be done. Jeremy Bentham wrote that "measures of mere self defense are naturally taken for projects of aggression" with the result that "each makes haste to begin for fear of being forestalled." *Principles of International Law,* Essay IV.

[12] The Quakers, in a book on *The United States and the Soviet Union: Some Quaker Proposals for Peace* (New Haven, 1949), p. 14, state that "it is highly questionable whether security can be achieved in the modern world through an attempt to establish an overwhelming preponderance of military power." This can be read to mean that a less ambitious military target than overwhelming preponderance might be a means of achieving security.

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replace it, by a policy intended to negotiate their opponent out of his aggressive designs.

The reason why "power of resistance" is not the general panacea which some believe it to be lies in the nature of security itself. If security, in the objective sense of the term at least, rises and falls with the presence or absence of aggressive intentions on the part of others, the attitude and behavior of those from whom the threat emanates are of prime importance. Such attitude and behavior need not be beyond the realm of influence by the country seeking to bolster its security. Whenever they do not lie beyond this realm the most effective and least costly security policy consists in inducing the opponent to give up his aggressive intentions.

While there is no easy way to determine when means can and should be used which are directed not at resistance but at the prevention of the desire of others to attack, it will clarify the issue to sketch the type of hypotheses which would link specific security policies, as expedient, to some of the most typical political constellations.

One can think of nations lined up between the two poles of maximum and minimum "attack propensity", with those unalterably committed to attack, provided it promises success, at one pole and those whom no amount of opportunity for successful attack could induce to undertake it at the other. While security in respect to the first group can come exclusively as a result of "positions of strength" sufficient to deter or defeat attack, nothing could do more to undermine security in respect to the second group than to start accumulating power of a kind which would provoke fear and countermoves.

Unfortunately it can never be known with certainty, in practice, what position within the continuum one's opponent actually occupies. Statesmen cannot be blamed, moreover, if caution and suspicion lead them to assume a closer proximity to the first pole than hindsight proves to have been justified. We believe we have ample proof that the Soviet Union today is at or very close to the first pole, while Canadian policy makers probably place the United States in its intentions toward Canada at the second pole.

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It is fair to assume that, wherever the issue of security becomes a matter of serious concern, statesmen will usually be dealing with potential opponents who occupy a position somewhere between but much closer to the first of the two poles. This means, then, that an attack must be feared as a possibility, even though the intention to launch it cannot be considered to have crystallized to the point where nothing could change it. If this be true, a security policy in order to be expedient cannot avoid accumulating power of resistance and yet cannot let it go at that. Efforts have to be made simultaneously toward the goal of removing the incentives to attack. This is only another way of saying that security policy must seek to bring opponents to occupy a position as close to the second pole as conditions and capabilities permit.

Such a twofold policy presents the greatest dilemmas because efforts to change the intentions of an opponent may run counter to the efforts to build up strength against him. The dangers of any policy of concessions, symbolized by "Munich", cannot be underestimated. The paradox of this situation must be faced, however, if security policy is to be expedient. It implies that national security policy, except when directed against a country unalterably committed to attack, is the more rational the more it succeeds in taking the interests, including the security interests, of the other side into consideration. Only in doing so can it hope to minimize the willingness of the other to resort to violence. Rather than to insist, then, that under all conditions security be sought by reliance on nothing but defensive power and be pushed in a spirit of national selfishness toward the highest targets, it should be stressed that in most instances efforts to satisfy legitimate demands of others are likely to promise better results in terms of security.[13] That is probably what George Kennan had in mind when he advised policy makers to use self-restraint in the pursuit of the national interest. While in the face of a would-be world conqueror who is beyond the pale of external influence it is dangerous to be di-

[13] As A. D. Lindsay puts it, "The search for perfect security . . . defeats its own ends. Playing for safety is the most dangerous way to live." Introduction to Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. xxii.

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verted from the accumulation of sheer defensive power, any mistake about his true state of mind or any neglect of opportunities to influence his designs, where it has a chance of being successful, violates the rules of expediency. It should always be kept in mind that the ideal security policy is one which would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized. While this is a utopian goal, policy makers and particularly peacemakers would do well to remember that there are occasions when greater approximation to such a goal can be effected.

We can now focus our attention on the moral issue, if such there be.[14] Those who advocate a policy devoted to national security are not always aware of the fact—if they do not explicitly deny it—that they are passing moral judgment when they advise a nation to pursue the goal of national security or when they insist that such means as the accumulation of coercive power—or its use—should be employed for this purpose.[15]

Nations like individuals or other groups may value things not because they consider them good or less evil than their alternative; they may value them because they satisfy their pride, heighten their sense of self-esteem or reduce their fears. However, no policy, or human act in general, can escape becoming a subject for moral judgment—whether by the conscience of the actor himself or by others—which calls for the sacrifice of other values, as any security policy is bound to do. Here it becomes a matter of comparing and weighing values in order to

[14] On the moral problem in international relations see my article on "Statesmanship and Moral Choice" in *World Politics*, vol. I, No. 2, January 1949, pp. 176 *et seq.*, especially p. 185. In one of his most recent statements on the subject, Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York, 1945), points specifically to the moral problem involved in security policy—"no imperiled nation", he writes, "is morally able to dispense with weapons which might insure its survival" (p. 39).

[15] It is not without irony that of the two authors who have recently come out for a policy of the national interest, the one, George F. Kennan, who calls for a policy of national self-restraint and humility, usually identified with morality, should deny "that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment" (*American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, 1952, p. 100), while the other, Hans Morgenthau (*op. cit.*), calling for a policy of unadulterated national egotism, claims to speak in the name of morality.

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decide which of them are deemed sufficiently good to justify the evil of sacrificing others. If someone insists that his country should do more to build up its strength, he is implying, knowingly or not, that more security is sufficiently desirable to warrant such evils as the cut in much-needed social welfare benefits or as the extension of the period of military service.[16]

Many vivid examples of the moral dilemma are being supplied by current controversies concerning American security policy. Is a "deal with fascist Spain" morally justified, provided it added an increment to our security, though principles valued highly by some were being sacrificed? Should we engage in subversive activities and risk the lives of our agents if additional security can be attained thereby? Should we perhaps go so far as to start a preventive war, when ready, with the enormous evils it would carry with it, if we should become convinced that no adequate security can be obtained except by the defeat of the Soviet Union? In this last case, would not the exponents of amoralism have some moral qualms, at least to the point of rationalizing a decision favoring such a war by claiming that it would serve to satisfy not primarily an egotistical national demand for security but an altruistic desire to liberate enslaved peoples? It is easier to argue for the amorality of politics if one does not have to bear the responsibility of choice and decision!

Far be it from a political scientist to claim any particular competence in deciding what efforts for national security are or are not morally justified. What he can contribute here is to point to the ambiguities of any general normative demand that security be bought at whatever price it may cost. He may also be able to make it more difficult for advisers or executors of policy to hide from themselves or others the moral value judgments and preferences which underlie whatever security policy they choose to recommend or conduct.

The moral issue will be resolved in one of several ways de-

[16] It would be unrealistic to assume that policy makers divide their attention strictly between ends and means and only after having chosen a specific target level as being morally justified decide whether the means by which it can be attained are morally acceptable. Moral judgment is more likely to be passed on the totality of a course of action which embraces both the desired end and the means which lead to it.

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pending on the ethical code upon which the decision is based. From one extreme point of view it is argued that every sacrifice, especially if imposed on other nations, is justified provided it contributes in any way to national security. Clearly this implies a position that places national security at the apex of the value pyramid and assumes it to constitute an absolute good to which all other values must be subordinated. Few will be found to take this position because if they subscribed to a nationalistic ethics of this extreme type they would probably go beyond security—the mere preservation of values—and insist that the nation is justified in conquering whatever it can use as *Lebensraum* or otherwise. At the opposite extreme are the absolute pacifists who consider the use of coercive power an absolute evil and condemn any security policy, therefore, which places reliance on such power.

For anyone who does not share these extreme views the moral issue raised by the quest for national security is anything but clear-cut and simple. He should have no doubts about the right of a nation to protect and preserve values to which it has a legitimate title or even about its moral duty to pursue a policy meant to serve such preservation. But he cannot consider security the supreme law as Machiavelli would have the statesman regard the *ragione di stato*. Somewhere a line is drawn, which in every instance he must seek to discover, that divides the realm of neglect, the "too-little", from the realm of excess, the "too-much". Even Hans Morgenthau who extols the moral duty of self-preservation seems to take it for granted that naked force shall be used for security in reaction only to violent attack, not for preventive war.

Decision makers are faced with the moral problem, then, of choosing first the values which deserve protection, with national independence ranking high not merely for its own sake but for the guarantee it may offer to values like liberty, justice and peace. He must further decide which level of security to make his target. This will frequently be his most difficult moral task though terms such as adequacy or fair share indicate the kind of standards that may guide him. Finally, he must choose the means and thus by scrupulous computation of values compare

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the sacrifices, which his choice of means implies, with the security they promise to provide.

It follows that policies of national security, far from being all good or all evil, may be morally praiseworthy or condemnable depending on their specific character and the particular circumstances of the case. They may be praised for their self-restraint and the consideration which this implies for values other than security; they may instead be condemned for being inadequate to protect national values. Again, they may be praised in one instance for the consideration given to the interests of others, particularly of weaker nations, or condemned in another because of the recklessness with which national values are risked on the altar of some chimera. The target level falls under moral judgment for being too ambitious, egotistical and provocative or for being inadequate; the means employed for being unnecessarily costly in other values or for being ineffective. This wide range of variety which arises out of the multitude of variables affecting the value computation would make it impossible, and in fact meaningless, to pass moral judgment, positive or negative, on " national security policy in general ".

It is this lack of moral homogeneity which in matters of security policy justifies attacks on so-called moralism, though not on moral evaluation. The " moralistic approach " is taken to mean a wholesale condemnation either of any concern with national security—as being an expression of national egotism—or of a security policy relying on coercive and therefore evil power. The exponent of such " moralism " is assumed to believe that security for all peoples can be had today by the exclusive use of such " good " and altruistic means as model behavior and persuasion, a spirit of conciliation, international organization or world government. If there are any utopians who cling to this notion, and have influence on policy, it makes sense to continue to disabuse them of what can surely be proved to be dangerous illusions.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that the opposite line of argument, which without regard for the special circumstances would praise everything done for national security or more particularly everything done for the enhancement of national

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power of resistance, is no less guilty of applying simple and abstract moral principles and of failing to judge each case realistically on its merits.

In conclusion, it can be said, then, that normative admonitions to conduct a foreign policy guided by the national security interest are no less ambiguous and misleading than the statement of fact concerning past behavior which was discussed earlier. In order to be meaningful such admonitions would have to specify the degree of security which a nation shall aspire to attain and the means by which it is to be attained in a given situation. It may be good advice in one instance to appeal for greater effort and more armaments; it may be no less expedient and morally advisable in another instance to call for moderation and for greater reliance on means other than coercive power. Because the pendulum of public opinion swings so easily from extreme complacency to extreme apprehension, from utopian reliance on "good will" to disillusioned faith in naked force only, it is particularly important to be wary of any simple panacea, even of one that parades in the realist garb of a policy guided solely by the national security interest.

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THE SCHUMAN PLAN AND RUHR COAL

WHEN Alsace-Lorraine was annexed by the German Reich in 1871, the new border line, following the historic boundary of the old provinces, cut through the rich iron fields of the Briey basin. The southern half remained French. By 1913 each country extracted an almost equal amount of iron ore on both sides of the border (approximately 21 million tons). In the production of pig iron, ferroalloys and steel, however, France lagged woefully behind Germany. In 1913 Germany produced 17.6 million tons of steel as against 4.7 million tons in France.[1]

The classical pattern of nineteenth-century enterprise prevailed in the French iron and steel industry, consisting mainly of family-owned, medium-sized plants with little incentive to expand and modernize. In the meantime the Germans went ahead to create an integrated system—the first on the continent—of steel production based on iron ore from Lorraine and coke from the Ruhr. Pig iron and iron ore would flow north to feed the huge metallurgical plants erected near the coal mines, while Ruhr coke would flow south to the blast furnaces in the Lorraine fields. Like the United States, Germany now possessed the two basic raw materials within its borders, and moved iron ore to the source of coal.[2]

[1] Production figures are taken from Appendix A, *Eleventh and Twelfth Reports to Congress* of the Economic Cooperation Administration (1950-1951); *Statistical Yearbook*, United Nations (1949-1950), pp. 141, 150, 255-257; production tables in T. S. Lovering, *Minerals in World Affairs* (New York, 1943), p. 349 and *passim*.

[2] The similarity between the movements of ores on the Great Lakes and on and along the Rhine (water and rail) is obvious. If the iron ore deposits of the Lake Superior region were located north of the border, no international complications would have arisen. The flow of iron ore to the south shores of Lake Erie and Michigan would have been organized in much the same way as it is now. The Canadians would not have contested the ownership of United States steel. On the contrary, they would have enjoyed the prospect of more United States dollars at their disposal to be spent in the United States. The historic fact remains, however, that if the United States and Canada had fought three wars over Minnesota, economic considerations would have succumbed to *Realpolitik*.

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During the First World War the Ruhr industrialists demanded the whole Briey basin for " total integration ". After the war French political thinking was dominated by a justifiable fear of German dynamic power and aggression. The French nationalists behind the Tiger wanted the Rhineland to be politically " independent ", that is, cut loose from Germany, though not necessarily " de-Germanized ", but integrated economically with France. Now, with the return of the Lorraine fields to France, the French proposed to build metallurgical plants near the iron ore mines. They expected coal from the Ruhr and the Saar (whose mines were ceded to France as part of German reparation payments). Thus, the flow of coke to the iron ore would have given France the advantage of free coal, use of her own iron ore, and consequently lower-cost steel production.

The French plan was finally thwarted partly through their own blunders (Ruhr occupation in 1923), partly through well-organized German passive resistance and sabotage. Though unintentionally, support to Germany came from unexpected quarters such as British public opinion—and Mr. Keynes. As an economist, Keynes was very much concerned with the effect of the French Ruhr policies. He feared a lasting disturbance of equilibrium if the French persisted in building in the Lorraine basin and in claiming free coal from the Ruhr. Though he accepted the new political frontier, he objected to the creation of " economic frontiers ".

> The economic frontiers [he wrote] which are to be established between the coal and the iron, upon which modern industrialism is founded, will not only diminish the production of useful commodities, but may possibly occupy an immense quantity of human labour in dragging iron or coal, as the case may be, over many useless miles to satisfy the dictates of a political treaty or because obstructions have been established to the proper localisation of industry.[3]

Keynes was accused of Francophobia when he attacked the political and economic provisions of the Versailles Treaty and

[3] J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, 1920), pp. 91-92.

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sided with the Germans in the Ruhr dispute. The fact remains, however, that it is uneconomical to move coal—the lower-cost bulk product—to the source of iron. Yet, Keynes weakened his case considerably with his predictions "that Germany cannot export coal in the near future if she is to continue as an industrial nation",[4] that the production of iron and its derivatives would decline drastically in Germany, and that the total volume of production in Western Europe would diminish correspondingly.

As Mantoux, in his brilliant rebuttal to Keynes, pointed out, "Germany need never fear a shortage of iron supplies from France—in peacetime, at any rate—but on the other hand, France would soon experience some difficulty in exporting her iron manufactured goods to Germany."[5] Germany could get all the iron ore she wanted in the free market from Sweden, Spain, and others, while Lorraine ore continued to flow to the Ruhr as before. Though she was deprived of her principal sources of ore, and produced less than a quarter of her 1913 total, Germany's output of pig iron, ferroalloys and steel continued to rise until 1929 when world production reached its pre-depression peak. In that year Germany produced 16.2 million tons of steel as against 9.7 million tons in France.

Mantoux wrote:

> It is clear that the output would have been increased even faster if in 1929 the International Steel Cartel had not been formed with a view to stabilizing prices between the iron and steel industries of France, Belgium, Luxumbourg and the Saar, who decided to limit total production to allocate it between themselves according to variable percentages.[6]

As normal market conditions returned, the fear of shortages in raw materials evaporated. Instead, Western producers were now confronted with prospects of glut and unemployment. French iron smelters found it easy to buy Ruhr coke, but difficult to sell iron manufactures.

[4] *Ibid.*; see also J. M. Keynes, *A Revision of the Treaty* (London, 1922).

[5] E. Mantoux, *The Cartheginian Peace* (London and New York, 1946), p. 74.

[6] *Ibid.*

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The French were plagued by political instability, the inertia of French enterprise, and the effects of cartellization which resulted in restriction of output, high cost, misdirection of capital, and so on. Germany, on the other hand, was able to recoup her pre-war position quickly. A new industrial revolution was now in progress, based on newly developed chemical and improved metallurgical processes. With the advent of a Nationalistic régime bent on restoring Germany's war potential, Ruhr coal was destined again to play a decisive rôle. The importance of coal as a fuel is now secondary to its importance as a raw material for new chemical processes. "Coal, once an abundant commodity, has become a scarcity."[7] This was true at the height of war preparation; it is equally true today. Under the watchful eyes of the government, there was a mad rush of the few surviving combines for the control of coal.

> In German industry, mixed plants, that is, a combination of iron and coal, mining, metallurgy, and engineering, were always decisive. Coal was and is the basis of industrial production, and each steel mill, each big machine-tool construction plant, fought for a coal basis. Very soon the new methods of coal processing made the acquisition of a coal basis a vital concern of the chemical industry.[8]

In the depth of the depression, Germany's total output of coal amounted to 20 per cent of world production; it rose to almost 30 per cent in 1940, while France's share amounted to 2.9 per cent only.

> In 1937 it [the Ruhr district] produced 127.8 million metric tons of coal—three times as much as all France and more than the entire Soviet Union. Its coal of excellent coking quality formed the basis for chemical and metallurgical industries. The coal mined in the Ruhr in 1937 contained more power than was produced by all the hydroelectric installations in the world in that year (the equivalent of 200 billion kilowatt-hours, as compared with 172 billion kilowatt-hours).[9]

[7] Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York, 1942), p. 279.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

[9] E. W. Zimmermann, *World Resources and Industries* (London and New York, 1951), pp. 468-469.

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Germany's iron ore production in 1929 was still a fraction of its 1913 total (35.9 million tons in 1913; 6.2 million tons in 1929). It fell to 1.3 million tons in 1932, but rose dramatically (due to the aggressive policy of the government) to 15 million tons in 1940.

Though France controlled the source of iron ore, she was forced to curtail her output from the 1929 peak of 50.7 million tons, or 25 per cent of world production, to 27 million tons in 1932. While her output rose during recovery and war preparation (to 37.8 million tons in 1937) her share in world production, when the Second World War began, had declined to one half of 1929. The per capita consumption of steel in France in 1935 was 115 kg. as against 212 kg. in Germany; in 1938 it increased to 315 kg. in Germany, while it remained 118 kg. in France.[10] France's recovery in the production of pig iron and steel lagged far behind Germany, and when the war broke out she produced only about 6 million tons of steel.

The quick conquest of northern France by the Germans in 1940 enabled them to triple their ore output as compared to 1932. Extensive bombing of industrial areas during the war, the division of the country, and the loss of markets caused a sharp post-war decline in German, and particularly in Ruhr, production. Coal output in the Ruhr in 1946 amounted to one third only, while steel fell to one fifth (as compared with 1939).

The problem of the Ruhr remained to be solved. Neither the British nor the Americans took seriously the plan to reduce the Ruhr district to digging coal, while the chemical and metallurgical industries concentrated near the mines would be removed as reparation payments. Since the Russians demanded a major share in the distribution of plants to be dismantled, the Allies were reluctant to let strategically important plants go and, after a number of industries had been removed, stopped dismantling altogether. Another plan to socialize and internationalize the Ruhr district, while keeping its industries intact, was also rejected by the Allies since it would have given Russia a voice in controlling its management. Limited socialization on

[10] Steel Division, Economic Commission for Europe, *European Steel Trends in the Setting of the World Market* (Geneva, 1949), p. 22.

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a British model, under the supervision of the West, was distasteful to the United States as well as to France.

Disagreement among the Western Allies became more and more pronounced. Western European nations objected at first to the inclusion of Germany in an integrated Western European economy. They feared her competition, her war potential, and her rôle in a revived cartel system. The United States, concerned over Russia's war potential, was anxious to see the output of strategically important products increased as quickly and as efficiently as possible. And, indeed, the Ruhr industries did not disappoint us. In four years, from 1946 to 1950, production of steel increased fivefold.

The loss of Lorraine iron ore and Saar coal fields does not curtail Germany's steel-making capacity. The loss of the Silesian coal fields, however, raises serious problems. In 1940 Germany produced 30 per cent of the world's total in coal, Russia only an estimated 7.5 per cent. Today, the Western European countries, with the exception of Britain, produce only an estimated 13 per cent, while the pro-Russian bloc has increased its share of the world total to an estimated 23 per cent. The output of steel in the West amounts to about 17 per cent, while the Russian bloc turns out almost 20 per cent of the world's total.

After the break with Russia, the Allies adopted a policy of piecemeal relaxation of the restrictions imposed upon German industry. In 1949 an agreement was reached to review the limitations and prohibitions of post-war years, and to permit Germany to raise its steel production above the set limit of 11 million tons a year. In addition, permission was given to reopen synthetic oil refineries and synthetic rubber plants. Additional plants are being built now and planned for the future. As a result of Allied concessions, the chemical industries are again carrying on, the roller-bearing industry is recovering, and the shipbuilding industry, with limitations on size and speed removed, is coming back in the 1950's as fast as it did in the 1920's.

The European Recovery Program has become an effective weapon in whipping Western nations into an integrated political and economic system. The production quotas set by the

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O.E.E.C. (Organization for European Economic Cooperation)' in 1948 for the five years from 1948 to 1953 were met in 1951. In 1950 France finally succeeded in topping her 1929 figures in steel production, and in 1952 she may exceed her proposed quota of 15 million tons of iron and steel (as against 6 million tons in 1938).[11] Saar production would add about 2 million tons.

The O.E.E.C. targets [12] for German steel, having been limited at first by an international agreement at 10.7 ingot tons, are now greatly increased. In 1950 the Ruhr district again turned out 12 million tons, that is, only 2½ million tons less than in the last pre-war year. But coal has remained on the 1938 level, while the index of industrial production has climbed to 140 as compared to 1938. With the Saar and the Silesian coal fields detached, Germany produced in 1950 only 110.7 million tons of bituminous coal as compared to 220 million tons in 1940.

Meanwhile the coal deficit grows with little prospect of replenishment through corresponding increase in output. There is the vexing problem of declining productivity in the post-war years. Low productivity as compared to the United States is due partly to natural conditions.[13] In 1937 the output per worker in the United States was three times as high as in Western Germany, in 1948 it was six times as high. The miner in the Ruhr district now receives comparatively high wages and adequate food; consequently his output is slowly increasing. Further mechanization may help increase his productivity.

Yet, the problem of labor shortage remains. It has been suggested that the German government draw from the pool of unemployed *Volksdeutsche* who were forced to leave Eastern Europe, but these people are mainly small farmers, tradesmen, or officials, who would fiercely resist descending into an undesirable occupation level. Formerly, mining in the Ruhr district depended for its marginal labor supply mainly on Silesia or Poland proper. Now this source has completely dried up. It

[11] O.E.E.C., *Interim Report on the E.R.P.*, vol. 2, Dec. 31, 1948, pp. 312-313.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 966-967.

[13] "The seams [in U. S.] are easier to work on account of their thickness and regularity, and they lend themselves better to mechanization both in cutting and in underground transport." Steel Division, E.C.E., *op. cit.*, p. 51.

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may be argued that Belgium, which, like France, is a high-cost producer, close her marginal mines, and induce her miners to migrate to the Ruhr district. It is doubtful whether Belgians would willingly leave their homes or whether miners in the Ruhr district would welcome them—unless perhaps, they would come as migrant workers to leave as soon as the emergency is over.

Training of a substantial labor force, skilled in mining, is a long-run proposition. It involves a shift from preferred, though less remunerative, occupations, special incentives, still higher wages, and so on. Though productivity (due to additional mechanization) may steadily increase, the cost of producing coal would still go up and thus in the long run weaken the competitive position of Western steel producers. Yet " the role of the steel industry in an economically healthy Europe is to provide as much cheap steel as can be consumed in Europe and exported to other continents." [14]

The interdependence of European countries for their supply of raw materials is best illustrated in the table below:

Dependence of the Main European Steel-Producing Countries on Imports of Essential Raw Materials from Other European Countries

Country	*Iron Ore*		*Scrap*		*Coal and Coke*	
	pre-war	post-war	pre-war	post-war	pre-war	post-war
1. England	50	45	10	10	—	—
2. France	—	—	—	—	55	50
Saar	100	100	25	—	15	—
3. Germany	75	45	5	—	—	—
4. Belgium	100	100	—	20	30	25
5. Luxembourg ...	30	50	—		100	100
6. Italy	30	10	35	35	100	100
7. Netherlands	100	100	—	—	—	—

Source: Steel Division, E.C.E., *op. cit.*, p. 43. Austria and the countries within the Soviet sphere have been omitted. The dependence factor, expressed by the percentage of net imports to consumption, has been given in round figures to the next 5 per cent.

In France, the iron ore output per man in 1949 was 1,266 metric tons (with an iron equivalent of 420 tons), while in Ger-

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

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many it amounted to only 404 metric tons with an iron equivalent of 139 tons). The coal output per manshift was 610 kg. in France in 1948 as against 958 kg. in Germany in the same year, though the post-war decline in French output amounted to one fourth, while in Germany it fell by one third.

The logic of comparative advantage is clear. The E.C.E. report for 1949 implied that a recession was imminent, since "abundant and sufficiently cheap steel is a prerequisite to a proper development of the European economy" and "large exports of steel and of manufactured products made from steel are one of the essential conditions for Europe to balance its trade with other continents." [15]

When the Schuman Plan proposing a Franco-German steel pool was announced (May 9, 1950), it was expected that the deflationary trends which had developed in 1949 would continue in the early 1950's with a corresponding decline in the price of raw materials, such as coal. The professed aim of the Plan was to establish by treaty a "community of production", a single European market for coal and steel, a market where "consumers of raw materials would be *guaranteed* free access to sources of production." [16] Without some binding Franco-German agreements, the vertical combines in the Ruhr which control their own coal supply, anticipating a glut, were expected to revive the old cartel tactics of dual pricing and restriction of production. As in the 1930's, German producers would again be able to buy iron ore at the lowest possible price level, while the French would remain dependent on Ruhr coke, as before.

The dramatic developments following the outbreak of the Korean War completely reversed earlier trends. In 1949, a surplus of coal, scrap and iron was expected; in the second half of 1950 with rearmament and stock-piling in full swing, accompanied by speculative buying, prices went up sharply as critical shortages developed. It was no longer a question of getting "sufficiently cheap steel" but "abundant steel" at any price. Instead of being confronted with price discrimination in the allocation of coal, the French now faced a diminishing supply,

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[16] Statement made by Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, May 9, 1950.

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simply because there was not enough coal to satisfy the rapidly increasing demand. Before the crisis developed, the recommendations of the Coal Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe were usually followed in making allotments of coal. But now, as military needs exceed its supply, participating countries are quarreling over their shares.

The fact remains, however, that Western Germany has now become a net importer of coal, relying mainly upon the United States to make up her deficit.[17] Full-scale production in the Ruhr district necessitates a vast increase in the use of coking coal. With supervision of heavy industries and restrictions on steel production in the Ruhr gradually removed, German steel output has now reached a rate of about 15 million tons a year, far outstripping the quotas set by the O.E.E.C. for 1951-52. If all limitations on production of war materials are removed, as demanded by the Adenauer government, Germany may increase her output by about one fourth at the end of 1952 (to 19 million tons a year), and if, during the period of intensified rearmament, she is permitted to expand at the same rate (limited only by her coal supply), she will again dominate the European steel market.

With the acquiescence of the Allied High Commissioners, vertical combinations, based on coal, with steel and products made of steel as end products, are being rapidly reconstituted. Law 27 permits reorganization of iron and steel units into 26 "core" companies (*Kerngesellschaften*), of which 14 have already been formed. The holding company is a convenient form to effect a nominal transfer of shares from one company to another. Though the structure of pre-war ownership has been restored as far as possible, the specter of nationalization still remains.[18] Whether privately owned or not, the Ruhr industries

[17] Coal imports from the United States increased sharply during 1951. They amounted to about 3,000,000 tons a month in the last quarter. Poland, the second important source of coal, sent approximately 1,000,000 tons a month in 1951. The price of United States coal in Europe—$10 a ton—has become the general selling price, a high cost factor for coal consumers, benefiting coal producers (especially Poland) but detrimental to steel producers without coal bases. *New York Times*, December 1, 1951.

[18] The High Commission, anxious not to intervene in German internal affairs, expressed the desire not to prejudice the legal right of the federal legislature to deter-

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are, as in the pre-war period, " rationalized ", that is, organized into combines of optimum size, each combine thus retaining its own coal base. The coal sales organization of the Ruhr district, a quasi-monopolistic outfit, has been permitted to function, though the French have objected to centralized sales organizations which, contrary to the spirit of the Schuman Plan, may again practice price discrimination in favor of Germany.

Thus, while steel production in Germany has reached 100 per cent of its capacity, French producers are operating at only 85 per cent, due mainly to the lack of coal. The French steel industry, suffering from obsolescence in many plants, and depending mainly upon Ruhr coal, faces another equally serious problem, besides increasing inflationary pressure. In terms of trade, France, a weak-currency country, finds itself in an increasingly unfavorable position as an importer from Germany with its overvalued mark. Thus, through the medium of exchange a form of price discrimination is practiced, which means that French consumers of German coal pay a still higher price. Only a common currency or German devaluation could give France better terms.

The French government had no choice (unless it repudiated its own plan) but to accept a *fait accompli.* The Third Force elements which comprise the somewhat elusive working majorities in the Chamber of Deputies have one political objective in common: to preserve the Fourth Republic and its institutions. In their quest for security they are ready to relinquish some sovereign rights jealously guarded in the past. The original intent of the Schuman Plan, as conceived by M. Monnet, was simple. A supranational organization, political in character (though the objectives of the Plan are, for the time being at least, purely economical), is created, with a High Authority as its executive arm, charged with supervision and regulation of the flow of coal, iron and scrap, unrestricted by tariff barriers and cartel practices.

The Pact, as ratified by the six participating nations (France,

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mine at any time the eventual ownership of the industries. A victory at the polls in 1953 may embolden the otherwise moderate Social Democrats to seek nationalization based on a purely nationalist, pro-German, policy.

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Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) sets up a stable but complicated and cumbersome administrative body with limited powers, which will supersede the fluid cartel arrangements of the inter-war period. It may have been sufficient, as Great Britain suggested, to create within the framework of the Council of Europe loosely coördinated agencies which would cope with all the problems affecting Western Europe, including defense. But security-minded France preferred a solemn treaty though it involved at first only two commodities. France signed the treaty, but not without "misgivings" that, though the High Authority would "intervene only in periods of crisis", she would henceforth "be living continuously under a regime of international *dirigisme*." These "misgivings" of the Third Force stem from a profound distrust of *dirigisme* (state control), and from the fear that the Authority may prove to be "partisan"; for example, "that . . . it will act in a manner systematically unfavorable to French interest." [19]

The Authority need not be "partisan", however, unless the Plan is interpreted to mean that "the most rational distribution of production at the *highest level of productivity*" is possible only if steel production were concentrated near the coal base. This would quite naturally defeat the real purpose of the Plan. It would then take as its guiding principle the declaration of the former High Commissioner, Mr. John J. McCloy, "that with German efficiency all uneconomic concerns in other Schuman Plan countries will be eliminated in a short time." Here we return to arguments similar to Keynes's in his *Economic Consequences of the Versailles Treaty*. If the Ruhr district is

[19] Quoted from a speech by M. Faure (former premier) speaking for the Third Force during the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, preceding the ratification of the treaty. (*News from France*, Jan. 15, 1952, No. 1, p. 7.) It is perhaps worth noting that the Socialists, whose preference for a mild form of *dirigisme* stems from their desire to maintain full employment and to accelerate social reforms, are anxious to see the legislative arm strengthened at the expense of the High Authority. Actually the powers of the Authority are limited, by giving the Common Assembly (appointed by the various national parliaments) and a special Council of Ministers (one minister for each participating nation) the right to overrule decisions made by the Authority. Besides, a Court of Justice is vested not only with the powers of review but also with "special responsibility" to intervene, "should the functioning of the common market provoke fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economy of one of the member states." Article 37, Treaty Draft.

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capable, in the long run, of producing at the highest level of productivity and if, in times of contracting demand, it can provide a common market with all the steel it needs, why should not the Authority concentrate its investments at the Ruhr coal base, and thus reduce the other districts to a mere satellite position? It would simply legitimize what was bound to happen, if only tariff barriers or quota systems were abolished, or if prewar cartels were reinstituted.

The simple conclusion from these unpalatable facts is: free market forces and a general upswing favor concentration in the Ruhr with its coal bases, skilled labor, ideal location and, consequently, ready capital from abroad. An inevitable downswing would find the Ruhr combines with their experience in "rationalization" of production better prepared to cope with the situation. It is clear that if the Authority refrains from interfering with the market, except in a "recognized" crisis, steel concentration in the Ruhr increases and France's share in its coal decreases.[20] The danger to steel producers in the Lorraine district could be avoided only if the French government assists them indirectly. But no French government would agree to the elimination of even a part of French steel production, or to the wholesale transfer of French workers into the Ruhr district. For this reason, German labor unions are unalterably opposed to the Schuman Pact. They fear that, since it provides for pooling of workers, poor mines in France and Belgium would have to be closed and workers from these countries would be sent to districts with remaining rich deposits. That means Germany.

The High Authority inherited a system of coal allocation which runs the gamut from centralized selling organizations and coal-steel combines in the Ruhr district to the O.E.E.C. in Paris. Nations and industries are now "competing" for a maximum share in the distribution of a relatively scarce raw material. If the Authority intervenes now, it may invoke Article 59 of the Treaty, and "establish consumption priorities and

[20] In the Chamber debate, Pierre André voiced the fear of the French industrialists, "that German consumption of coke will increase, because Germany will need to produce more steel and the Germans will need all their production for the steel industry. . . ." *News from France*, Jan. 15, 1952, No. 1. p. 7.

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determine the allocation of coal and steel resources among the industries subject to its jurisdiction." [21] This would result in an imposition of higher coal export quotas upon the Ruhr district, equalizing the coal supply for the productive capacity of all participating countries.

A particularly difficult problem, however, arises from the fact that the High Authority will be called upon to reconcile conflicting national interests without direct interference, if " normal market conditions " favor concentration, or to expose and prevent " restraint of trade " which may result from such concentration. It may impose fines, order the dissolution of combines; but can it stop open or concealed cartel practices,[22] unless it has the power to coerce a recalcitrant nation to abide by its decisions?

Fortunately, coal production continued to rise in 1951 and 1952,[23] thus easing the Authority's allocation problem considerably. But, more important, the great Western Powers realized that the High Authority must be given extensive sovereign powers, if the treaty is to be enforced effectively. When the High Authority was finally installed in the city of Luxembourg last August, Mr. William J. Draper, special United States representative in Western Europe, met M. Monnet, the newly elected President, in a formal diplomatic conference. Definite commitments were made. The United States, represented by an accredited mission, will negotiate direct agreements affecting the allocation of coal imported from the United States, the allotment of Congressional funds voted for mutual aid in Western Europe, or the marketing of High Authority bonds, thus tapping the private capital market.

Though the Churchill government is not ready to join either the pool or a Western federation, it has nevertheless decided to establish the " closest association " with the High Authority by sending a strong delegation which " will have the task of laying

[21] Treaty Draft, p. 49.

[22] Concealed cartel practices were reported from coal regions, where hoarding of coal and iron scrap was encouraged by the government.

[23] In 1951, coal production increased by 6 per cent in Western continental Europe as against 4 per cent in Eastern Europe and 3 per cent in Great Britain. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1951*, p. 65.

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the foundation for intimate and *enduring* association between the Community and the United Kingdom." Another, perhaps more decisive, factor is the readiness of the three more powerful member nations of the pool to extend the scope of the Schuman Plan and transform the Community into a political union. These governments, though conservative and traditionally nationalistic and particularistic, but motivated, no doubt, by fear of recurring crises and radical experiments, have now agreed to federalization, to accept a constitution drafted by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Schuman Plan Assembly, to establish a common parliament, and eventually to evolve a common monetary, tariff and defense system. Federalization would strengthen the Authority immeasurably if, as a result of intergovernmental unity, arising disputes could be settled on a regional rather than a nationalistic basis.

But even if the Authority succeeds in the internationalization (within the six-country pool) of coal and steel, and in eventually extending its control over all other basic resources, it is still faced with a formidable task. Cyclical fluctuations in steel consumption have, in the past, been far more violent than those in net industrial output. M. Monnet simplifies matters somewhat, when he declares that " for the foreseeable future, overproduction is out in Europe . . . we can expand with confidence." If military requirements are reduced, and " there is peace, the East will want steel." However, " if there is a real crisis of overproduction there will be quotas." [24] The French government took great pains to explain the difference between cartel practices and the proposed interventionist policies of the High Authority. It is true that cartel agreements were entered into secretly for the purpose of fixing prices, reducing output, dividing markets, and so on; but at a time of declining demand, and in the absence of direct government intervention, they attempted to bring some order into a chaos of price wars, dumping, and a high rate of business mortality.

The Schuman Plan organization may outlaw cartels in principle, but can it refrain from such practices if, during a recession, it is faced with a glut, and, consequently, with disastrously

[24] Interview with M. Monnet, *Fortune*, January 1952, p. 146.

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falling prices? "A cartel", says M. Monnet, "regards *any* oversupply as a potential crisis, and anticipates it with production controls to avoid competition."[25] The High Authority would, after recognizing "existing crises", take "appropriate measures" *openly*, such as production quotas, limitation of imports, and so on, when overproduction threatens. But if crises are continuous (as they are most likely going to be in the foreseeable future), it is the duty of the High Authority to "anticipate". One of the specific functions is to "carry on a permanent study of the market." One assumes that these studies are not meant to be merely exercises in statistics.

As long as massive buying for stock-piling and rearmament persists, as long as American funds continue to flow into Western Europe, building new strip mills, mechanizing coal production and modernizing industries in general, there is little concern over "existing crises"; for example, over the problem of added output and allocation. But if rearmament reaches a saturation point, possibly in two or three years, and if defense expenditures are subsequently curtailed abruptly, causing a sharp decline in demand, will the High Authority permit "normal market conditions" to deflate the existing price structure[26] (with consequences similar to the early 1930's)? Will it attempt to protect producers by freezing prices—an old cartel practice?

The proponents of the Schuman Plan claim that they, unlike cartelists, believe in continuous growth, continuous expansion. Statistical studies have proved that there is a direct relation between the growth rate of industry and the rate of reduction in real cost. If the cost of coal is kept high, they cannot have *sufficiently cheap* steel for returning normal market conditions. Cartels were held responsible for stunting industrial growth through price-fixing. We have here the same vicious circle. Price control in the interest of coal and steel consumers may lead

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] During 1951 average wholesale prices of hard coal continued to rise in coal-producing countries (12 per cent in Western Germany, 42 per cent in France). The effect upon coal-importing countries was a disproportionately higher increase, such as 72 per cent in Sweden and 79 per cent in Austria. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1951*, p. 66.

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to direct intervention, perhaps assuming the responsibility of managing the industries by the Authority. With controls over financing, production and marketing eventually centered in the city of Luxembourg, the High Authority would develop into a *Central Planning Board,* whose decisions based upon "anticipation" and definite plans would be binding upon all member firms, privately owned or nationalized. This is the kind of *dirigisme* which diverse groups such as the Third Force in France and the industrialists in the Ruhr district sought to avoid.[27]

Conclusion

The very novelty of this experiment makes its ultimate results hard to predict. Highly optimistic press releases from Strasbourg should be taken *cum grano salis.*[28] Federalization as proposed in Strasbourg will not in itself prevent recurrent economic crises. Resumption of East-West trade may, as M.

[27] The Ruhr industrialists objected to an Authority with coercive powers as *super-dirigisme.* They suggested instead the creation of a purely supervisory agency "leaving the initiative to management of the producers who are responsible for the destiny of their enterprises." *New York Times,* Jan. 27, 1951.

[28] Correspondents reporting from Strasbourg and editorial writers commenting on the "Monnet miracle" naïvely assume that once the Plan is put into effect a "common" "free" market will evolve, a market corresponding to the classical rules of competition. "To show how the system is designed to work," writes Harold Callender in the *New York Times* (June 21, 1952), "let us take the case of a steel mill in France. Under the Schuman plan it will be free to buy its coke anywhere in the six countries as if there were no frontiers. It will, in fact, buy it in Germany mostly. It will have before it the price lists of all producers in the area and will be free to *bargain with them* [italics mine], kowing that there cannot be any price-fixing agreements or double prices or subsidies to falsify selling rates. The steel mill will itself be subject to the same rules. . . ."

It would be heart-warming, indeed, to watch a little French steel mill bargain with a Ruhr producer over a ton of coal in a nineteenth-century setting of free competition under the ever-watchful aegis of the High Authority. But, as Mr. Callender explains, "If it [the High Authority] deems this desirable, it may fix minimum and maximum prices . . . it may fix production quotas . . . it may apportion the output among the states in times of shortage . . . it may impose fines", et cetera. A common market, perhaps, but is it free and competitive according to the rules? Like his confrères in Strasbourg, Mr. Callender, being carried away by his enthusiasm for the Plan, indulges in slight exaggerations and, consequently, though unwittingly, in slight contradictions. His endearing French steel mill owner studying "price lists of all producers" may find—unlike wine lists, of which journalists are particularly fond—only one price, fixed either by the Authority or by combines, if the Authority relaxes.

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Monnet suggested, relieve the West of some surpluses after the rearmament boom, but only in the short run. Detailed plans have been prepared by United Nations agencies, by authorized committees (and others) here and abroad, suggesting gigantic international development and welfare projects (Point 4, for example), programs for a steady increase in the standard of living, in both industrial and raw-material-producing countries, international agreements affecting the flow of raw materials and capital, regularization of consumption, et cetera—in short, an integrated economic system, of which the Western coal-steel pool would form but a small part. It remains to be seen whether these measures, if accepted, are effective in staving off a serious recession.

The architects of the Schuman Plan envisaged a Saint Simoniste type of " industrial system ", a " productive association " of all Europe evolving from the Schuman Plan organization. They are hard at work now in Strasbourg, in the Schuman Plan Assembly and its offspring, the Ad Hoc Assembly, laying the groundwork for a European federation. Perhaps the day is not far off when Victor Hugo's cherished dream of a " cantonized " Europe becomes feasible; when nations once hostile are (in the words of the late Lord Balfour) " so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and are so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of political conflict."

Today, a world state still remains a Utopian dream. To settle even a minor dispute member nations still resort to bilateral negotiations. Before they met officially, when the Council of Ministers (of the Community) convened last summer, Dr. Adenauer and M. Schuman had a *secret* talk regarding the status of the Saar!

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SWITZERLAND'S POSITION IN THE WORLD PEACE STRUCTURE

SOME people wonder whether Switzerland is anything more than a museum or a great vacation park for foreign tourists. While they do not question the nation's independent existence, they seem to think that Switzerland's foreign policy is anachronistic. Why did the Swiss not apply for membership in the United Nations? Why did they refuse to send a representative to the European Council? What is neutral Switzerland doing for the preservation of peace?

The answers to these questions, which have been frequently asked in recent years, are not easy. When we consider the magnitude of the present world crisis, the importance of the challenge with which the world is confronted and the innumerable difficulties in which the countries of Asia, of the Western hemisphere and of Europe are involved, we might be tempted to repeat with André Siegfried [1] the maxim of La Rochefoucauld: " C'est une grande folie de vouloir être sage tout seul."

I believe, however, that some sort of positive answer can be given; and that Switzerland, in spite of its neutrality, in spite of its smallness, makes its own contribution to the development of peaceful collaboration among the nations of the world.

* * * * * *

To begin with the smallest, but also the most natural, of its contributions, we shall mention the fact that Switzerland at least does not endanger peace and has not been, for a long time, a threat to any of its neighbors. In our era, when not only big states but even small nations have not always refrained from the use of arms for the defense of what they consider as their interests, I think that this readiness for peace and these pacific dispositions are important considerations.

An even more important contribution, however modest, is what I shall call Swiss self-reliance. This country is not a

[1] André Siegfried, *Switzerland: A Democratic Way of Life* (New York, 1950).

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burden on its neighbors. It is not a satellite of any foreign Power. It is not asking help from outside in order to maintain its standard of life, to defend its economic order, to make social experiments, or to build up its military strength. In 1952, as well as in 1939 or 1914, the Swiss are willing to pay the price, however high, for the maintenance of their way of life, their freedom, their independence. Fourteen years ago, at the time of Munich, Switzerland was, according to some estimates, "proportionally the best armed democracy in the world." We could not say the same today. But what should be pointed out is that, since 1945, Switzerland has not relaxed its effort to maintain its national defense. Every year about 400 million Swiss francs, nearly one fourth of the total government budget, have been appropriated for the army, and in March 1951 the Swiss Parliament voted a special credit of more than one billion Swiss francs in order to modernize its armaments.

The will to protect Switzerland from foreign interference is expressed even better by the personal contribution of every Swiss citizen to the defense of his country. If this nation of 4½ million inhabitants can mobilize in the short space of one or two days a lightly armed, but well-trained, army of about 500,000 men, it is because all its citizens are ready to go to the military school for a period of four months, when they are twenty, and later to leave their trade for regular three-week periods of training. It is also because hundreds of them are ready to serve voluntarily as noncommissioned officers or officers, to attend the special schools and courses and to devote a part of their time —for some of them several hours a week—to administrative work.

This concern of a small country for its army, a concern which does not go without a point of pride, could be taken as an expression of naïveté and blindness as to the facts of modern life. In our atomic age where only big and highly mechanized armies appear to be able to wage wars, there may seem to be something unrealistic in the stubborn attachment of the Swiss to their army as an efficient means of protecting their independence.

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I think, however, that the attitude of the Swiss should not be considered as one of blind disregard for reality. On the contrary, it seems to me that most of them are well aware of the danger that threatens the whole world and their country, and a proof of this awareness can be found in the widespread pessimism which has prevailed in Switzerland since the end of the war. The Swiss clearly appreciate how fortunate they are not to have been involved in any war for more than a century. They know that they owe this luck to the geographic position of their country which was not, like Belgium or the Netherlands, on the path of invasion and did not constitute for the belligerents an objective of strategic value. They do not ignore the rôle played by the natural defenses of the country. That is why they have repeatedly expressed their sympathy with the other nations that have been involved in wars and have always considered it their duty to give what help they could toward the reconstruction of other nations.

They cannot forget, however, that if they had not had an army, they would have been involved in war in 1914 and in 1940. At that time, the presence of even a small army at the national boundaries was a factor which the Germans had to take into account. They had to estimate in particular how many divisions they would have to use for an operation against Switzerland. And when they arrived at the conclusion that the price was too high for what the enterprise was worth, they abandoned this plan. That was for the Swiss proof that their army had performed its duty and that the price paid for it was not too high. Thus, after such an experience, it is not at all amazing to see the Swiss ready to pursue a costly policy of self-defense, although they are well aware that in case of an attack by a major Power, they would be eventually overrun. And while they do so, obeying the primitive instinct of self-protection, they make their own contribution to the maintenance of a small area of relative strength in which the big Powers do not have the temptation of entering into a struggle for a sphere of influence.

As we all know very well, however, military power or will for self-defense is not enough. What seems still more impor-

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tant, particularly during the present world crisis which could be characterized as a period of international civil war, is the ability of a nation to solve its political, social and economic problems; or, more generally speaking, its ability to solve its internal tensions and to reëstablish by institutional or social changes an equilibrium which is constantly modified by the changing factors in our life today.

In this respect, one must admit that Switzerland represents an interesting case as a kind of political experiment. Here, indeed, is a country which is a living, challenging paradox, as pointed out accurately by Charlotte Muret and Denis de Rougemont.[2] It is a fact, to follow these authors, that Switzerland "has concentrated and synthesized all the diversities of Europe itself" in one of the smallest territories of Europe and that "this very diversity, recognized, cultivated and humanized," is the background of its "stability". It is a fact also that Switzerland is an advanced democracy, but simultaneously a country attached to tradition. It is furthermore a fact that the standard of living is "one of the highest in Europe" despite a scarcity of natural resources.

How can we explain this unity in diversity? How can we explain that, despite the pressure exerted by great nations, despite the attraction of great cultures, despite strong currents of nationalism, the Swiss remain Swiss, that they stick together, that through centuries they have been able to preserve their way of life, their standard of living, and their existence as a nation?

There is always some element of chance in any historical success, and no one could deny that Switzerland owes its present privileged position partly to the fact that it was not involved in the last two wars.

But it would certainly be a mistake to underestimate the difficulties which the Swiss people have had to overcome in recent times as well as during past centuries. A politician of a small African nation who recently saw the future of his country assured by a kind of Swiss constitution "with a leader" was as far away from understanding Switzerland as a Swiss

[2] Denis de Rougemont and Charlotte T. Muret, *The Heart of Europe* (New York, 1941).

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author who declared that Switzerland was created in nine months and that Europe should not hesitate to follow at once its example.

Actually Switzerland was built through difficult experiments, internal crises, civil wars and revolutions. It is a product of a long historical process, the result of repeated attempts of generations to adapt their lives and their institutions to a geographic framework and to changing and challenging circumstances. From this point of view the 1450 settlement by arbitration of an old conflict between two cantons (Schwyz and Zürich), the mediation of the hermit Nicholas de Flue, after the wars of Burgundy, the negotiations between Catholics the Protestants in the sixteenth century, and the long struggle of the 1798-1848 period between federalists and unionists present a real interest for the student of peace, particularly to all those who are now working for a better understanding among the European nations.[3]

The history of the last century is no less interesting. To say that the Swiss Confederation was made in 1848 is not enough. More important is the fact that the Swiss were able to live as Swiss and to protect their freedom not only against possible interference from outside, but also against themselves; for the achievement of a new Constitution did not suppress all the causes of internal tensions. There remained the problem of relations between people speaking different languages, of collaboration between the federal state and the cantons. And these problems were made more acute by the economic and social changes which were bound to accentuate a general trend toward statism and centralization and to give new impulse to the struggle between federalists and unionists, while at the same time the pressure of foreign Powers and of modern nationalism was growing.

Why did they succeed? Certainly because a long habit of life in common had created a Swiss patriotism strong enough to overcome the attachment of every citizen to his canton, the conflicts between cantons, the difference of languages and culture, as well as to compensate for the attraction exerted by Germany

[3] See William Rappard, *Cinq siècles de sécurité collective* (Geneva, 1945).

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(before 1914) upon the German Swiss and by Paris upon the French Swiss. Actually they all considered the 1291 pact as their national charter, and the history of the small communities of Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden as a part of their history. But, beyond this patriotism, to the development of which the school and the army contributed, what kept the Swiss together was a sense of social and political responsibility, a sense of citizenship born out of life in small communities. To be a Swiss means to be a good citizen, to accept his responsibilities toward his community, toward his canton, toward his country, and to accept implicitly that the country cannot exist without the participation of all its citizens. Switzerland is for many Swiss a political entity which differs from France or Germany not only in its history or in its landscape, but also by virtue of the way of life —not standard of living—of its inhabitants and by the way they have learned to practice democracy. Thus, after having seen the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire, after having lived in safety through two world wars in which Germany was destroyed, France and Italy badly damaged, they cannot help feeling that they have succeeded. And this feeling contributes to reinforce their will to keep together and to follow their own course.

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The conclusion which could thus be drawn from these first remarks seems to be that Switzerland's contribution to the preservation of peace is an indirect one and that the country performs at least its mission, the mission of a small nation which exists in order to give its citizens the liberties which they need, without being a burden or a cause of worry for its neighbors.

The question now is whether or not Switzerland is able and willing to offer a more direct and positive contribution to the cause of peace.

Apparently its traditional neutrality bars it from any intervention in the field of international politics, and it does not seem that the Swiss are prepared to give up a principle observed for centuries and adopted as an "axiom" of their foreign policy; for they know, or at least they feel, that their neutrality is one of the conditions of their existence as a nation. Neutrality

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was not imposed upon the Swiss confederates by pressure from outside, but it grew as a consequence of divergences of interests and religions within the old Confederation. The danger of being divided, which was apparent enough at the end of the fifteenth century to lead Nicholas de Flue to recommend abstention from foreign war, became so evident after the Reformation that both sides realized that to take a stand in the European religious wars would mean the end of their country. The events which followed during the next centuries—the Thirty Years' War, the European wars of the Louis XIV period, and above all the crisis of the French Revolution—gave more reasons to the Swiss to hold to their neutrality, to define it more precisely and to implement it by the adoption of the principle of armed neutrality. No wonder that the Swiss delegates to the Congress of Vienna were instructed to ask for the recognition of Switzerland as a "free independent State governed by its own Constitution", but also for the recognition of its neutrality "which has at all times been the mainstay of Swiss policy, which has been faithfully preserved for three centuries and which has been proved indispensable by the events of the last sixteen years." To this request the great Powers answered in a positive way by a declaration which recognized that "the neutrality of Switzerland, the inviolability of her territory and her freedom from all external intervention are in the true interests of European policy as a whole."

Is this policy of neutrality still valid in the twentieth century? Most of the Swiss, after recent experiments, seem to believe so. The First World War, for instance, demonstrated very strongly that neutrality was not imposed by an external pressure, but still remained the only way to preserve the existence of the country which, otherwise, would have been divided into two antagonistic camps. In 1920, however, Switzerland tried to go a step further on the road toward active collaboration for collective security and to reconcile the principle of perpetual neutrality with membership in the League of Nations. The Federal Council at that time made a distinction between armed neutrality, which Switzerland would observe, and economic neutrality, which she could abandon for participation in

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possible economic sanctions. But the failure of the League of Nations led the Swiss government to decide in 1938 on a return to complete neutrality. Apparently this was a wise decision, since Switzerland survived the last war and the occupation of Europe by Germany.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1945 Switzerland was not prepared to apply for membership in the United Nations. There was much discussion, and there still is, about the United Nations or, above all, about the European Union, for the Swiss are well aware of the fact that they live in "one world". The choice is a difficult one. On one side there is a traditional policy of neutrality which has been successful up to now; on the other side there are organizations which do not give to the small nations a sufficient guarantee against foreign interference and the threat of big Powers. In an article of March 1948, *The Economist* made the point very sensibly:

> Would it not be expecting too much of their idealism and decidedly too little of their common sense, to believe that the generation of Swiss, which has survived two world wars unscathed, would be prepared to reverse it? In favor of what could they be tempted to do so? The United Nations, whose main characteristic is their fundamental disunion and whose charter does not even pretend to shield the weak against the strong? A European Union, that is either a western *bloc*, formed to protect one half of Europe against the other, or, for the tragic present at least, the idlest of day dreams?

In 1952, this statement remains true. Europe is not yet united nor is the European Council able to offer any guarantee of security to the participating nations. And if, on the other hand, the Korean war should strengthen the prestige of the United Nations, some time is still needed to appreciate the political value of the new "United Action for Peace" adopted by the General Assembly. One should not forget indeed that the inhabitants of Switzerland feel very acutely the fragility of their work. They know, better than outsiders, how difficult it was and still is to preserve the existence of the trilingual Confederation; hence a constant fear that, if they abandon a part of their sovereignty, their country will be in danger of being

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weakened by some decision taken by a majority of foreigners who do not understand the real meaning of " federalism " and pay no attention to differences created by traditions, geography, history or standard of life.

Should we draw the conclusion that the policy of Switzerland is one of abstention, of indifference to what is happening in the world, of a kind of Alpine isolationism? Not at all. On the contrary, Switzerland is one of the most " international " countries in Europe, one of the most open to the external world. First, this is so simply because it would not be possible for its 4½ million people to live on a small territory with limited natural resources if there were not intensive importation of foodstuffs and raw materials, more or less compensated by the export of manufactured goods and the revenue from tourists and from capital investment in foreign countries. But economic interest is not the only cause of Swiss internationalism. The Swiss does not like to live in a kind of intellectual isolationism. He is educated as a Swiss, but also as a European. He knows that his country, although not a part of Germany or France, is sharing their culture, participating in their intellectual life. He will react very strongly to what is happening in France, in Germany, in Italy, has discussed with passion French internal problems, resented as treason to German culture the rise of nazism. Neutrality for him is neutrality of the state, never neutrality of the individual, who has the right and even the duty to take a stand for one cause or another because he well knows that in the long run his country will be affected by events happening in Europe and in the world.

This interest in the life of the outside world, and the fear of intellectual and moral isolationism which could be the result of neutrality, have led the Swiss to look for some means of demonstrating their will to participate in the building of a better world. Too weak to play a rôle in international politics and to prevent conflict between great Powers, they more and more considered it their duty to help in easing the plight of the world. The conflict between neutrality and internationalism was thus solved or overcome by the conception of a humanitarian mission, the best expression of which is the

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International Red Cross, with its headquarters in Geneva and a personnel recruited only among Swiss citizens. But the International Red Cross is not the only manifestation of this Swiss humanitarianism. The feeling that something had to be done to help other people, and to make them understand that Swiss neutrality was not indifference, found various and frequent expressions during the recent wars by the sending of relief across the border and the visits of many foreign children to Switzerland. After the last war, moreover, the foundation of the *Don Suisse à l'Europe* was considered as the best means for Switzerland to demonstrate its willingness to contribute to world reconstruction and to the establishment of peaceful coöperation between nations.

Moreover, Switzerland is so well aware of the danger of being imprisoned in its neutrality, which is after all only one means among others to preserve its independence, that it does not neglect any occasion for making effective, whenever possible, its participation in an international organization. As a study published in a *Foreign Policy Report* put it recently: "The Swiss tendency to march alone is modified by willingness to take part in humanitarian, economic and judicial organizations calculated to improve the situation of all nations without war." Thus, Switzerland, while being the seat of many nongovernmental and governmental organizations, is now a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Court of Justice, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the International Postal Union, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and even the Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

It would be too difficult and probably too early to make an appraisal of the value of the Swiss contribution to these various international organizations, inasmuch as this contribution is more or less dependent upon the personal efforts of the Swiss representatives. More important would it be to stress the gen-

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eral trend which this willingness to collaborate reveals. Switzerland, while not yet ready to abandon its neutrality, makes plain that it has decided to coöperate in the development of an international community. During the present period of uncertainty it does not give up a policy which was successful, but tries to amend it by an ever more positive attitude toward international organizations. As the Federal Council pointed out in its message of August 20, 1948 to the Federal Assembly about the O.E.E.C. Convention:

> Being situated in the heart of Europe, our country dare not allow itself to become economically isolated, nor ignore what goes on outside its borders. Within the limits of its power, which is not great, our country must join in the efforts that are now under way to attempt the reconstruction of the Continent and to set up for this task a régime of mutual understanding, a condition of stability and peace. Our status as neutrals forbids us to take part in any political alliance, whether open or disguised, but it does not prevent us—indeed the sense of solidarity which is the natural counterpart of this same neutrality compels us—to take part in the economic rehabilitation of Europe. As has been justly remarked, " Switzerland seems almost as if fated by its geographical situation, as well as prepared by its history, to fulfill the international duties closest to the root idea of neutrality, and to strip off the character of selfish privilege which is usually imputed to her by her neighbors when at war."

Thus, a definition of Switzerland's foreign policy which would limit itself to a few words about its neutrality could not be considered accurate; for the Swiss government as well as the Swiss people consider that solidarity is the natural complement of neutrality, the only means of giving it a positive value, the only way to reconcile the need for security of a small nation with the promotion of an international community. Therefore it is not surprising that the United Nations have a strong support in this neutral country, and that in some Swiss who were ardent supporters of the League of Nations the hope remains that the other nations will eventually recognize that a neutral status is not incompatible with membership in the UN.

Such a suggestion would have been condemned a few years

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ago. There was at that time no place in the United Nations for a state which does not participate fully and share all the responsibilities. But some incidents, and mostly the Korean war, have demonstrated that such an interpretation of the Charter by many countries has been very extensive. It is interesting to note that states which in June 1950 voted for the condemnation of the aggressor in Korea and which supported a resolution commending the intervention of United Nations forces did not consider it their duty to participate in a military action. More recently the discussion of the so-called "United Action for Peace" revealed that some member states are not yet ready to assume military commitments which are, however, set forth by the Charter and that they do consider that a kind of military neutrality is not incompatible with their quality as UN members.

From these facts one could be tempted to draw the conclusion that the contribution of every nation to the preservation of peace does not have to be the same, but, on the contrary, can vary according to its geographical position, its size, its possibilities. There are no Swiss battalions in Korea, but there is a representative of the International Red Cross. Although this representative was prevented by the North Korean Communists from having access to prisoner camps, he was at least able to report on the condition of Communist prisoners of war on the United Nations side and to refute the accusations which were made by Communist propaganda against the American Army. There can be no doubt that, by this fact, he helped to strengthen the moral position of the great country which had taken the leadership in the struggle for collective security. There can also be no doubt that the value of this report in the eyes of representatives of other nations depended upon the reputation for accuracy and objectivity acquired by the International Red Cross whose independence and disinterestedness are possible largely because it is established in a neutral country.

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To the great nations goes leadership with its honors, but also its risks and its burdens. The small nations have to find satisfaction in the achievement of more modest missions, the first of

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which is the preservation of their own freedom. In this respect any discussion about Swiss neutrality should not prevent the author from emphasizing again what is, in his opinion, the main contribution of his country to peace: its determination to protect its independence. Switzerland pursues a policy of limited risk while trying to collaborate in international organization without making political commitments. But one can be sure that if the attempts made since the war to promote a system of collective security and peaceful collaboration between the nations should fail, this country will resist any attack upon its independence and any country which threatens the principles and values essential to the Western civilization to which Switzerland belongs.

JACQUES FREYMOND

LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND

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IMPACT OF WARS ON RELIGION

THE Second World War seems to have brought about a widespread religious revival, at least in so far as it relates to politics. Many continental countries are now dominated by parties emphasizing their allegiance to religious doctrine. The De Gasperi régime has incorporated the main provisions of the Lateran Treaty of 1929 into the democratic constitution of post-war Italy. The Catholic orientation of the French Popular Republican party and the religious coloring of Adenauer's Christian Democratic following are likewise uncontested. One need but add the influence of religiously oriented parties in the Low Countries and the evident strengthening of the religious element in the public life of such "neutrals" as Spain and Portugal, to note the far-reaching effects of this religious revival on the political structure of almost all continental Western Europe.

During the Second World War, and in the post-war years, even the Soviet Union has greatly toned down its antireligious policies. Although the "peoples' democracies", under the impact of Soviet imperialism, have for the most part seen fit to persecute the Catholic Church and its hierarchy, indeed to view the Vatican as one of the world's major anti-Communist forces, the Soviet régime has long since made peace with its Greek Orthodox Church. This reconciliation, under way ever since the first war clouds had begun gathering on Russia's horizon after Hitler's rise to power, reached its climax in the installation of the new Patriarch of the Russian Church in 1945. This installation, performed with great pomp in Moscow with the participation of leading ecclesiastics of most Eastern churches, received the full blessing of the Stalin régime. In fact, Patriarch Alexis was soon thereafter encouraged to make a pastoral tour through the Balkans and the Near East, a tour which was to serve Russia's imperialist aims as much as the ecclesiastical interests of its national Church.

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In the Anglo-Saxon countries the political impact has been less noticeable, although even in the United States observers have noted many signs of weakening of the rigid separation between state and church. All students, moreover, agree that whatever its political influence, the revived interest in religion has made itself felt in education, literature, the arts, and many walks of social life.

While some sort of religious revival is thus uncontested, its extent and duration remain debatable. One is readily reminded of the early years of the great American depression, when many observers claimed to have noted an intimate correlation between economic adversity and increased attendance at church services. This observation may have been colored, however, by the often postulated nexus between religion and "hard times", inherited from medieval ascetics and modern Puritans. Perhaps there is some merit in the suggestion, yet to be fully explored, that there are periodic swings in religious attitudes as there are in economic life. "Probably there is a cycle", remarked Rev. Romanzo Adams of Honolulu, "in the changes that take place in the religious experience of a people, but it covers a much longer period than does the business cycle." [1]

Are we, then, merely in another phase of that spiritual cycle which happened to coincide with World War II and its aftermath? Or is it a very special constellation which has made living Western man despair of the rational and humanistic solutions because of his keen disappointment with the millennial promises held out either by nineteenth-century liberalism or by twentieth-century communism, fascism or Nazism? True, many thinking persons have been impressed by the resistance offered by churches under totalitarian régimes. They saw how quickly the press, the universities, and the labor unions surrendered to the Hitler régime in 1933 and were *gleichgeschaltet* almost with no opposition, and how the churches alone, both Catholic and Protestant, put up a struggle; not to mention members of the Jewish faith, those tragic victims of the Nazi onslaught. This struggle, though not as strong and consistent

[1] In a private letter to Samuel C. Kincheloe, communicated in the latter's *Research Memorandum on Religion in the Depression*, Social Science Research Council Bulletin 33 (New York, 1937), p. 57.

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as some outsiders may have wished it to be, was nevertheless a significant deterrent to the all-embracing uniformity of Nazi totalitarianism. Obviously, religion was not altogether that "private affair of the individual" which many liberals and socialists had long thought it to be.

Answers to these complex problems could be given only by the intensive collaboration of scholars from different fields, using refined sociological and psychological techniques, alongside of the more traditional methods of literary and theological disciplines. These combined efforts must be supported by comprehensive historical investigations which alone will enable us to discern how much of the new findings are but the result of a special concatenation of contemporary circumstances and how much is the more or less permanent effect of interrelations between war and religion.[2]

Nature of Conflict

We must always bear in mind the important difference between wars among belligerents of the same faith and such as were fought by nations professing different religions. In the latter case religion itself often became an instrument of war, since by fanning religious fanaticism each state could hope to increase its army's will to fight. In ancient times, particularly,

[2] Unfortunately the historian is confronted simultaneously by a bewildering richness and variety of primary sources and monographs on related subjects and an extreme dearth of studies directly relevant to our inquiry. On the one hand, in *The War and Religion: A Preliminary Bibliography of Material in English,* Marion J. Bradshaw listed almost 2,000 items relating to the First World War alone and published before January 1, 1919. Similarly prolific had been the output in French, German and other languages; and of course a great deal more was added since 1919. On the other hand, only the following three monographs have proved directly helpful to the present writer: Karl Holl, "Die Bedeutung der grossen Kriege für das religiöse und kirchliche Leben innerhalb des deutschen Protestantismus", *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte* (Tübingen, 1928), III, 302-84 (concentrating on the Thirty Years' War and the German Wars of Liberation and their impact on German literature and German-Protestant theology); Otto Baumgarten, *et al., Die geistigen und sittlichen Wirkungen des Krieges in Deutschland* (New Haven, 1927); and Ray H. Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms* (New York, 1933) (both relating only to the First World War). Despite his attempt at a purely sociological inquiry, however, Abrams has presented evidence mainly for an indictment of the vast majority of the clergy for their surrender to war hysteria. Like Baumgarten and his associates, moreover, Abrams is more concerned with what religious leaders had done for the war than with what war had done to religion.

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armed conflicts between nations were considered also combats between their respective deities. A victorious nation usually claimed that its gods, too, had been victorious and sometimes demanded the religious, as well as the political, surrender of the vanquished population.

Even more emphatic was the religious conflict in outright wars of religion. Initiated, as it seems, by the Maccabean Wars, these ideological, as well as political, struggles generated the idea of religious martyrdom superimposed upon that of death on the battlefield in fulfillment of a patriotic duty. This blend of political and religious sacrifice was refined by Mohammed, and deeply permeated the conquering hosts of expanding Islam. In reaction thereto the great European Crusades likewise became wars of religion in which the propelling political and economic forces appeared totally submerged under the religious façade. Later, the Thirty Years' War quickly uncovered the mutual jealousies among the Protestant Powers and their wish to benefit from the discomfiture of their coreligionists. Before long a cardinal (Richelieu) led his Catholic country into an alliance with the Protestant enemies of the Catholic Habsburgs. Nevertheless, here too it was the flame of hatred fed by religious intolerance which threatened to consume all of Germany in unprecedented devastation. Clearly, the reciprocal effects of such wars on contemporary religious beliefs and practices were equally profound.

More relevant to our inquiry are, therefore, wars among adherents of the same faith. Such were the hostilities between Israel and Judah, those between the Greek city-states or between countries within the orbits of either medieval Christendom or Islam. True, each Greek city-state had patron deities of its own, but so great was the overriding unity of the Hellenic religion that even the Peloponnesian War had none of the earmarks of a religious conflict. Thucydides, the great historian of that war, may have deplored the death of one Nicias who "least deserved to meet with such calamity, because of his course of life that had been wholly regulated in accordance with virtue," and admitted that by crossing a frontier one was immediately placed under another god, but he did not allow the religious element to infringe upon his purely secular explanation of the factors

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operating during the war.[3] Perhaps it was this very absence of intense religious feelings during that great conflict which induced its famous narrator to give a purely secular interpretation of history, and thereby to depart from Herodotus and all other known predecessors. This new approach, as we know, revolutionized all subsequent historical writing.

Similarly, the endless wars among medieval states professing the same Catholic religion were not fought over principally religious issues despite medieval man's overriding concern with matters pertaining to his faith. Modern romantics to the contrary, medieval wars recurred with distressing regularity. Spring was often called but the season in which kings went to war. The devastating Hundred Years' War, exceptional even then, was not condemned as a matter of principle but, on the contrary, produced one of the greatest patriotic saints in history, Joan of Arc.[4]

Contemporary rationalizations are, therefore, of very great interest. Heinrich Finke, the distinguished historian of medieval Spain, once claimed that Christianity was the first to introduce the idea of a "just" war into the world. This theory is debatable, for we find an early Jewish distinction between wars "in fulfillment of a commandment" as opposed to "wars of choice", and many Graeco-Roman attempts to justify a particular campaign or even war in general. One may readily admit, however, that "holy" wars became characteristic of the more exclusive medieval monotheistic religions, rather than of the more tolerant and all-embracing polytheistic faiths of antiquity. Justification of war as a "holy" or even "just" war is in the ultimate sense derived from some religious preconception. No wonder, then, that awareness of this problem reciprocally influenced also the religious feelings of combatants.[5]

[3] *Cf.* Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, II, 71; VII, 86, in the English translation by Charles Forster Smith (London, 1919-23), I, 389-390; IV, 177.

[4] *Cf.* Alfred Vanderpol's detailed analysis of *Le Droit de guerre d'après les théologiens et les canonistes du moyen-âge* (Paris, 1911).

[5] Mishnah Sotah VIII, 7; Sanhedrin I, 5; Heinrich Finke, *Der Gedanke des gerechten und heiligen Krieges in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit* (Freiburg i. B., 1915), p. 15. A modern Catholic apologist enumerated seven criteria of a "just war";

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For the sake of greater clarity, however, most of the illustrations in the following remarks will be limited to three major wars, all of them of a religiously fairly neutral character: (1) the Roman-Jewish War of 66-70; (2) the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; and (3) the First World War. These wars seem to be particularly significant for our theme because they all marked important turning points in history, because they had long-range and enduring effects on religion though the issues involved in them were not primarily religious, and, last but not least, because we have a considerable number of data left behind by contemporaries.

The mixed character of the Roman-Jewish War requires perhaps some further elucidation. On its face this was a religious war between the monotheistic, messianically inspired Jews, led by a religiously fanatical Zealotic party, and polytheistic Romans who likewise cherished a semimessianic belief in the manifest destiny of their empire. Many Jews believed that Daniel's apocalyptic visions of the four beasts applied to the successive empires of Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome. They felt that the Roman Empire, " dreadful and terrible, and strong exceedingly ", would soon be succeeded by the reign of a son of man whom God would entrust with " domination and glory and kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages should serve him." On the other hand, most Romans, too, believed, with Pliny the Elder, that Italy had been chosen " by the providence of the gods to make heaven itself more glorious, to unite scattered empires . . . to give mankind civilization, and in a word to become throughout the world the single fatherland of all the races." [6]

The particular encounter of 66 A.D. might well have been delayed, however. Certainly the religious leaders of the Jewish

John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition and the Law of Nations* (London, 1935), p. 331. *Cf.* also Robert Regout, S. J., *La Doctrine de la guerre juste de Saint Augustin à nos jours* (Paris, 1935).

[6] Daniel 7:2 *et seq.*; Pliny, *Historia naturalis*, III, 5.39, in the English translation by H. Rackham (London, 1938), II, 31 *et seq.* *Cf.* also Albert Zwaenepoel, " L'inspiration religieuse de l'impérialisme romain ", *Antiquité classique*, XVIII (1949), 5-23; and Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (Rev. ed., New York, 1952), II, 89 *et seq.*

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people, whether Pharisee or Saducee, as well as King Agrippa II and his counselors, were all opposed to the revolt against Rome. So were many sectarian groups, including the generally pacifist Essenes and the nascent Christian Church. As a matter of fact, a century and a quarter earlier Judea had been taken over by Pompey almost without resistance. True, even at that time Cicero voiced the regnant opinion of ancient imperialists concerning the divine will which had led to the subjugation of Judea. Four years after Pompey's occupation, the famous Roman jurist pleaded before the Senate,

> Even while Jerusalem was standing and the Jews were at peace with us, the practice of their sacred rites was at variance with the glory of our empire, the dignity of our name, the customs of our ancestors. But now it is even more so, when that nation by its armed resistance has shown what it thinks of our rule; how dear it was to the immortal gods is shown by the fact that it has been conquered, let out for taxes, made a slave.[7]

Nevertheless the War of 63 B.C., and even that of 66 to 70 A.D., were principally political conflicts. In the latter, the dissatisfaction of the masses with Rome's fiscal exploitation decidedly overshadowed the religious disparity in importance.

The wars initiated by the French Revolution at times likewise assumed a religious coloring. The religious policies of the Revolutionary government, France's progressive alienation from the Catholic Church, and her increasingly radical reforms climaxed in the Religion of Reason—all contributed much to the bitterness of the struggle. On the other hand, the insolent manifesto issued by the Duke of Brunswick upon his entry into France at the head of the Allied armies added much fuel to the antireligious agitation. Internally, too, the levy of 300,000 soldiers for the Revolutionary armies was the final spark for the revolt in the Vendée, which ultimately broke the back of the antireligious movement. For many years country priests preached against the war as detrimental to both the French religion and society. On the other hand, the interventionist propaganda of French

[7] Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, XXVIII, 69, in his *Speeches*, translated by Louis E. Lord (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), p. 441.

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émigrés, particularly from among the so-called refractory clergy, also injected much religious venom into the war. The 8,000 French priests—more than a quarter of all refugee priests—who settled for a time in England doubtless added fuel to the English people's growing hostility to the Revolution.

Only with the advent of Napoleon and the subsequent Concordat of 1801 between France and the Papacy were the religious problems shoved into the background. They nevertheless continued to color both the French and the Allied domestic and international policies. Gneisenau, as well as Schleiermacher, realized that here was a great ideological conflict cutting across all national boundaries. "Two parties", the latter exclaimed, "seem to oppose each other with undisguised hostility in all states, two historical eras oppose each other among all nations." [8] This clash of ideas, religious and political, flared up anew under the French Restoration and the European system of the Holy Alliance.

Nor was the religious issue quite negligible during the First World War. Viewed superficially, it should have played no rôle whatsoever. Predominantly Protestant Germany, Catholic Austria, Greek Orthodox Bulgaria and Muslim Turkey were allied against practically the entire rest of the world which included the religiously heterogeneous British Empire and Shintoist Japan. Christians of all denominations and Jews fought on both sides at all fronts; and yet, the propaganda machines of all belligerent nations, now put into high gear, exploited to the full the religious differences as well. The Ottoman Empire called for a *jihad* (holy war) against the "unbelieving" Allies, even though the latter included more Muslims in India and North Africa than lived in the Ottoman Empire itself. Although appealing for domestic religious peace with Catholics and Jews, the Russian government tried to rally the Greek Orthodox majority around the "Little Father" in St. Petersburg, head of both their Empire and their Church. Even the Western Allies tried to whip up enthusiasm against the Kaiser's worshipers of the anti-Christian virtue of "blood and iron". Exaggerating certain

[8] Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, *Predigten* (Berlin, 1843), IV, 675. *Cf.* also Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (Munich, 1928), p. 176.

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manifestations of German science and philosophy, they tried to prove that the Germans were really pagans or followers of a pantheistic doctrine, rather than Evangelical or Catholic Christians.

Warrior's Faith

Numerous essays have been written on the influence of war on actual combatants during the two World Wars, though none is based upon objective psychological tests. Even in the United States forces during World War II, where psychological testing reached a high degree of refinement, the usual nine tests did not include any concerning the moral and spiritual make-up of the individual soldier or sailor. Our main sources of information, therefore, remain, next to direct observation, letters sent home from the front. These showed, indeed, that being uprooted from one's customary environment and the imminence of death often produced a religious awakening among previously agnostic or only superficially religious persons. Confirmed believers found their convictions intensified in the crucible of war. Outward conformity, moreover, also in the religious sphere, was promoted by the general military discipline.

In many other cases war produced opposite effects. Constant violence and bloodshed awakened in many men dormant sadistic impulses and helped remove their customary inhibitions. External conformity here often went hand in hand with acts of lawlessness and the breakdown of ethics particularly in the sexual sphere. Already in 1915 Alfred Loisy protested against overoptimistic assertions that there "had come to France a marvelous revival of faith."[9]

Apart from this evident polarity one must bear in mind that letters from the front were generally attuned to the prevailing views at home and were most articulate with respect to emotions

[9] *Cf.* the judicious analysis in his *Guerre et religion* (Paris, 1915), pp. 82 *et seq.* Similar conclusions were reached by the German pastor, W. Veit, the English chaplain, F. R. Barry, and others. *Cf.* Veit's "Busse" in *Die Religion im Krieg, Frankfurter Vorträge* (Frankfurt, 1914), p. 23; and Barry's "Faith in the Light of War" in *The Church in the Furnace*, ed. by F. B. Macnutt (London, 1918), p. 35. These experiences were confirmed by observations during the Second World War, reported by John E. Johnson in "The Faith and Practice of the Raw Recruit" in *Religion of Soldier and Sailor*, ed. by William L. Sperry (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), pp. 42-67.

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and behavior considered laudable by the recipients. One may discount, particularly, the pious assertions intended for the comfort of the families left behind. Moreover, most of the letters examined, particularly those considered worthy of publication, stemmed from the more sensitive, often exceptional, intellectuals. These lent themselves admirably to poetic exaggeration, even outright propaganda, as in the booklet by Maurice Barrès.[10] But they need not have been representative at all of the rank and file of soldiers and sailors. Together with some obvious biases of most investigators, this limitation has proved a serious drawback for the few psychological studies published soon after the First and Second World Wars.[11]

One wishes that studies of this kind were available also for earlier wars. We possess a great many letters from participants in the Napoleonic Wars, including those of that perennial letter writer, Napoleon himself. In one of his epistles, for example, the then young general Bonaparte confessed that constant danger made him a fatalist rather than a believer. "My permanent state of mind", he wrote to his brother Joseph in 1795, "is that of a soldier on the eve of battle. I have come to the conclusion that, since a chance meeting with death may end it all at any minute, it is stupid to worry about anything."[12] Diaries and memoirs could likewise be used to good advantage. If the German pastor, Heinrich Möwes, for example, later reminisced that before the battle at Ligny he had not taken part in any church service, and probably had not prayed at all, his recollection may well have reflected the religiously rather lackadaisical attitude of many German soldiers during the early campaigns.[13]

[10] Barrès, *The Faith of France: Studies in Spiritual Differences and Unity*, translated by Elisabeth Marbury, with a Foreword by Henry Van Dyke (Boston, 1918).

[11] *Cf.*, e.g., Raymond Dreiling, *Das religiöse und sittliche Leben der Armee unter dem Einfluss des Weltkrieges: Eine psychologische Untersuchung* (Paderborn, 1922); *Religion among American Men: As Revealed by a Study of Conditions in the Army* (New York, 1920); W. L. Sperry, *op. cit.*

[12] *Mémoires et Correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph*, compiled by A. Du Casses (Paris, 1853-54), I, 141; in the English translation by J. M. Thompson in his selection of *Letters of Napoleon* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 17-18.

[13] "The solemnity of the battle", Möwes wrote, "did not drive me to Him. I do not recollect even offering up one prayer. We were called up before the engagement

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Beginning with Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach,[14] many observers have also rightly emphasized the importance of another psychological factor, boredom. The dramatic moments of battle are usually preceded and followed by days, weeks and even months of inactivity during which the soldier's mind is apt to turn to spiritual, as well as to material, preoccupations. This was particularly true in the case of the trench warfare of 1914-18, in which boredom alternated with danger in endless succession.

In many ways different was the attitude of soldiers and sailors stationed behind the lines, or while in training. Here the element of personal danger appeared more remote, although sensitive or fearsome individuals often envisaged the gruesomeness of warfare even more vividly there than while they were in action. Distractions were also more numerous, temptations very great. On the other hand, the military discipline and the pressure of public opinion induced a great many young men who had never gone to church before to attend services and to participate in other religious functions. True, agnostics were not forced into the fold. But, except among socialists and other determined freethinkers, resistance to moderate religious conformity was generally weak.

Here we have to consider the historic rôle of military chaplaincy. A comprehensive history of the part played by chaplains in modern armies is much needed by itself and also for the light it would shed on the general impact of religion on war and vice versa. Apart from official chaplains, clergymen and students of theology often served as soldiers themselves. "Yale's records show", Professor Henry Hallam Tweedy informs us, "that there is scarcely a campaign of note, or an important battle in American history, in which her sons among the clergy did not share the hardships and dangers of the soldier's lot."[15]

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to receive the sacrament. I let my friend, whose side I had never before left, go up without me. I could not then comprehend of what use it could be to me." Cited in *Memoir of the Late Rev. Henry Möwes*, with an introduction by Rev. J. Davies (London, 1890), p. 7.

[14] Gerlach, *Aufzeichnungen aus seinem Leben und Wirken 1795-1877*, ed. by Jakob von Gerlach (Schwerin, 1903), I, 64.

[15] Tweedy, "The Ministry and the War" in *Religion and the War*, ed. by E. Hershey Sneath (New Haven, 1918), pp. 88-89.

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Some countries like the United States or Austria-Hungary exempted theological students from active service, but others, including Germany and France, entrusted only a minority of the clergy with official chaplaincies, whereas the rest served as regular officers or soldiers. Early in the First World War it was estimated that there were more than 25,000 clerics in French uniform alone. These comrades in arms doubtless influenced their respective coreligionists in a different, but no less direct, fashion.

On the other hand, religious, as well as patriotic, enthusiasm often wore off in the course of a long campaign. "At the beginning of a war," Bertrand Russell warned in January 1915, "each nation, under the influence of what is called patriotism, believed that its own victory is both certain and of great importance to mankind." [16] During the French Revolutionary Wars, to be sure, only the French armies were aroused to patriotic and semireligious—even if at first antireligious—frenzy, whereas the Coalition armies long went about their work matter-of-factly. In the last years of the Napoleonic régime, however, the enthusiasm of the French soldiers, even more of the home front, greatly cooled off, and it was the turn for the Russians during the invasion of 1812, and the Germans during the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14, to be inspired with great national and religious zeal. Once having expelled the enemy from their own country, however, the Russian armies which pursued Napoleon into Germany and France lost much of that zest. The German armies of liberation were perhaps saved from losing their ardent religious, as well as national, fanaticism only by the relatively short duration of the campaign.

In the First World War, the great élan of the first year of war, nurtured in part by the prevailing belief that it would last only a very short time, gradually gave way to a feeling of despondency among millions of Frenchmen, Germans, Austrians and Russians. In Russia, particularly, the revolutionary agitation within the armed forces assumed a strongly antireligious coloring because of the deep interlocking of the Russian state and the Russian Church. Ultimately, the armed forces themselves overthrew the Tsarist régime, making way, first, for the

[16] Russell, *Justice in War Times* (Chicago, 1916), p. 23.

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liberal and, later, for the Communist Revolution. The latter immediately proceeded to implement its antireligious program which provoked the memorable outburst of Patriarch Tikhon in January 15, 1918, marking the definitive break between the Church and the Revolution. Less dramatically, but no less deeply, the German armies felt an upsurge of antireligious feeling during the last difficult and increasingly hopeless war years.

On the Home Front

The effects of wars on the religious life at home were no less marked. Many wives, parents or children of combatants often found their way to religion even if they had had none before. True, there were some embittered citizens who, especially during World War I, queried why religion, and more particularly Christianity, had not prevented the wholesale destruction of human lives. But, as Dean Charles Reynolds Brown of the Yale School of Religion remarked, those who thus questioned the integrity of the churches unwittingly paid a fine compliment to religion. No one asked, remarked Dean Brown, as to why science, big business, newspapers, or universities had not prevented the war. Only Christianity, or religion in general, was held at least theoretically capable of sufficiently restraining human belligerence.[17] Whether or not echoing such sentiments, most persons unquestioningly repaired to their churches to pray for their beloved at the front, and to give vent to their pent-up emotions. In dramatic moments, before and after decisive battles or at the conclusion of the Armistice, most churches were crowded beyond their capacity.

True, such reports, though attested with a fair degree of unanimity, lack solid statistical support. Before long, war fatigue began affecting church attendance, too, and, from 1916 on, Evangelical church bodies in Germany voiced increasing concern over the decline of public participation in services which, in many areas, had fallen below that of 1914. Certainly observers impressed by thousands attending churches may easily have overlooked other thousands who had remained at home. We know how generally inadequate have been religious statistics

[17] Brown, "Moral and Spiritual Forces in the War" in Sneath, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

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of the United States despite the decennial censuses of religious bodies. (Unfortunately, even that modicum of information is no longer given for 1947 when the United States Congress, in one of its rare economy moves, cut out the necessary appropriation.) But even in those countries where data on religious affiliation are included in regular population censuses, statistical studies concerning the ratio of regular or irregular participants in religious functions during war or peace are woefully inadequate. We possess practically no quantitative measurements, extremely difficult but not impossible, of the more subtle changes in inward religious emotions at times of crisis.

Fuller studies of the impact of war on inter-faith relations are likewise indicated. As soon as the French Revolution realized that its antireligious policies were greatly undermining its military strength, it quickly made peace with the " refractory " churches. Just as the outbreak of the revolt in the Vendée and adjacent districts can be traced back to the levy of soldiers for the Revolutionary armies, so was their pacification in many ways the direct effect of the war's exigencies. Napoleon's entire policy of reconciliation with the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths was in the ultimate sense dictated by his military-imperialistic aims.

> My policy is [he declared in 1800] to govern men as the greatest number of them wish to be governed. That is, I think, the way to recognize the sovereignty of the people. It was this principle that made a Catholic of me when I had finished the war of Vendée, made a Mussulman of me when I had established myself in Egypt; made an Ultramontane of me when I had gained the good will of Italy. If I governed a Jewish people, I should reestablish the temple of Solomon.[18]

On the other hand, he was perfectly prepared to make use of inner religious dissensions in enemy countries. In his letter of April 21, 1807 to his Minister of Police, Joseph Fouché, he wrote, " I want you to get up a great agitation, especially in the provin-

[18] Boulay de la Meurthe, *Documents sur la négociation du concordat . . . en 1800 et 1801* (Paris, 1891), I, 77; Henry H. Walsh, *The Concordat of 1801* (New York, 1933), p. 85 n. 17.

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cial press of Brittany, Vendée, Piedmont, and Belgium against the persecutions which the Irish Catholics are suffering at the hands of the Anglican church." At the same time he enjoined the minister to speak very tactfully of the Anglican, rather than the Protestant, Church, " for there are Protestants in France, but there are no Anglicans." [19] His grandiose gesture in convoking a Jewish Sanhedrin, some seventeen centuries after the dissolution of that ancient institution, was intended to serve the double purpose of domestic pacification and of undermining the internal cohesion of enemy countries. It so impressed the Austrian and Russian emperors that they forbade their Jewish subjects to send delegates to Paris. In Russia it even led directly to the suspension of the expulsion of Jews from rural districts which was then under way.[20]

Napoleon's daring religious policies baffled his enemies, particularly among the German nationalists. Schleiermacher was convinced that the emperor was toying with the idea of reunion of the two churches. " I should like ", he exclaimed in August 1806, " to challenge the most powerful man on earth to try to put this thing over, too, for everything is but a game to him." Four months later, however, he felt that Napoleon, who loathed " Protestantism as much as he hated speculative philosophy," would soon initiate a religious war and encounter the invincible resistance of Northern Germany. This would, indeed, be a holy war for the Germans—not so much for the German states which, not being " cosmopolitan entities ", had a foremost duty of safeguarding the interests of their subjects, as for the German people, which would defend its religious and scientific as well as its political ideals. Fichte, too, argued that Napoleon's attempt to establish a universal monarchy ran counter to the divinely

[19] Thompson, *Letters of Napoleon*, p. 193. On the same day Napoleon ordered his Minister of Cults, Jean Etienne Portalis, to find a bishop who would recommend to the churches " to institute prayers for our brethren, the persecuted Irish Catholics, and that they may enjoy the liberty of their worship." *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* (Paris, 1858-70), XV, 126. *Cf.* also his earlier letters to the Pope and the Minister of War, Gen. Bertier, dated Jan. 13, 1804, *ibid.*, pp. 194 *et seq.*

[20] N. M. Gelber, " La Police autrichienne et le Sanhédrin de Napoléon ", *Revue des études juives*, LXXXIII (1927), 1-21, 131-45; S. M. Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, English translation (Philadelphia, 1916), I, 346 *et seq.*

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ordained national and cultural variations. To an ultranationalist like Ernst Moritz Arndt, finally, Napoleon's empire was the very embodiment of Augustine's *civitas terrena,* to which he sought to oppose "German freedom, a German God, German faith without a scoff." [21]

The First World War started with an effort to unite all national forces. The *Burgfrieden,* proclaimed by the German war administration, contrasted sharply with the previous residua of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf,* the sharp anti-Polish policies in the eastern provinces, and the traditional discrimination against Jews in officers' corps and higher governmental posts. Tsar Nicholas II, too, immediately suspended his administration's traditional anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish measures. He appealed, in particular, to the Catholic Poles, strategically located at the front lines, to let bygones be bygones. He who is said to have spent more than 12,000,000 rubles of his private funds on financing the printing and distribution of anti-Semitic literature, now, through his mouthpiece, the Generalissimo Nicolai Nicolaievich, appealed in a manifesto addressed "To My Beloved Jews" for the latter's unstinting collaboration in the war effort. Such closing of ranks was characteristic also of France, Great Britain and the United States.

Of course, actions did not always correspond to the high-sounding professions. As soon as the Tsarist armies entered eastern Galicia in 1914 they began to persecute the leaders of the Ruthenian Uniate Church. They resumed here the old Russian policy of converting the Greek Catholic Ukrainians, or, as they preferred to call them, Little Russians, to the Orthodox faith, thus paving the way for the complete denationalization of the Ukrainian peasantry and its incorporation in the Russian nation. Jews were also harassed by the removal of "hostages" to the

[21] Schleiermacher, Addendum to the 2d ed. of his addresses, *Ueber die Religion* (Berlin, 1806), p. 371; his letter to Georg Reimer of Dec. 20, 1806 in *The Life of Schleiermacher as Unfolded in His Autobiography and Letters,* English translation by Frederica Rowan (London, 1860), II, 73; Fichte's *Reden an die deutsche Nation* in his *Sämmtliche Werke,* ed. by J. H. Fichte (Berlin, 1845-46), VII, 467; E. M. Arndt, *Katechismus für den deutschen Kriegs- und Wehrmann,* ed. by Max Haber (Dresden, 1913), pp. 18 *et seq.* *Cf.* also Heinrich Laag, *Die religiöse Entwicklung Ernst Moritz Arndts* (Halle, 1926); and, more generally, Salo W. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York, 1947), pp. 42 *et seq.*, 136 *et seq.*

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interior of Russia and, later, by wholesale deportations from areas threatened by the advancing Austro-German armies. Russian "massacres of Moslems on the Asiatic fronts", wrote M. Philips Price, at that time Special Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, "were no less criminal if less extensive, than the Turkish massacre of the Armenians." [22]

Elsewhere, too, interdenominational peace could not permanently withstand the strains and stresses of a long war. Religious disparity strengthened the national irredentas of Germany's, as well as Russia's, Polish population, which ultimately led to the resuscitation of an independent Poland. Finland's and the Baltic countries' secession from the Russian Empire was likewise stimulated by the revival of old religious animosities. By 1918 Germany's internal peace had so greatly weakened, that the Catholic Center party, and particularly its leader, Matthias Erzberger, now began preparing for a *rapprochement* with the Allies against the will of the imperial régime.

More overt were the effects of the war on intellectual life and religious thought of the belligerent nations. The impact of the great Roman-Jewish War, particularly, on both Judaism and Christianity has been the subject of extended literary discussion by modern scholars. S. C. F. Brandon has recently argued (in this writer's opinion, unjustly) against the authenticity of Eusebius' report concerning the departure of all Christians from Jerusalem to Pella in Transjordan in 66 A.D., and denied that the young Christian Church thus publicly proclaimed its neutrality in the armed conflict. Yet there is little doubt that most Christians failed to participate in this crucial encounter and thus definitely broke their ties with the old religion.[23] This attitude of aloofness was the more deeply resented as the equally pacifist Essenes rallied behind the revolutionary leadership in this great emergency of their people, and literally fought to the last man.

The breach was finally sealed by the Bar-Kocheba uprising

[22] Price, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia* (London, 1918), p. 271.

[23] Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, III, 5, 2-3; and Brandon, *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church* (London, 1951), pp. 168 *et seq.* *Cf.* also Heinz Joachim Schoeps, "Die Tempelzerstörung des Jahres 70 in der jüdischen Religionsgeschichte", *Coniectanea neotestamentica*, VI (1942), 1-45, reprinted in his *Aus frühchristlicher Zeit* (Tübingen, 1950), pp. 144-83.

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against Rome in 132-35. This time the overshadowing issue was Hadrian's religious intolerance, and particularly his outlawry of circumcision and Jewish public assemblies. Jewish public opinion, now united in the defense of its cherished religious institutions, viewed the professedly neutral Christian community as an outright fifth column in favor of Rome. Internally, too, the effects of the fall of Jerusalem were manifold and enduring. From there on, the Jewish people, eschewing all sectarian currents, concentrated on the cultivation of its national mores and instilled in its members an exclusive allegiance to the growingly normative talmudic forms.

The impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on religious thought has likewise been deep and enduring. The new religious and political views formulated in France by Chateaubriand, De Bonald and De Maistre had a far-reaching influence on French, indeed on all European, literature in the first half of the nineteenth century.

In 1795, at a time when most enlightened Germans were still exalting the liberating effect of the Revolution, the Bremen theologian, Gottfried M. Menken, began preaching a religious crusade against atheistic France. To him Napoleon's universal empire embodied the principle contrary to God's universal empire.[24] Before long, the distinguished poet, Novalis, contrasted "Christendom or Europe". In an essay under this title published in 1799, which so sharply ran counter to regnant opinion that Goethe, for example, opposed its inclusion in the *Athenäum*, he preached the return to the medieval unity of Catholicism. Somewhat later, Friedrich von Schlegel, after his conversion, actually preached world unity through the medium of the Catholic clergy. Beginning with Count Friedrich Leopold Stolberg's conversion in 1800 there set in a regular stampede of Protestant writers and artists hastening to join the Catholic faith. Within German Protestantism itself the new teachings of Schleiermacher, Neander and other theologians, buttressed by the related philosophies of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, permanently transformed the intellectual image of German Protestant

[24] *Cf.* his widely read *Glück und Sieg der Gottlosen*, in his *Schriften* (Bremen, 1858).

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thought. All these teachings clearly revealed the imprint of the great wars of the period.[25]

No less pronounced were the religious effects of the First World War on both religious and antireligious thought. From the war years emerged the great assault on all organized religions set in motion by the Russian Revolution and climaxed in the ruthless propaganda of Russia's "godless" societies of the 1920's. On the other hand, there also was a less publicized, but intrinsically profound, reorientation in the new schools of theology and religious philosophy. Reacting in part to this agnostic propaganda, Karl Barth and others writing during the war years called for the return to the more dogmatic and traditional teachings of their respective churches. In Neo-Reformation theology, Protestantism found a method of reconciling liberal, at times even radical, social action with fairly orthodox religious convictions. Reinhold Niebuhr was not alone to feel, at least during the great economic depression, that "adequate spiritual guidance can come only through a more radical political orientation and more conservative religious convictions than are comprehended in the culture of our era."[26] Catholicism, too, unflinchingly adhered to the antimodernist doctrines of Pius X. In fact, "modernism" suffered during the war a defeat from which it has never recovered.

[25] This transformation may be illustrated by the changing attitudes to war itself on the part of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schleiermacher. Kant alone, after publishing in 1795 his famous essay on perpetual peace under the impact of the French Revolution, remained true to his convictions in the remaining nine years of his life. Fichte who lived to 1814, Hegel and Schleiermacher who died in 1831 and 1834, respectively, all began as ardent admirers of the Revolution. Even in his later *Philosophy of History* (English translation by J. Sibree, New York, 1905, p. 558) Hegel still spoke of that "glorious mental dawn", acclaimed by all thoughtful persons of the period. Yet before long they all became ardent protagonists of the Wars of Liberation. As early as 1802-3, Schleiermacher entered in his diary, "The view that all action consists in war, can be demonstrated even in a religious discourse with reference to Christ's words: 'I came not to send peace, but a sword'" (Matt. 10:34). Of course, the great Berlin preacher agreed with Fichte that only a "true war" was justified, namely one which met the requirements of "history". But in the ultimate sense, he believed, "all history is religious history, and religion itself must by its very nature be historical." *Cf.* his *Tagebuch* of 1798; and, more generally, Wilhelm Braun, *Der Krieg im Lichte der idealistischen Philosophie vor hundert Jahren und ihrer Wirkung auf die Gegenwart* (Gütersloh, 1917).

[26] Niebuhr, *Reflections on the End of an Era* (New York, 1934), p. ix.

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Churches

From ancient times priests were expected to bless arms. Ancient soothsayers were often instrumental in precipitating or delaying the outbreak of hostilities by whatever omens they derived from their particular oracles. Even in the Middle Ages and early modern times, war was so much taken for granted that the collaboration of the religious functionaries under both Christendom and Islam appeared self-evident. Christian theology had some difficulty in squaring this new attitude with the pacifist traditions of the early Church, dating from a time when Christianity was not yet a dominant faith of the empire. As leaders of a persecuted religion, Church Fathers could indulge in such affirmations as that "Christians inhabit their own fatherland as aliens. Each foreign country is their fatherland, and each fatherland a foreign country."[27] But the rationalizations of the new attitude had so long and so thoroughly changed prevailing opinion that religious pacifism hardly was a deterrent to the coöperation of any church with its national leadership in times of war.

During the Roman-Jewish War the priests reflected the deep inner divisions of the people. Like the other upper classes, the priestly aristocracy was averse to the rebellion against Rome. Not only the mercenary high priests of the period but most of their associates at the Temple of Jerusalem had long been active collaborators with the Herodian rulers and their Roman overlords. Mostly belonging to the Sadducean party, they had lost contact with the living currents and particularly the messianic yearnings of their people. They also sensed the rumblings of unrest among the masses and foresaw that any anti-Roman outbreak would signal also the beginning of a social revolution aimed, in part, at the extortionist practices of many priests. Josephus, himself a priest, severely censured, for instance, the high priest Ananias (47-59 A. D.), whose servants "went to the threshing floors and took away tithes that belonged to the priests by violence, and did not refrain from beating such as would not give these tithes to them." Some undoubtedly feared

[27] *Epistola ad Diognetum* in Migne's *Patrologia graeca*, II, 1173.

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that an unsuccessful revolt would lead to the destruction of the Temple by the Romans. A priest Zadok, the Talmud tells us, had fasted for forty years imploring God to avert this anticipated disaster. No class willingly commits mass suicide. Even a non-officiating country priest, like Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai, allowed himself to be smuggled out from beleaguered Jerusalem to come to terms with the conqueror. He was aided therein by the officiating Levite, R. Joshua ben Hananiah, who was to become one of his chief associates in the post-war reconstruction period.[28]

Other priests, however, collaborated with the " rebels ". The very outbreak of the revolt dated from an incident occasioned by the Roman procurator Florus extracting seventeen talents of silver from the Temple treasury. However reluctantly, Josephus assumed the military command over the rebellious forces in Galilee. Other priests more actively supported the uprising and carried on with their Temple services to the very end. They also played a vital rôle in the subsequent reconstruction of their people and its religion.[29]

Even more deeply divided was the French clergy during the Revolutionary Wars. As the name indicates, the " refractory clergy " refused to coöperate with the new régime. In fact, those of its members who emigrated abroad willy-nilly became protagonists of a crusade against the atheistic republic. The constitutional clergy, however, and later the priests of the new Religion of Reason supported the constantly changing revolutionary governments to the best of their ability. In no other country of the time, however, was there any serious cleavage between the churches and the respective governments.

It was a sign of the growing pacifism and humanitarianism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the churches' attitude to war became such a major issue in 1914. A considerable number of conscientious objectors refused to bear arms for their country. Their right to do so was upheld not only by such pacifist sectarian groups as Quakers or Mennonites,

[28] Josephus, *Antiquities*, XX, 9, 2.206-7 (Whiston's translation); Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 56a.

[29] *Cf.* Baron, *Social and Religious History of the Jews*, II, 110 *et seq.*, 117, 375 *et seq.*

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but in principle also by all major churches. Only in the Anglo-Saxon countries, however, were such conscientious objections tolerated, with however ill a grace, by the governments. Elsewhere the military usually rode roughshod over all conscientious scruples.

Official church bodies and most of the outstanding ecclesiastical leaders in all countries lent a willing hand in the support of the war efforts. No large-scale collection of war sermons, similar to those compiled for the American Revolution, for the German Wars of Liberation, or for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71,[30] has appeared in print. The sermons published during the war bear earmarks of undiluted apologetics, whereas after the war the churches themselves lost all interest in permanently recording these homiletical effusions which, for the most part, no longer squared with their reawakened conscience. Many felt, with Devere Allen, that "the black and sickening record of those years will not bear close retelling. If it could be obliterated, what a blessing it would be!" [31] But enough is known to justify the generalization that, with few exceptions, churchmen of all denominations clung closely to the propaganda line of their respective countries. Individual preachers were more circumspect than others, but few, like John Haynes Holmes or Judah Magnes, dared publicly to invoke the ancient pacifist ideals of their faiths and to defy the prevailing war hysteria.

On the whole, declarations by church bodies were somewhat more restrained. Although in essence they, too, reflected their authors' conviction that their countries fought for a just cause, none went so far as publicly to avow the principle of "right or wrong my country." [32]

Behind these public declarations, however, a great deal of inner soul-searching was going on. Most clergymen deplored

[30] John Wingate Thornton, *Pulpit of the American Revolution* (Boston, 1860); Friedrich Julius Winter, ed., *Geistliche Weckstimmen aus der Zeit der Erniedrigung und Erhebung unseres Volkes: Zeitpredigten* (Leipzig, 1913); P. Piechowski, *Die Kriegspredigt von 1870-71* (Leipzig, 1917).

[31] Allen, *The Fight for Peace* (New York, 1930), p. 43.

[32] *Cf.* for example, the 1917 declaration of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, reprinted in the interesting chapter on "What the Church Learned in the War" in William Adams Brown's *The Church in America* (New York, 1922), pp. 97 *et seq.*

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the necessity of advocating war. Only in the first months after the entry into the war (1914-15 in Europe, 1917 in the United States) was there much joyous affirmation of patriotism as a supreme religious duty. In this early period French Catholics, whether of the orthodox or the modernist variety, were so convinced of the righteousness of their country's cause that they viewed the struggle against the German war machine as part of their religious obligation to fight evil impersonate. German Catholics, organized in a special defense committee, replied in kind. "If Harnack [an outstanding Protestant theologian]", commented an English pastor at that time, "talks of the Czar as desiring the destruction of Protestant *Kultur* . . . the Archbishop of Cologne speaks of 'schismatic Russia' in alliance with 'infidel France' against our 'God-fearing Kaiser.'" [33]

Formally the relations between the states and their churches underwent little change, and yet the outbreak of hostilities usually led to the relaxation of existing tensions. Not only did each nation's concentration on winning the war relegate all divisive issues to the background, but the growing subtle integration of the churches in the political fabric of each wartime society reduced many sources of friction. In France the din of controversy, raging before and after 1906 over the separation of state and church, now died down. Even agnostic groups no longer fulminated against the very large enrolment of pupils at Catholic schools. Relations to the Holy See likewise became more intimate. Italy alone persevered in shutting the Vatican out of international conferences, whereas France and the United States found it to their advantage to send representatives to the

[33] Charles Edward Osborne, *Religion in Europe and the World Crisis* (London, 1916), pp. 163-64. *Cf.* especially *The German War and Catholicism,* ed. by Alfred Baudrillart, rector of the Catholic Institute of Paris, with an introductory letter by Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris (Paris, 1915); Loisy, *Guerre et religion*; and the replies from Germany entitled *Der deutsche Krieg und der Katholizismus,* ed. by A. J. Rosenberg, *et al.* (Berlin, 1915); and *German Culture, Catholicism, and the World War,* ed. by Georg Pfeilschifter, Professor of Theology at the University of Freiburg, English translation (St. Paul, 1916). The latter volume, in which some such outstanding leaders of German Catholicism as the later Cardinal Michael Faulhaber participated, was clearly designed for foreign propaganda as much as for the allaying of the scruples of German Catholics. From the outset French, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish translations, as well as that English translation, were planned, principally for distribution in neutral countries.

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See of St. Peter. The Vatican was too important a sounding post for the belligerent Powers not to make use of it despite objections of extreme " separationists ".

Wars also influenced the development of foreign missions. Imperialists of all kinds could not resist the temptation to make use of missionaries for their political purposes. With his customary frankness Napoleon wrote in 1804, " These monks will prove very useful to me in Asia, Africa and America. I shall send them there to collect information on the state of the various countries. Their habit protects them and helps cover up political and commercial designs." Just as in his Near Eastern campaign he restored French " protection " of the Holy Sepulchre and the Syrian Christians, he also tried to revitalize the French missions in China, principally, as he admitted, in order " to deprive the English of the management of these missions." [34]

During the First World War, too, the Allied blockade effectively disrupted the communications between the German missions and the home country. As a result many of them withered away even before the direct occupation of the German colonies by Allied troops. At the same time the expanding world-wide hostilities seemed to open new opportunities for Allied missions. An otherwise judicious senior army chaplain of the Church of England suggested that every young cleric be made to serve several years overseas. " The nation ", he exclaimed, " that sends its working men to conquer Bagdad and defend the Suez Canal has learnt to think imperially; and the Church that is to hold its allegiance must think imperially, too." Only after the war did some leading missionaries realize how much the internecine struggle among the colonial Powers had undermined the prestige of them all, and fostered the desire for national independence among the colonial peoples.[35]

[34] Letters to the Pope and the Archbishop of Paris of August 28 1802. It was an acknowledgment of defeat of his overseas plans when in a letter to his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, dated October 8, 1809, he conceded that he had abandoned the foreign missions to the British. *Correspondance du Napoléon Ier*, VIII, 7-8; XIX, 560-61; and Thompson, *Letters of Napoleon*, pp. 84, 252-53.

[35] Philip C. T. Crick, " The Soldier's Religion " in *The Church in the Furnace*, ed. by F. B. Macnutt, p. 367; *The Missionary Outlook in the Light of the War*, prepared by the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, and published in New York, 1920.

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Religious Minorities

Despite efforts to secure internal peace, many pre-war antagonisms were unavoidably sharpened after the beginning of hostilities. In the general witch hunt of alleged or real spies, shirkers and war profiteers, which became a popular pastime in most belligerent countries, the patriotism of religious, as well as ethnic, minorities was often impugned. Prejudices, long dormant or but timidly voiced before 1914, burst out into all-devouring passions during the hysteria of the first " total " war. Protestants in Catholic countries, Catholics in Protestant or Greek Orthodox lands, and Jews practically everywhere were easy targets. These suspicions stimulated leaders of minority faiths in many countries, especially in the United States, to organize special bureaus to secure denominational statistics of combatants. This gave rise to a vast literature listing not only members of particular denominations serving in the armed forces, but also those who died in battle, received military decorations, or otherwise distinguished themselves in the service of their country. At times such war-born religious statistics became major contributions to the knowledge of denominational divisions in general. Before long these and other denominational war agencies proliferated to such an extent that the Federal Council of Churches had to prepare a directory covering over 300 pages.[36]

The attitude of the minority leaders is well summarized by the declaration of the First Plenary Council of Catholic archbishops and bishops in the United States held in September 1919.

> The traditional patriotism of our Catholic people [the resolution read] has been amply demonstrated in the days of their country's trial. And we look with pride upon the record which proves, as no mere protestation could prove, the devotion of American Catholics to the cause of American freedom. . . . The account of our men in the service adds a new page to the record of Catholic loyalty. It is what we expected and what they took for granted. . . . To many assertions it answers with one plain fact.[37]

[36] *War-Time Agencies of the Churches: Directory and Handbook*, ed. by Margaret Renton (New York, 1919).

[37] Peter Guilday, *The National Pastorals of the American Hierarchy, 1792-1919* (Washington, 1923), pp. 235, 294 *et. seq.*

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Did these minority efforts attain their practical, apologetic objectives? A detailed and fully documented answer to this question would furnish valuable insights into the general long-range efficacy of apologetic literature. For the most part, it appears, these compilations were read by members of each minority group, rather than by outsiders to whom they were addressed. Certainly few deeply prejudiced persons were persuaded by them to change their minds.

In Germany, for example, the rising tide of anti-Semitism was in no way stemmed by the proofs adduced by Jewish leaders that more than 30,000 Jews, or some 6 per cent of the Reich's total Jewish population, had won military decorations during World War I. Subsequently, the Association of German Jewish War Veterans listed the names of over 10,000 Jewish soldiers and sailors who had given their lives for the fatherland. These cold statistical facts were enlivened by a remarkable selection of letters sent home by Jewish combatants from the various fronts.[38] These data showed conclusively that Jews had participated in the German war effort beyond their ratio in the population. And yet the myth of Jewish " shirking " and preponderant share in the legendary " stab-in-the-back " continued to haunt for years the Jewish minority in Germany, and became one of the most powerful propaganda weapons during the Nazi march to power.

Nevertheless, these apologetic efforts were not all in vain. Like most other apologias they eminently served the purpose of strengthening the morale of the writers' own groups. Indirectly, accusations and replies contributed to the general religious awakening. They also promoted many interdenominational activities, such as those initiated in the United States by the Committee of Six, under the chairmanship of Father Burke which, formed at the request of War Secretary Newton Baker, advised the Department on matters of religious concern.

[38] Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten, *Die jüdischen Gefallenen des deutschen Heeres, der deutschen Marine und der deutschen Schutztruppen, 1914-1918: Ein Gedenkbuch* (Berlin, 1932); *idem, Gefallene deutsche Juden: Frontbriefe 1914-1918* (Berlin, 1935).

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Post-War Effects

For the most part, it appears, war-generated religious revivals carried over into post-war periods—with varying degrees of intensity. The great Judeo-Roman War resulted in the lasting reformulation of Judaism and great intensification of the Christian mission. Although Jewish extremists demanding total abstention from the consumption of meat and continuous national mourning were quickly checked by such moderate leaders as Joshua ben Hananiah, a modicum of mourning became a permanent and characteristic feature of the Jewish religion and way of life during the following centuries. The war helped the Pharisaic-Rabbinic leadership to establish undisputed control over Jewish life, to eschew all sectarian movements and to pave the way for the unification of Jewry in the institutional forms of talmudic Judaism. It also brought about the final separation of Christianity as an independent religion. Forever after, the Christians were persuaded that the fall of Jerusalem had proved that the "sceptre had departed from Judah" because of the Jews' repudiation of Christ.

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars likewise had permanent religious effects. Precisely because the Revolution had been associated in the minds of men with anti-Christianity, even outright atheism, the subsequent revulsion led to strong reaffirmation of the Christian tradition. Politically, the French Restoration and the international system of the Holy Alliance with their strong religious mystique may have proved to be of short duration, but the spiritual forces brought to the fore in the renaissance of French Catholicism, German Protestantism, and such intermediary forms as the Oxford Movement and Puseyism in England strongly reversed the powerful antireligious currents of European Enlightenment. In his anti-Christian crusade Lenin, following Engels, advised his readers to study the antireligious works of French Enlightenment, which he considered more effective than anything written in the nineteenth century.[39]

[39] N. Lenin, "Socialism and Religion", in his *Selected Works* (New York, 1932-38), XI, 658, 661; Friedrich Engels, *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat, 1871-75* (Berlin, 1894), p. 44.

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Instead of being on the defensive, Catholicism reasserted itself after 1815 not only through the writings of such "romantics" as Chateaubriand and De Maistre or such distinguished converts as Schlegel, Adam Müller, Newman and Manning, but also through the reformulation of its own doctrine with an ever stronger reaffirmation of its dogmatic and irrational elements. Of course, the great pre-Revolutionary authors continued to be widely read. According to a governmental inquiry, more than half a million copies of Rousseau's works alone were sold in the years 1817-1824. Nonetheless even French Gallicanism now gave way to the supremacy of the Papacy, whose infallibility was ultimately proclaimed by the Vatican Council, profoundly challenging the basic principles of enlightened rationalism.[40]

Protestantism, too, underwent, through Schleiermacher and others, a reaction against the preëminence of "enlightened" doctrines. Within the very church services there was increasing concentration on prayer, congregational as well as individual, as against the sermon. Not only were the new reactionary governments suspicious of political sermons which some of them had encouraged during the Wars of Liberation—Schleiermacher and Dräsecke were now expressly enjoined by the Prussian administration to devote their sermons only to "pious sentiments"—but the congregations themselves wished to commune more directly with God. Even church architecture reflected for a time this change of emphasis from pulpit to congregational service.[41]

No one will deny that in academic circles historicism, and with it a certain measure of liberal relativism, continued to celebrate ever new victories. As the nineteenth century progressed, radical Bible criticism and philological-historical approaches to Protestant theology and church history dominated all scholarly discussions. At the same time there evolved in the official Church bodies a growing reassertion of the dogmatic and irrational ingredients of the Reformation and a more authoritative control of life within the churches. The revived forms of German

[40] Albert Schinz, *Etat présent des travaux sur J.-J. Rousseau* (New York, 1941), p. 14; Auguste Viatte, *Les Interprétations du catholicisme chez les romantiques* (Paris, 1922).

[41] *Cf.* the data assembled by Holl in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, III, 377 *et seq.*

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pietism, continued growth of Methodism in England and America, and the spread of the various ritualistic and liturgical movements—all testified to the deep reaction among the ecclesiastical intelligentsia against the " shallow " teachings of the Enlightenment era. True, the impact on the masses was far less immediate and widespread. Its uneven diffusion was illustrated in the very vicinity of Paris where, in 1816, of the 1,600 inhabitants of the village of Gallardon only four participated in the Easter communion, while in Champrond only fifteen persons of a population of 800 failed to do so. Curiously, however, when some priests refused ecclesiastical burial to noncommunicants, anti-ecclesiastical mobs at times forced entry into the churches for such corpses.[42] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, moreover, rationalism raised its head again within the churches themselves. An increasing segment of the population turned its back completely on all organized religion, many joining one or another of the increasingly powerful antireligious movements. However, the post-revolutionary reaction of the early 1800's was still very much alive when the First World War broke out.

In this war, religion as such was not a major subject of controversy and, hence, the war's effects upon it were also more complex and ambiguous. The great religious revival in its early stages was soon displaced by war fatigue and, after the Armistice, by a stampede back to " normalcy ". It had been wishful thinking on James Monroe's part when, in his message to Congress of December 3, 1822, he had written:

> It has been often charged against free Governments, that they have neither the foresight nor the virtue to provide, at the proper season, for great emergencies; that their course is improvident and expensive; that war will always find them unprepared, and whatever may be its calamities, that its terrible warnings will be disregarded and forgotten as soon as peace returns. I have full confidence that this charge as far as relates to the United States, will be shown to be utterly destitute of truth.[43]

[42] Adrien Dansette, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine de la Révolution à la Troisième Republique* (Paris, 1948), pp. 266-67.

[43] *Annals of the Congress of the United States*, 17th Cong., 2d sess., 1855, pp. 20-21.

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Alas, in the United States even more than in other countries, 1919, as well as 1946, confirmed the truth of the charge, rather than of President Monroe's optimistic forecast. In an attempt to forget the horrors of the war as quickly as possible, there was an increasing revulsion also to the ideals and institutions which had supported it. Returning veterans at Amherst College were reported in the spring of 1920 to have told their professors, "For God's sake, don't talk to us about ideals! We never want to hear of them again." [44] Precisely because, in the first rush of patriotic enthusiasm, the leading churchmen of all countries had aligned themselves with the powers that were, the ensuing reaction often assumed an antiecclesiastical and antireligious character. The closer the alliance between the church and the state had been, and the deeper went the disaffection of the masses with the established order, the more did the ensuing revolutionary movements repudiate the church along with the powers of the state. In Russia the armies themselves supported a revolution which increasingly went beyond the original Leninist program of complete separation of the church from the state and the school, and finally led to the well-known distinction in the decree of 1929 (also in the Constitution of 1936), establishing "freedom for the conduct of religious worship and freedom for antireligious propaganda." They thus unfurled the flag of universal antireligion or, if we wish, a universal counterreligion.

In Germany, too, spokesmen of the various Socialist parties likewise pointed an accusing finger at the churches and their part in the war. Typical of the growing antireligious mood is the following wartime exclamation of Adolf Hoffmann, the later Socialist Minister of Public Enlightenment in Prussia: "The religion of love for one's neighbors has long since suffered shipwreck. Battlefield and religion cannot be reconciled. . . . Christianity, financially supported by the state, has never yet vigorously combated the atrocities and bestialities of war." [45] The

[44] Lucien Price, "Between Two Wars" in *Religion of Soldier and Sailor*, ed. by William L. Sperry, pp. 21-22.

[45] Cited from the Socialist *Vorwärts* of February 28, 1917 by Karl Holl in his "Luthers Anschauung über Evangelium, Krieg und Aufgabe der Kirche im Lichte des Weltkrieges" (1917), reprinted in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, III, 147.

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number of formal withdrawals from church membership jumped from an annual average of some 12,000 before the war to almost 230,000 in 1919, and to 305,584 in 1920, declining gradually in the following years.

On the other hand, the pre-war prediction of a leading Socialist that a world war would spell the end of all organized religion in Germany proved to be mere wishful thinking. Upon seizing power in 1918 the Socialists themselves, partly as a result of surprising electoral successes of the Catholic Center party, had to tone down their opposition to the churches. The new Weimar Constitution provided for separation of state and church, but this was accomplished in a way which actually accrued to the internal benefit of all major denominations. Although in the Catholic parts of Europe there was some rejoicing about the downfall of the foremost Protestant Power on the Continent, Protestant churches found themselves, for the first time in German history, liberated from the stifling tutelage of the state. No longer did Catholic monarchs like the Emperor of Austria or the King of Bavaria appoint ecclesiastical chiefs for their Protestant subjects. So effective now became the religious teaching of both Protestant denominations (Lutherans and Reformed) that, aided by the population shifts to the large metropolitan areas of Northern Germany, they succeeded year after year in converting more Catholics to their faith, than they lost through the conversion of their adherents to Catholicism. In 1920, for example, 11,017 Catholics joined the Protestant faiths, while only 8,565 Protestants entered the Roman Church. It has also been estimated that in the post-war years two thirds of German children born from mixed Catholic-Protestant unions were reared in the Protestant faith.[46]

At the same time Catholicism, too, rapidly gained ground. In Germany it was relieved from many official restraints and the residua of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*. Enjoying the new freedoms, the Church rapidly expanded its school system. In the Rhineland, where in 1900 Protestant school teachers outnumbered Catholics 2:1, the ratio was reversed by 1924 to five Cath-

[46] Adolf Keller and George Stewart, *Protestant Europe: Its Crisis and Outlook* (New York, 1927), pp. 160 *et seq.*

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olic teachers for each Protestant teacher. There also was a great resurgence of the monastic orders. In less than a decade after the Armistice the number of German monasteries increased by 711, and that of monks and nuns by 11,354. No wonder that European wags of the early inter-war period often asserted that "from the military point of view France had won the war; from the political, England; from the economic, America; from the cultural, the Jew; from the racial, the Slav; from the religious, the Roman Catholic Church." [47]

In the victorious Allied countries the effects in both directions were more moderate. While war fatigue and general disillusionment with the achievements of the peace often nurtured cynicism and antisocial behavior, the negative effect on the churches found expression less in overt attacks than in growing indifference. Large segments of the population once again stayed away from churches, failed to provide for the religious education of their children, or merely paid lip service to their religious allegiance. A clergyman ministering to some 50,000 population in a London suburb during the inter-war period complained that "only some 100 or fewer attend our two church halls of a Sunday. They are all working class: the devotion of the little worshipping community (men as well as women) to their Church is amazing. Outside their circle is a vast unapproachable paganism." [48] Other informed observers claimed that in France less than a quarter of the population had any real contact with the Church. Many, however, who had undergone some deeper religious conversion during World War I continued to cherish this ideal also in the post-war era.

In one respect, the post-war period generated new religious concerns. Revulsion to the nationalist frenzy of the war period awakened increasing consciousness of the humanitarian and pacifist traditions of Christianity. The result was the rise of a new religious universalism which benefited both the Catholic and Protestant churches. Catholic leadership now emphasized the Church's supranational character, condemned the excesses of a man-centered universe, and preached the return to the

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 168, 171.

[48] Guy Kendall, *Religion in War and Peace* (London, n.d.), p. 118.

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orderliness and harmony of the Catholic Middle Ages. Many Catholics subscribed to Pope Pius XI's declaration of December 23, 1922 that

> there exists an institution able to safeguard the sanctity of the law of nations. This institution is a part of every nation; at the same time it is above all nations. She enjoys, too, the highest authority, the fullness of the teaching power of the Apostles. Such an institution is the Church of Christ.[49]

Less extremely the Protestant churches found in the ecumenical movement a way of world-wide coöperation to overcome their previous nationalist limitations and the more effectively to preach peace among men. Old antagonisms could not be readily overcome, however. While the Greek Orthodox churches, now decimated by the Russian Revolution, were ready to collaborate with Protestant leadership, the Catholic Church held aloof. An individual Jesuit's *Catholic Plea for Reunion,* published in London in 1934, led to the author's (Albert Gille's) forcible retirement from the Society of Jesus. Even more tragic was the failure of the ecumenical movement to stem the new tide of nationalism and racism loosened by the rise of the Nazi party. Precisely when the ecumenical movement was reaching a certain degree of fruition in the Oxford Assembly of 1938 and the establishment of the World Council of Churches, the new demonic forces were setting in motion that powerful train of events which led to the outbreak of the Second World War.[50]

Not that these energies were completely lost. The lessons of the First World War and the achievements of the inter-war period exerted a great moderating influence during the Second War. True, few clergymen could live up to professions made after the First War. At that time Rev. Merle N. Smith of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Pasadena, California, asserted, " I would be loyal to my country and to Christ. If my country forces me to choose, I will be loyal to Christ." After analyzing the vast and then still growing evidence for the spread

[49] Pius XI's encyclical *Ubi arcano Dei* in *Principles for Peace: Selections from Papal Documents,* ed. by Harry C. Koenig (Washington, 1943), p. 347.

[50] *Cf.* Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion,* pp. 155 *et seq.*, 299 n. 39, 316 *et seq.*

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of pacifist sentiments among Protestant churchmen, Walter W. Van Kirk predicted, as late as 1934, " that the government in the event of another war, will have to get along without the moral support of many of our larger and more influential Church bodies." [51]

When these words appeared in print, a new storm was quickly gathering momentum. Before long it swept away all such pious expectations. Yet, when World War II finally broke out, the churchmen of all denominations were, as a rule, far more circumspect in their utterances and more anxious to harmonize their convictions as citizens and as believers. They were aided therein by a generally less hysterical frame of mind of the general public. The mood of all countries was far less permeated with the messianic fervor of a " war to end all wars ". The previous Nazi onslaught on all churches, moreover, not only dampened the ardor of the German clergy, but also furnished the churches in both the occupied and the Allied countries a genuine religious issue. This time, indeed, the very fundamentals of the Judeo-Christian tradition were under attack. Churchmen of all denominations could not forget Alfred Rosenberg's programmatic enunciation: " Today a new faith is arising: the myth of blood, the belief that by defending the blood, we defend at the same time the divine essence in man. This faith is combined with the clearest knowledge that the Nordic blood represents that mystery which has replaced and overcome the old sacraments." [52] Typical of most contemporary declarations was one issued by 93 leading American Protestants which read, " We abhor war, but upon the outcome of this war depends the realization of Christian principles to which no Christian can be indifferent." To Karl Barth even this statement was not outspoken enough.

> If the realization [he wrote] of the Christian principles depends upon the outcome of this war then there is no point in the assurance that war is abhorrent; for it is surely only unnecessary and unjust wars which are condemned as abhorrent, and among this number the present one is not to be classed.

[51] Van Kirk, *Religion Renounces War* (Chicago, 1934), pp. 13, 44.

[52] Rosenberg, *Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1937), p. 114.

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True, even now there were some such devotees of the idea of nonresistance and the supreme horror of shedding human blood that, before the outbreak of the war, they had urged on Archbishop William Temple " to receive the evil of the Nazi regime into my own soul as a redemptive sacrifice, instead of resisting it." The Archbishop of Canterbury repudiated these suggestions by pointing out what such pacifism would mean to the oppressed Czechs and Poles and even contending that " this notion that physiological life is absolutely sacred is Hindu or Buddhist, not Christian." [53]

All this greatly facilitated the speedy revival of the inter-war ideals soon after the cessation of hostilities. In fact, the ecumenical movement and the World Council of Churches resumed in 1945 with renewed vigor where they had left off in 1939.

More far-reaching were the effects of World War I on theological doctrine. In the midst of the First World War Barth had sounded his clarion call for a return to the ideals of the early Church and the Reformation. At the same time, Rev. F. William Worsley, a Church of England chaplain, discussed sin, the sacramental view of life, and the future life as the main " beliefs emphasized by the war ", and concluded that " far from needing a lessening of dogmatic teaching this generation needs more than anything else real definite instruction " in these doctrines.[54] From 1918 on, these appeals to " metahistorical " and absolute verities began to multiply in number and insistence. Within Catholicism, too, pre-war modernism gave way to Neo-Thomist and other dogmatic affirmations, sometimes combined with outright historic negativism. This new quest for religious absolutes has also been reflected in the belles-lettres of our generation, although not with the same degree of intensity which characterized the Romantic literature of the early nineteenth century.[55] This process is still continuing today. Whatever its outcome, it has already fructified and intensified religious thinking in many domains.

[52] Barth, *The Church and the War* (New York, 1944), pp. 29-30; William Temple, *Thoughts in War-Time* (London, 1940), p. 29. *Cf.* also *ibid.*, pp. 31 *et seq.*

[54] *Cf.* his essay in *The Church and the Furnace*, ed. by F. B. Macnutt, pp. 69-96.

[55] *Cf.* Halford Edward Luccock, *The Questing Spirit: Religion in the Literature of Our Time* (New York, 1947).

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Tentative Conclusions

Of course, effects of wars on religion cannot be isolated from other contemporary factors. We must never forget that the same body of men, often the very same persons, who as church members deeply influence religious affairs, as politicians, business men, labor leaders or scholars guide also the political and economic destinies of their nations. Any " established " church will naturally be subject to the wishes, even whims, of political rulers. In countries of separation of state and church, the latter will always depend on the voluntary allegiance of a mass membership and the financial contributions, particularly of wealthy members. Here we have natural incentives toward both demagoguery and plutocracy, and frequent submission to an aroused public opinion or to demands of the ruling classes. That is why the religious evolution of any period cannot be understood out of context with contemporary socio-economic, political and cultural factors.

During the inter-war period one often heard—not only from economic determinists—that " wars settle nothing." Clearly, wars themselves are but the result of peculiar political and social situations, created by a concatentation of historical factors. It was argued, therefore, that even without war these factors would have produced essentially the same results.

This assertion is a gross oversimplification. The mere acceleration and intensification of existing trends have often precipitated decisions previously far from certain. Karl Marx once called revolutions the " locomotives of history ". With equal right one may so designate wars, too. By speeding up existing social processes, armed conflicts usually shortened the time of their maturation and often produced within a few years what would otherwise have required decades. With the constant changeability of human evolution such acceleration has also doubtless prevented the maturing of some opposing forces, which would have nullified or modified those earlier factors. In many cases, moreover, some opposing forces are from the outset more or less equally strong. Wars, like other dramatic events, by tipping an often tenuous balance, did indeed " settle " issues which otherwise would have been resolved in some other way.

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In the religious sphere, too, wars as such have had many permanent effects. Without recourse to ever futile "iffy" questions, we may assert that, in the case of at least two of the three wars discussed here, religion was affected deeply and enduringly. Both the Judeo-Roman and the Napoleonic Wars resulted in lasting religious decisions, the effects of which have been felt in both the religious and the social spheres during all subsequent generations.

Certainly, the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 A. D., with or without Titus' concurrence—this was a moot question already in that emperor's lifetime—ended once for all Jewish sacrificial worship. Few Jews in resurrected Israel today think of rebuilding their sanctuary. Even the most orthodox do not expect a reëstablished priesthood to be entrusted with the task of again offering animal sacrifices—before the advent of a supernatural Redeemer. To be sure, the majority of world Jewry living in the dispersion had long before the year 70 been alienated from the Temple ritual. In the daily life of the rank and file of Palestinian provincials, too, the Synagogue had played a far greater rôle than the Temple, which they visited on relatively rare occasions and whose prestige had been undermined by the abuses of its venal hierarchy. Yet, judging from the general acceptance of animal sacrifices in the ancient world, the great admiration for the Temple of Jerusalem on the part of such outstanding Diaspora Jews as Philo of Alexandria, and the widespread genuine mourning after its destruction, one must admit that Jewish sacrificial worship still had tremendous vitality. No one can tell how, under what totally different circumstances, and with what totally different results, it would have gone out of existence at some later date.

This victory of the Synagogue over the Temple paved the way for the eventual universal acceptance, throughout the Western World, of the former's daughter institutions, the Church and the Mosque. It also tipped the balance in the struggle between Judeo-Christianity and Paul's Gentile Christianity. Only a few years before the fall of Jerusalem, Paul himself had to acknowledge the supremacy of the Jerusalem Judeo-Christian leadership, and even personally perform certain

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ritualistic purifications rather inconsistent with his own doctrine. It stands to reason that, without the fall of Jerusalem, the Judeo-Christians would long have retained their position of leadership in the nascent Church. Without the concomitant victory of Pharisaism over all other sectarian groups, they would also have remained members of the formerly latitudinarian Jewish community. No one can gauge the extent to which this development would have retarded the halting progress of the Gentile-Christian mission during the following two centuries, and played into the hands of such competing propagandists as the devotees of Mithraism. The fall of Jerusalem thus indeed became a decisive event in the secular, as well as in the religious, destinies of the Western World.

Less far-reaching, but quite significant, were also the long-range religious effects of the Revolutionary Wars. The anti-religious onslaught of French Enlightenment was definitely checked. This is the more remarkable as Enlightenment's other ideals, such as individualism and nationalism, rational and scientific approaches, civil liberties and the dissolution of the feudal order, continued to celebrate one victory after another during the nineteenth century. In all these areas Napoleon's military dictatorship, rather than reversing the Revolutionary program, spread it into other lands. In the religious sphere, however, Napoleon's policies marked a clear reversal of the Revolutionary trends, paradoxically made more complete and peremptory by his defeat.

One may perhaps explain this difference by the fact that only in Voltairian France did the antireligious forces gain real ascendancy, whereas in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Germany such leading spokesmen of Enlightenment as Hume, Jefferson and Lessing had a far more positive attitude toward religion. One need but compare the effects of the American and French Revolutions. Where the two revolutionary movements agreed, as in the Rights of Man, they really expressed the basic universal trends of the Enlightenment era and, as such, they proved victorious. Where they disagreed, as in the area of religious freedom, France, pursuing her peculiar course, was ultimately defeated. Perhaps, because in America separation of

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state and church meant freedom *for* religion, while in France and all of nineteenth-century Europe it came to mean freedom *from* religion, the final military defeats of the French armies decisively influenced not only the revival of religion but also that of religious authority, as symbolized by papal supremacy, new ritualistic emphases, romantic yearning for the medieval hierarchy of values, and religious as well as imperialistic Panslavism.

This religious revival wore off toward the end of the nineteenth century. Aided by the spread of popular education and democratic participation in public affairs, religious agnosticism and free thought now attracted far greater mass following than it ever did in eighteenth-century France. Once again a great war, World War I, brought to a head this long simmering conflict. As its result, antireligion triumphed for a time in defeated Russia and, to a lesser extent, in the successor states of the Central Powers. But the war set in motion also the contrary quest for new religious absolutes. Once again there was a widespread resurgence of both religious feeling and submission to religious authority. Catholic modernism and Protestant historicism were now eclipsed by renewed stress on metahistorical truths, on dogma and ritual. The Second World War, finally, in many ways but a climactic continuation of the First, abruptly terminated even the antireligious crusade of the Soviet Union. In any case, taking the entire period of World Wars as a single entity—one may consider it a Thirty Years' War of rivaling nationalisms as opposed to the seventeenth-century Thirty Years' War of rivaling religions—there has been a marked upsurge of religion in 1952 as contrasted with, say, 1912.

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THE SOURCE OF MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY

AT a time when the subject of enterprise management is just beginning to receive the systematic attention which it has long deserved, there is a serious possibility that the energies of theorists may be diverted from promising research to a barren argument about the source of authority. Business men may be surprised to learn that their right to command is being questioned. For these many centuries they have operated on the assumption that their orders must be obeyed. In relatively recent years it has been asserted that they have no authority except in so far as their subordinates choose to confer upon them the right to issue commands. Perhaps an inquiry into the source of managerial authority will eliminate the basis for disagreement.

Indeed, success in this venture may do much more. It is not only important but extremely urgent that management theory develop a generally accepted explanation of the source of authority. To continue in the present maze of conflict is both unproductive and undignified. Until the matter is settled there is really little merit in talking about what managers do. We must know by virtue of what authority they act at all. The urgency of this issue will be best understood if we realize that the present world conflict in ideologies rests upon diverse theories of authority.[1]

I. *The Historic Position*

For four decades none of the writers in the management field inquired into the nature of authority, not even into its source. This is not strange, of course, when one considers that their main interest was in the specialization of enterprise tasks. But it is significant that none seemed to think that the right of managers to give orders would be questioned. Seeing all about them

[1] E. L. Allen, "Authority and Freedom in East and West", *The London Quarterly and Holborn Review* (April 1948).

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that business men, in fact, did give orders and that they were generally obeyed, that the state promulgated laws and that these were generally obeyed also—seeing these things, the facts seemed to point to acceptance of the idea that the right to issue orders must certainly rest with the business managers. Indeed, if the question had been put to them they probably would have agreed with Peterson and Plowman, who state that

> Under our democratic form of government the right upon which managerial authority is based has its source in the Constitution of the United States through the guaranty of private property. Since the Constitution is the creature of the people, subject to amendment and modification by the will of the people, it follows that society, through government, is the source from which authority flows to ownership and thence to management.[2]

It is more than probable that business men past and present would subscribe to this statement as it stands. They would be surprised to find out that the source of authority is a very contentious subject of political theory.

II. *The Dissentients*

First among the writers in the field of management theory to question this accepted doctrine was Chester I. Barnard, Harvard graduate, successful top manager of large-scale enterprises, and the author of *The Functions of the Executive*.[3] Apparently reading widely in the fields of philosophy and psychology, and being much impressed by the political theory of Harold Laski, Barnard postulates that a correct theory of authority must be consistent with the facts and then proceeds to enumerate several instances wherein the members of an organization have refused to obey persons in authority. On the basis of these "facts" he states that "which specific laws will be obeyed or disobeyed by the individual citizen are decided by him." His approximate definition of authority is "the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is ac-

[2] Elmore Petersen and E. Grosvenor Plowman, *Business Organization and Management* (Chicago, 1949), p. 62. This is a very restricted view of the source of authority.

[3] Cambridge, 1950. Succeeding quotations from Barnard are from his chapter xii.

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cepted by a contributor or 'member' of the organization as governing the action he contributes. . . ." And again, "the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in 'persons of authority' or those who issue these orders." This concept means, if anything, that the source of authority lies in the members of an organization, that they confer authority upon their superior by deigning to accept and act upon commands, that they may, if they wish, decide to accept orders seriatim, and that they may withdraw conferred authority at any time by refusing to obey the commands of their superiors.

Barnard does appear to be somewhat disturbed by the obvious conflict between the widely held legal conception of authority and his own, but he proceeds to show that there *really* is no cause for alarm if one merely sprinkles the discussion with such words as "usually", "greater part", "most of", "considerable", and "essentially"—words which scientists have long since plucked from their lexicon.

The fact of the matter is that Barnard leaves the reader with a distinctly queasy feeling. He does cite two sources which are presumably included to buttress the position which he takes on authority. He has two sentences from Roberto Michels' article in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* and three sentences from General Harbord's *The American Army in France*. But even these sources, doubtful as they are for the purposes in hand, are dismissed by the cavalier statement, "We must not rest our definition, however, on general opinion." Overlooking the fact that two opinions certainly do not make "general opinion", Barnard proceeds with his entire discussion of authority on the basis of personal musings.

Mr. Barnard is not alone in his ideas about the source of a manager's authority. Robert Tannenbaum [4] dubs as "formal" the authority of a manager when it is viewed as "originating at the top of an organization hierarchy and flowing downward therein through the process of delegation." He thinks of "informal" authority as a right conferred upon a manager by his

[4] Robert Tannenbaum, "Managerial Decision-Making", *The Journal of Business*, XXIII, 1 (January 1950).

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subordinates. Thus, informal authority is equated with Barnard's complete concept. But Tannenbaum, as a practical matter, does not actually differ from Barnard because he says,

> The real source of the authority possessed by an individual lies in the acceptance of its exercise by those who are subject to it. It is the subordinates of an individual who determine the authority which he may wield. Formal authority is, in effect, nominal authority. It becomes real only when it is accepted.

In order to substantiate this conception of authority, Tannenbaum quotes approvingly from Barnard, Kardiner, Benne and Simon. The citation attributed to Kardiner does not appear to me to be particularly applicable because he is, in that place, concerned with parental authority, and even in this respect is generalizing from a report of one case which illustrates a relationship between a mother and a very dependent child. Benne has written a thoughtful book in which his interest is to develop a theory of authority from a psychological approach. But even Benne says, "Certainly no one could be more aware than I am that the conceptual analysis of authority which I have sought to carry through is in need of further testing, clarification, and correction." [5] Perhaps unnoticed, the quotation from Simon does not support the position taken by either Barnard or Tannenbaum, although it may be said parenthetically that this source could be used to support either the historical position or that of the dissentients. And I may add that Selekman [6] simply cannot make up his mind on the subject so he says:

> It is true enough that the management executive must, directly or indirectly, obtain consent to his decisions from the men under him; the importance of such consent now receives ever-increasing recognition. Nonetheless, the manager still wields authority over his workers as of right—a right delegated to him by the owners of the business.

Thus the pendulum has swung from the theory that the source of authority rests with property owners to the theory

[5] Kenneth D. Benne, *A Conception of Authority* (New York, 1943), p. 157.

[6] Benjamin M. Selekman, *Labor Relations and Human Relations* (New York, 1947), pp. 175-76.

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that it lies with the subordinate members of an organization. It is now moving back from the latter extreme to a position where it points in both directions. This is not an eclectic theory: authority is merely thought of as bifurcated.

III. *The Implications of Dissent*

At this point I believe that it is pertinent to comment upon certain assumptions underlying the theory of authority which is supported by Barnard and Tannenbaum, and upon the implication of this theory. Mr. Barnard is greatly impressed by his citation of instances wherein members of an organization refuse to obey the commands of their superiors. His cases are rather meagre. He should look into the discussion of this matter by Charles Merriam.[7] Of course, it is generally recognized that there are many instances of refusal to obey. Who has not heard of Tolstoy and his boycott of government, Gandhi and his passive resistance, Americans and their Eighteenth Amendment, and our own revolution which brought us independence? But to generalize from this behavior that the source of authority *therefore* rests with the subordinates, the ordered, the workers, the individual citizens is assuredly a *non sequitur*. These instances merely tell us that sometimes (and, indeed, not very often) subordinates do refuse to obey. An acceptable theory of authority would have to include these phenomena within its framework but not to the exclusion of the much more important patterns of obedience.

In describing how subordinates confer authority upon their superiors, these writers leave the distinct impression that such is the procedure within each organization. Now if this were the actual case, every organization would be in the hands of subordinates. The dream of Sorel and the Syndicalists would be realized.[8] Owners would be quickly deprived of all of their rights. Trade and industrial unions would be triumphant in the destruction of enterprise. Do these writers realize the implications of their doctrine? It is exceedingly doubtful, although neither raises the question.

[7] *Political Power* (New York, 1943), pp. 156 *et seq.*

[8] For a synopsis see J. Ramsey Macdonald, *Syndicalism* (Chicago, *circa* 1913).

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Authority is the right to command or to act. It implies the possession of the power to coerce, for obviously if there were no way to enforce an order the enterprise would become disorganized and unable to achieve its purpose. To realize how clear this is, the reader should imagine what would happen in a business if workers failed to adhere to the opening and closing hours of work; if individual players on a football team decided to engage their opposites in competition at any time; if the local government could not punish the violators of traffic regulations; and what actually did happen under the Articles of Confederation when the central government taxed the states.

Now, if subordinates do confer authority on their superiors, they must also confer the right to levy sanctions, even to coerce.[9] Neither Barnard nor his followers deal with this aspect. Tannenbaum does get close when he has the subordinate include the disadvantage of coercion in his hedonistic calculus to determine whether or not to obey. But does this mean that such subordinate did in fact confer upon his superior the right to levy sanctions? It seems most unrealistic so to assume.

In the last two decades so much propaganda has poured forth from the trade unions and nonbusiness enterprises that the business manager may be forgiven if he has begun to think that for him there may be, indeed, no rights. He is warned about the political power of the organized workers; he sees that many enterprises are engaged in illegal activities without repression; he is instructed by psychologists on the danger of creating a " block " in the attitudes of his employees; he is taught that the productivity of labor would rise phenomenally if he would only quaff deeply of the milk of human kindness; and, lastly, he is told in a convincing manner that *really* he has no authority except that which his subordinates give to him.

It is anarchistic to imagine that subordinates confer authority on their superiors. This teaching is perilous because it provides a philosophical basis for the direct action of subordinates, for unilateral action, for the complete control of the enterprise by organized workers, for power without responsibility.

[9] Coercion includes sanctions and the compulsion of obedience despite the lack of approval of a majority.

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IV. *A Theory of Authority*

A search of the literature on the source of authority reveals that it is the political theorist who has been most concerned with this problem. Inquiry into the source of authority has been made at least since the Greek city-states flourished. As the symbol of power seemed to sway from emperors to churchmen to victorious generals to divine-right kings to parliaments, there were always writers at hand with a theory about the origin of authority. Sometimes they were mere time-servers catering to a sovereign, sometimes they were churchmen intent upon the aggrandizement of ecclesiastical power, sometimes they were mere propagandists who wanted to provide an apparently reasonable basis for a " movement ", and sometimes they were learned men who were genuinely interested in trying to find a satisfactory explanation.

A generally acceptable theory of the source of authority would have to begin with a clear understanding of the natural rights of man. Without arguing the question, it may reasonably be assumed that there is a human nature, that it is the same for all men, and that man is gifted with intelligence as a result of which he acts with understanding and with the power to determine for himself the ends for which he strives. The natural rights of man are summarized in the law of mankind and in the natural law.[10] These consist of what man " ought " to do, as we

[10] According to Radin (see *infra* note 12), there have been three rather distinct legal traditions. Aristotle, noting the dichotomy, taught that there was a law by nature and a law by convention. (The Stoics and the Churchmen felt that the latter was no law at all.) A second tradition conceived the law as of two parts, the civil law, that is, the law of a particular community, and the *ius gentium* which was based on the nature of man. The third tradition conceived of a law as a triple transmission, namely, the civil law, the *ius gentium*, and natural law. The second and third comprised the Roman legal tradition.

The *ius gentium* was discoverable by observation—an innately scientific approach because what men do is natural and it can be observed. Now it so happens that the early writers and travelers were more interested in the differences between peoples than in the similarities. Consequently, the reports of how men lived seldom contained information which we would consider vital from the point of view of the moral unity of mankind. The critics of natural law have seized upon this omission, emphasized the divergencies, and concluded that there really was no *ius gentium*. But careful research does note many similarities which have become the root of the regulation of property, family life and penology. Its modern fruit may be ob-

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understand by the duty-right identity, and of what man "may" do. The sum of these natural rights is the sum of our liberties. It is "law" in the older sense. As a community changes its characteristics, these rights may increase in number, complexity, nature and content—indeed, become such a problem that for mnemonic purposes attempts are frequently made to codify them.

Somehow the moral sense of mankind has developed along with the process of becoming civilized. True it is that our moral unity had a precarious beginning in the right of a man to protection should he be cast upon strange shores. The principle was well understood in Homeric times that the rights of man did not arise from a political authority or from a tradition in any one country. In the course of a few millenia the rights of man have increased manyfold and have now found their best expression in the Declaration of Human Rights.[11] "More men than ever before would think it impossible to deny that men as men have rights, and by admitting that they have, they would be asserting the kind of law for which 'natural law' is a bad name, but still a name."[12] The measure of our civilization is the continuous expansion of these rights.

It profits little to speculate about natural rights as they may have existed in the "original state of nature". Anthropological evidence reflects the universal existence of relatively large social units from the earliest times of which there is a record. This means that everywhere man has developed an organized behavior. He has naturally chosen to live a community life.

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served in the law of commerce and, since the Dark Ages, in the universal punishment of acts of aggression against man which includes such matters as the security of life, property, person, and family relations.

The concept of natural law was considerably different. It was held that law was derived from reason, that right reason would command what was good and forbid what was bad. Thus the Stoics, arguing from suppressed premises of accepted moral standards, pointed out that slavery was quite proper according to the *ius gentium*, but was irrational since it violated natural law.

[11] Myres S. MacDougal and Gertrude C. K. Leighton, "The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action", *The Yale Law Review*, vol. 59, No. 1 (December 1949).

[12] Max Radin, "Natural Law and Natural Rights", *The Yale Law Review*, vol. 59, No. 2 (January 1950), p. 232.

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Now, the *order* in organized behavior implies authority—the right to command coupled with the right to coerce. Malinowski is emphatic in saying that "submission to laws as well as the power to enforce laws and rules are indispensable in human behavior." [13] Otherwise, there will only be anarchy. West is of the opinion that

> *The prime requisite and firm creator of any community life is a law of order maintained by force.* For human nature is such that, in all its most necessary social relationships, it is subject to the permanent threat of the self-assertive impulse, which misinterprets facts, misjudges events, and then, through consequent self-justificatory passion, breaks the social bond, unless it be externally restrained. We may claim this as adequately confirmed. Nursery studies and family life confirm it. Social and natural history confirm it. Modern psychology confirms it. And finally, our common sense tends to confirm it—for all others except ourselves, which is in itself a final confirmation. Individual, group or nation-state, we cannot judge our own cause. And if we try to do so, we shall be reduced again and again to fighting for a supposed "right" against a supposed "wrong," for one set of illusions against another.[14]

Thus man, as an intelligent and sentient being, has chosen to establish an authoritative institution which we have called a tribe, a clan, or a state—the highest expression of the institutional side of secular life—as the best means of furthering the enjoyment of his natural rights.

Quite clearly, then, the state is a mechanism or tool for achieving certain purposes willed collectively by the citizens. The latter, as a group, evaluate their civilization in terms of "what to do next", or, negatively, in terms of the limiting factors. If the state appears to offer better means of achieving their objectives than individual action, the right to act in the area of the limiting factor(s) will be granted in the basic constitution or an amendment thereto. It is obviously unrealistic to think of the peoples of the various states in the world evaluating their objectives in the same way or in the same order of

[13] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Freedom and Civilization* (New York, 1944), p. 27.

[14] Ranyard West, *Conscience and Society* (London, 1942), p. 240.

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importance. The pursuit of happiness to a Russian may very well be visualized in terms of higher living standards and, until some degree of satiety is achieved in this area, he may not feel at all that free speech or private property is important. Other people may evaluate peace most highly, and be quite willing to overlook incursions upon free enterprise as long as they are protected—a situation that seems to exist today in China and certain Latin-American countries. Thus, it appears reasonable to look upon a people as having a scale of values relative to the development of its civilization; this scale may change with changes in environment, and so on; it is the strategic or limiting or obstructing factor which stands in the way of achieving its purposes, and consequently it is this factor that must first be removed. In the course of time, successive limiting factors are gradually overcome until a people may, ideally, develop a noble civilization in fullest measure.

It is not implied that there is a necessary positive growth factor in the extent to which the objectives of a people are achieved. Should the environmental factors move adversely to the growth of culture, a new evaluation of objectives would be required. For instance, it is conceivable that external forces may combine with internal elements to bring about the loss of a free press in the United States. After a time the citizens may be persuaded that their greatest danger is foreign invasion; that to fend off this threat, free speech, private property, and so on, are really unimportant. A large share of the national product would be devoted to building a "defense". Such a development would, quite clearly, result in a cultural regression similar to that experienced by the great empires which pass in review before the historian.

Neither should it be assumed that because a group is not presently allowed to enjoy certain natural rights it is thereby forever deprived of them. Governments, exercising coercive power, can and frequently do deprive a people of many liberties. This may be done by overemphasizing other objectives the accomplishment of which saps the attention and the substance of a people to a point where the natural rights which it enjoys are disparagingly evaluated. ". . . the people is never corrupted,

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but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad." [15]

Thus, in considering the degree to which natural rights are enjoyed by a people it makes little difference whether its government uses sanctions or coercion. In the former case, a majority of the people approve of the actions taken, and in the latter case government is by minority. A governing group simply uses different means to keep people from reëvaluating objectives in such a way as to seek actively greater liberties than are presently enjoyed. The period over which success will attend these official efforts is a more or less short run. We know that it took many decades for a people to demand and get a Magna Carta, a monkish thesis tacked to a church door in Wittenberg, and a Declaration of Independence. But eventually freedom from certain types of political and religious repression was obtained. With the passage of time the periods of long struggle seem to grow shorter because the world itself is smaller: communication is swift, a higher level of education is achieved, the lessons of foreign struggles are fresh, and the power of foreign help is imminent. Those who yearn for liberty can now have the bright hope of achievement within their lifetime. Note how quickly the nations of Europe have freed themselves from the necessity of supporting a " royal " family; how rapidly has come the disintegration of British, French and Dutch imperialism; and how quickly spreads around the world the consensus of the United Nations.

And, finally, it should be noted that no social contract is implied. As is well known, Rousseau gave the greatest currency to such an idea. It was his view that there existed in fact a contract between the state and its people whereby in return for civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses, man gives up his natural liberty. This contract was thought of as inviolable without destruction of the state; man could not retrieve his bargain. Jefferson, on the other hand, unequivocally takes the position that the ultimate authority lay in the national will.[16]

[15] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses* (New York, 1950), p. 26.

[16] Charles M. Wiltse, *The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy* (Chapel Hill, 1935), p. 93.

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If the state fails to meet the expectations of the people, there is no reason why the grant of authority could not be modified, restricted, or retrieved. I look upon the state as a mechanism by which a people achieves certain purposes. It has no life of its own beyond that conferred by the national will and it must always be amenable to this will.

Upon its establishment, government proceeds to carry out the purposes of the people by the passage of laws and by providing for their interpretation through a legal system. A law is a rule of conduct approved and promulgated by government authority and enforced by sanctions. Morally, a law may not be enacted which is *ultra vires* of the governing authority. It must be within the areas of authority which the people have delegated to government. The subject matter of the laws may be derived from the generally accepted practices of a people as determined by the courts, it may be directly derived from the provisions of the basic constitution, and it may be conceived by legislators as a rule which will enhance the opportunity of the people to improve the hope of fulfillment of their human nature.

Now, part of the subject matter of legal systems is the well-established law of contract. This is the proximate source of a manager's authority. The relationship between the entrepreneur and employee is one of right-duty in which the manager has the *right to command* and the managed the *duty to obey*. While the employee has the *power* to disobey, and thus he may do so, he is subject to whatever penalties the law provides. Note carefully that *the exercise of the power to disobey does not deprive the manager of his authority.*

But, it may be asked, of what avail is authority when employees exercise their power of disobedience? The manager has recourse to the broad penalties of the law. These have proved generally effective in securing obedience in our society, for, be it remembered, man behaves in an organized way. If this recourse is insufficient, and disobedience spreads to universal proportions, the society is undergoing a revolution which may or may not be morally justified. But the end result will always be a new legal system and, possibly, a new set of managers and managed in which the former derive their authority from the same source as always—the collective will of the people.

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As long as the legislative activity of the government and the interpretive activity of the courts are confined to the areas set forth in the basic constitution of the people, the obedience of the latter can be taken for granted. It is a case of prior acceptance. If the trend of law or its interpretation appears to infringe upon the achievement of a people's objectives in a way which has not been foreseen, such a law or such interpretation of its meaning can be clarified by statute whenever the people as a whole so desire. A good case in point was the developing relationships between managers and labor just prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. It was the general sense of the people that the Wagner Act was being interpreted in such a way as to infringe upon the rights of both property owners and consumers. An attempt to protect these rights was made by the passage of a new statute.

But supposing, it may be said, that the government in question uses its police powers immorally by requiring obedience to laws which are not only *ultra vires* but are an infringement upon natural rights. For example, we are faced in the United States with a strong tendency among the people to approve of legislation which infringes upon the right of free speech and free press—a tendency which John Stuart Mill foresaw [17] and which was deplored by Justice Holmes in *Abrams v. United States*. When a government takes such action, it is a usurper. The people as a group have not granted authority to it in this area, but they will obey individually (sometimes) in the same way that we would deliver up our goods to a highwayman who has the " drop " on us. Force creates no right. But, of course, this is not the end of the matter. Education and other means of propaganda may ultimately be successful in reversing the legal interpretation, repealing the statute, or causing a new constitution to be written. Failing this, there is always the right of revolution which was invoked by George Washington and the Founding Fathers.

V. *Applications of the Theory*

In order to test this theory of the source of authority, various circumstances may be considered, especially those occasions when

[17] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York, 1885), chapter iv.

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it appears that "man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains": [18] the parent-child relationships; the operation of a government enterprise; and the managerial authority relationships in business enterprise.

Perhaps enough has already been written about the circumstances in Spain, Argentina, Russia, China—in fact, all areas that now seem to be outside the pale of democratic Western European culture—to indicate that there, indeed, the people appear to be in chains. But the essential point is that what appears to be a chain, as viewed from the vantage point of America, need not be and, indeed, probably is not so viewed by the majority of the inhabitants of those nations. They may consider that peace or economic welfare is the great desideratum. But we may look forward confidently to the time when, their present greatest desires having been achieved, they will reëvaluate their objectives and modify the authority of their governments in such a way as to permit the further development of their civilization.

Sometimes the relationship between parent and child is cited for the purpose of illustrating the delegation of authority by the child to the parent. The point is made that very early, and in progressive degree, the parent is defied and consequently deprived of authority. Now in most societies the patriarchal conception of the relationship between parent and child is very strong. We do not choose our parents. Neither do we "hold a quinquennial inquiry into the manner in which they have discharged their duties and decide, in the light of this, whether we shall continue to accept them or shall engage others." [19] Our marriage laws confer on a couple authority over their prospective children. They have this "anticipatory" authority in the same sense as the sheriff has authority to incarcerate a criminal before there is a crime. The asserted "rebellion" of the child should be viewed in the light of the anticipated adjustments by which parents gradually recede from particular relationships as the child's capacity to act in his own interest develops. Despite frequent poor timing, it is all "according to plan".

[18] Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[19] Allen, *loc. cit.*, p. 141.

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We in America have been conditioned during the past twenty years to view with approval the spectacle of our government engaging in the ownership and operation of a few yardstick enterprises. The TVA is a good example. What is the authority relationship of managers and subordinates in this activity? All subordinates have a duty to obey the lawful commands of their superior managers because the right to issue such orders descends from the people as a whole through the Constitution to the federal government which has approved the project. The use of coercive methods to secure acceptance of orders is the manager's right. The recalcitrant subordinate can and should be deprived of employment in this enterprise if he disobeys commands, for he not only endangers the success of the firm in achieving its objectives but he may not, as an individual, decide issues which are the prerogative of the collective will.

In the case of private business enterprise the authority relationships operate in much the same way. Americans have not deprived themselves of their common-law freedom to engage in business activity. It is true that elaborate safeguards for the rights of others have been spelled out in ordinance, rule, law and constitution, but within this framework anyone can engage in business as an individual proprietorship or on a partnership basis without special permission. Since corporations are legal persons created by law, their managers exercise authority which has reached them through the chain of delegation from the people to their constitution and thence through government to its creature. But whether a manager is operating an incorporated enterprise, or not, his subordinates are obliged to obey his lawful orders, as long as the employer-employee relationship exists, because the right to command issues ultimately from the collective will of the people. Neither the individual subordinate nor the trade union to which he may belong is in a position to disobey those commands. If there is doubt of their pertinency, the courts may adjudicate the matter. If both the right to command and its interpretation by the courts are unacceptable to individual or union, the proper procedure is to begin political action designed to bring about favorable legislation or an amendment to the constitution. A well-known recent instance of such action resulted in the passage of the Wagner Act.

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VI. *Summary*

Writers in the field of management have either neglected to consider the source of a manager's authority, or they have made the bland assumption that it derives from the right of private property. These positions left them open to vigorous criticism, especially by those who assert that the manager derives authority from his employees. Neither of these positions appears tenable to the present writer. My thesis is that: (1) man as man has natural rights derived from the law of mankind and from the natural law; (2) somehow, man has developed a moral sense; (3) man has always behaved in an organized way and thus submits to laws and the power to enforce them; (4) the tool created for the purpose of developing statute law and confirming natural law is the state; (5) part of the legal system is the law of contract which establishes the right of a manager to command and the duty of the managed to obey; (6) the managed have the power to disobey but the broad penalties of the law generally prove sufficient, along with the natural behavior of man, to achieve obedience; and (7) at the extreme, universal disobedience results in revolution which is succeeded by another legal system embodying status or contract law which is approved by the collective will of the people. The source of managerial authority cannot be conferred upon a manager by an employee; nor is it derived from property rights. It rests ultimately in the nature of man.

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AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND JAPAN'S NO-WAR CONSTITUTION

THE war in Korea and the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty have drawn the attention of the world to the rôle which Japan is to play in the cold war. Although Japan was completely demilitarized immediately after World War II, the conviction is growing among the Western Powers and in Japan that for self-defense in the present world situation Japan must have an effective army and navy. A principal hindrance to that rearmament, however, is the new Japanese Constitution, which renounces war and the maintenance of armed forces forever. How has it come about that the Japanese people have adopted a Constitution which deprives them of arms as a means of self-defense? The story of how the no-war Constitution came into being is perhaps the most remarkable episode in the history of the Occupation of Japan.

When they surrendered to the Allied Powers, the Japanese formally "accepted" the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, which, among other things, called for the strengthening of democratic tendencies, respect for human rights, and the establishment "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people [of] a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

On October 4, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), urged Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Deputy Premier of the outgoing Higashi-Kuni Cabinet, to take the lead in reforming the Constitution. Prince Konoye, who had been Premier when Japan launched her "Holy War" against China in 1937, obtained appointments for himself and Professor Sōichi Sasaki from the Emperor to investigate the proposed revision of the Constitution in the Office of the Lord Privy Seal. At about the same time, Ambassador George C. Atcheson, Jr., political adviser to the Supreme Commander,

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confidentially informed Prince Konoye of twelve " points which SCAP considered basic " in the revision of the Constitution.[1]

Prince Konoye's assumption of the task of constitutional revision was violently attacked in both Japan and the United States. In the former country it was asserted by noted publicists that the Cabinet rather than the Lord Privy Seal was responsible for advising the Emperor on constitutional revision, so that the Konoye investigation was unconstitutional or at least undemocratic, the Lord Privy Seal being in no way responsible to the Cabinet or the Diet. In the United States, particular objection was made to the selection of Prince Konoye to direct the revision because of his alleged war guilt.[2]

On November 1, SCAP Headquarters issued a statement denying that General MacArthur had chosen Prince Konoye personally to revise the Constitution.[3] This disavowal appears to have been inspired less by the criticism of Konoye as a reactionary than by a desire to prevent State Department officials, who were in contact with Konoye's associates, from influencing constitutional revision.[4]

Notwithstanding their loss of support from Allied Headquarters, Prince Konoye and Professor Sasaki made reports to the Emperor on November 22 and 24, in which they recommended extensive revisions in the Imperial Constitution intended to enhance the powers of the Diet and in other ways democratize the government, without altering the theory embodied in the old Constitution that sovereignty rested in the Emperor.[5] The Office of the Lord Privy Seal was abolished on

[1] Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington, 1951), vol. I, p. 91.

[2] Editorial in the *New York Times*, September 28, 1945.

[3] *Nippon Times*, November 3, 1945.

[4] Theodore McNelly, " Domestic and International Influences on Constitutional Revision in Japan, 1945-1946 " (Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1952. On microfilm, Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1952), pp. 46-47.

[5] The Konoye recommendations were published in *Mainichi Shimbun* on December 21, 1945, and have been republished in Isao Satō's *Kempō Kaisei no Keika* (*The Progress of Constitutional Revision*) (Tokyo, 1947), pp. 275-277. An English translation is in McNelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 382-386.

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November 24, and Prince Konoye, after being indicted as a war criminal, committed suicide in December. Nothing whatsoever came of his recommendations.

General MacArthur, on November 11, 1945, informed Prime Minister Shidehara that the accomplishment of the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration would "unquestionably involve a liberalization of the Constitution." Shidehara appointed Minister of State Jōji Matsumoto to head a committee of scholars and officials to determine whether or not the Constitution needed to be revised and, if so, to what extent. The Cabinet's committee on constitutional revision had no connection whatsoever with the Konoye group, which was investigating the identical problem in the Office of the Lord Privy Seal.

In his 1946 New Year's message to the Japanese people, Emperor Hirohito disclaimed his divinity, thus repudiating that part of Article 3 of the Imperial Constitution which stated that the Emperor was sacred.

In the meantime, political parties and private individuals and civic groups published outline and draft constitutions. The outlines of the Liberal, Progressive, and Social Democratic parties all provided for retention of the Emperor, increased powers for the Diet, and enhancement of civil rights. The Social Democratic draft, however, was more liberal than those of the conservative parties, particularly because it contained a modification of the principle of imperial sovereignty. The Japan Communist party proposed a "Japanese People's Republic" with a unicameral legislature based on universal suffrage.

The Cabinet, in its report to SCAP Headquarters early in February 1946, recommended a group of amendments to the text of the Imperial Constitution designed to enhance the powers of the Diet and to guarantee popular rights without, however, altering the principle that sovereignty resided with the Emperor.[6]

General MacArthur was completely dissatisfied with the exceedingly conservative recommendations of the Cabinet. He was advised by the chief of his Government Section that he had virtually unrestricted authority to direct the revision of the

[6] Text in SCAP, Government Section, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 617-621.

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Japanese Constitution as he saw fit, until such time as the Far Eastern Commission formulated a policy on the matter. He could not remove the Emperor, however, without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[7]

The Supreme Commander immediately directed his Government Section to prepare a draft Constitution to "guide" the Japanese government in its efforts and stipulated that the draft include the following three points.

I

The Emperor is at the head of the State.

His succession is dynastic.

His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsible to the basic will of the people as provided therein.

II

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.

III

The feudal system of Japan will cease.

No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lives of those now existent.

No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody within itself any National or Civic power of Government.

Pattern budget after British system.[8]

Thus General MacArthur originated the famous clause in the new Japanese Constitution in which Japan forever renounces war and the maintenance of arms.[9]

[7] Memorandum from Brigadier General Courtney Whitney to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, February 1, 1946. Full text in *ibid.*, pp. 622-623.

[8] From MacArthur's own notes, cited in *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 102.

[9] In his New Year's message to the Japanese people in 1950, General MacArthur referred to the no-war clause as "a product of Japanese thought" (*Contemporary*

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SCAP's Government Section prepared its draft Constitution in deepest secrecy and without reference to either the Far Eastern Commission or the Allied Council for Japan, Allied agencies which had been established in December 1945 to make policy for Japan, but had not yet begun functioning. The haste and secrecy with which the draft Constitution was prepared strongly suggest that the Supreme Commander wished to direct the revision of the Constitution without interference from the United States government or from the Allied control agencies.

The SCAP draft Constitution was a completely new document rather than a mere list of amendments to the text of the old Imperial Constitution. The SCAP draft was presented as a "guide" to the Shidehara Cabinet on February 13, 1946, with the understanding that if the Cabinet did not sponsor such a Constitution, General MacArthur would go over the head of the Cabinet and present it directly to the Japanese people.[10] The conservative half of the Cabinet, led by Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida, strongly opposed the provisions of the SCAP draft and made an unsuccessful effort to persuade General MacArthur to soften his demands. The conservatives in the Cabinet were finally overridden after the Emperor declared himself in favor of a thoroughgoing revision of the Constitution and two government officials favoring acceptance of the SCAP proposals were made members of the Cabinet.

On March 4 the Japanese Cabinet presented to SCAP Headquarters a draft Constitution embodying all of the features of the SCAP draft with the exception that it provided for a bicameral rather than a unicameral legislature. The bicameral legislature was acceptable to General MacArthur, and on March

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Japan, vol. XIX, Nos. 1-3, January-March, 1950, p. 139). MacArthur further asserted during the Senate hearings on his dismissal in 1951 that the no-war clause was first proposed by Premier Shidehara (*U. S. News and World Report*, vol. XX, May 18, 1951, p. 60). However, no such clause appears in the Cabinet proposals for constitutional revision submitted to MacArthur only two days before he drafted his "three points". SCAP, Government Section, *op. cit.*, nowhere credits the origination of the war-renunciation clause to the Japanese. Irrespective of the origin of the no-war clause, there is no question that MacArthur's support for it was decisive in its adoption.

[10] SCAP, Government Section, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 105.

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6, 1946, the Japanese government made public its SCAP-inspired draft Constitution. At the same time, the Supreme Commander, without obtaining the concurrence of the Allied Powers represented in the Far Eastern Commission, published his emphatic approval of the document. He praised the renunciation-of-war clause as " foremost of its provisions ".

The Constitution figured as only a secondary issue in the election of April 10, 1946, because the voters were primarily interested in a solution of their economic difficulties and because all of the political parties, save the Communist, had abandoned their own proposals for constitutional revision and announced their support of the general principles of the SCAP-approved draft.

On April 17 the government published a new version of its draft Constitution written in colloquial Japanese—a revolutionary innovation in the history of Japanese law. The use of colloquial rather than classical Japanese appears to have been largely the result of proddings from SCAP Headquarters. The new draft contained a few substantive changes which had been cleared with SCAP's Government Section, the principal one of which provided that when the House of Representatives was dissolved, the House of Councillors (the proposed upper House) could enact temporary emergency legislation.

During the critical food shortage of May 1946, a series of Leftist-led mass demonstrations in Tokyo led to the issuance by General MacArthur of a " Warning Against Mob Disorder and Violence ". This warning and the disposition of American tanks near the Prime Minister's official residence were interpreted as a threat of intervention by American troops in any attempted Communist revolution in Japan. Immediately following General MacArthur's statement, there was a marked decline in the size and number of popular demonstrations. The warning against mob violence meant, of course, that the Supreme Commander would not countenance the establishment by revolution of a Leftist government and that any change in the form of government would have to come about through nonviolent methods.

When the Ninetieth Diet convened in June 1946, the new

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Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, stated that revision of the Constitution was necessary to fulfill the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, which Japan had accepted when surrendering to the Allies. The old Constitution was very vague concerning the right of the Diet to modify constitutional amendments proposed by the Emperor, but General MacArthur settled doubts on this score by announcing that the Diet was free to accept, modify, or reject the draft Constitution presented to it. No serious opposition was anticipated, however, since the government parties (Liberal and Progressive) controlled a majority and the chief opposition party (Social Democratic) supported the general principles of the draft Constitution.

The Far Eastern Commission, on July 2, 1946, issued a statement of its "Basic Principles for a New Constitution". The FEC Basic Principles required either the establishment of a democratic republic or the democratization of the monarchical government. The SCAP-inspired draft Constitution was already in general conformity with the essential principles embodied in the FEC document, largely because both documents had been influenced by policy papers prepared in the United States State Department during the war. In matters of detail, however, the SCAP-inspired draft did not completely conform with the FEC Basic Principles.

SCAP Headquarters was successful in influencing the Diet Committees on constitutional reform to sponsor amendments to the Constitution Revision Bill which brought the draft Constitution into complete conformity with the Far Eastern Commission's Basic Principles. Provisions inserted by the two Houses of the Diet in the draft Constitution as the result of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission were (1) clarification of the principle that sovereignty resides in the people, (2) selection of the Prime Minister and the majority of the Cabinet from the Diet, (3) civilian status for all Cabinet members, (4) universal suffrage, and (5) transference of all property of the imperial household to the state.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives, a Liberal, attempted to prevent the Constitution Subcommittee from recommending the FEC-inspired amendment which would transfer

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all imperial household property to the state. This display of partisanship by the Speaker antagonized many of the Progressives (a government party) and provoked the Social Democrats to move no confidence in the Speaker, who was finally forced to resign.

A number of other amendments, cleared with SCAP and of no fundamental importance, were made in the draft Constitution by the Diet acting on its own initiative. The most important was that providing for the *immediate* abolition of all titles of peerage, rather than their extinction with the deaths of their present holders, as originally prescribed by General MacArthur.

Hitoshi Ashida, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Constitution Committee, has recently claimed credit for toning down paragraph 2 of General MacArthur's war-renunciation clause. He inserted a phrase intended to qualify the prohibition of armaments. The revised Article 9, with Mr. Ashida's insertion italicized, reads as follows:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
>
> *In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,* land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

In a magazine article published in 1951,[11] Mr. Ashida held that the first paragraph of Article 9 " means just what it says; that the thought of war of aggression will be forsaken; it should be evident to anyone that it does not mean the abandonment of the right of self-defense." Mr. Ashida went on to explain his rôle in the modification of Article 9:

> The phrase, " *in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,*" was first inserted by me into the amended draft presented to the House of Representatives. The original said simply,

[11] Hitoshi Ashida, " Japan: Communists' Temptation ", *Contemporary Japan,* vol. XX, Nos. 1-3 (January-March, 1951), pp. 15-24.

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> "*armed forces of the army, navy and air-force will not be maintained.*" My opinion at that time was, and now is that to prohibit the maintenance and employment of armed forces even for self-defense is absurd, and that the prohibition is limited by the phrase "*in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph.*"

It would appear that this interpretation of the modified no-war clause (to mean that armaments for self-defense are permissible) is considerably at variance with MacArthur's original text of the clause, in which Japan was to renounce war "even for the preservation of its own security."

The amended draft Constitution was passed almost unanimously in both Houses of the Diet on October 7, 1946, notwithstanding strenuous objections made to some of its provisions, especially those which stripped the Emperor of his prerogatives. The only political party voting against the draft Constitution was the Communist, which in July had published its draft Constitution for a "People's Republic". The new "Constitution of Japan" was sanctioned and promulgated by the Emperor as "amendments of the Imperial Constitution" on November 3, 1946, to become effective May 3, 1947.

On October 17, 1946, the Far Eastern Commission adopted a policy providing that both the Diet and the Far Eastern Commission should between May 3, 1948 and May 3, 1949 "review the situation with respect to the Constitution." It also stated that the Commission might require a referendum or other procedure to ascertain Japanese opinion on the Constitution. General MacArthur, however, did not inform the Japanese government of this policy until the Commission threatened to make it public. Neither the Diet nor the Far Eastern Commission formally reviewed the Constitution during the specified period, nor was any referendum held.

There is no question that the United States Occupation authorities in Japan, particularly General MacArthur, played the dominant rôle in bringing into existence the new Japanese Constitution.

American policy on Japanese armament has recently undergone a radical change. When the Korean war broke out in

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1950, General MacArthur authorized the Japanese government to establish the National Police Reserve of 75,000 men organized along military lines, trained and equipped by the United States. Complementing the Police Reserve is an embryo navy known as the Maritime Safety Board. In 1951, General MacArthur privately urged Japanese statesmen to strike out Article 9 to permit arming the country.[12]

Today two of the leading questions in Japanese politics are how much Japan should rearm and whether rearmament requires a change in the Constitution.

Theodore McNelly

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[12] Demaree Bess, "Is Japan Hoping for World War III?" *Saturday Evening Post*, vol. 225, No. 4 (July 26, 1952), p. 27. It was believed premature to advocate openly the amendment of the Constitution, although, in his New Year's message to the Japanese people in 1951, General MacArthur hinted that revision of the no-war clause might be necessary. The text of the message is given in *Contemporary Japan*, vol. XX, Nos. 1-3 (January-March, 1951), p. 120.

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REVIEWS

U. N. O. and War Crimes. By VISCOUNT MAUGHAM. With a Postscript by Lord Hankey. London, John Murray, 1951.—vi, 143 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*

In his little volume, Viscount Maugham, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain in 1938-1939, is concerned primarily with the impact of the Nuremberg Charter (August 8, 1945) and Judgment (October 1, 1946) upon international law. In a succinct and challenging Postscript, Lord Hankey, who has held a variety of responsible offices in England, discusses the war crimes trials and the resulting situation from the political and moral standpoint. Both studies throw much light on the history of the trials and that of pertinent documents.

It is not easy to do justice in a brief review to Viscount Maugham's closely knit, albeit somewhat repetitious, argument. It will be remembered that the Nuremberg Charter made the "major war criminals of the European Axis countries" chargeable on three counts (Article 6): (a) Crimes against Peace; (b) War Crimes (violation of the laws and customs of war); and (c) Crimes against Humanity. Viscount Maugham deals chiefly with the first category of crimes, that is, "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." In no sense an apologist for the German war criminals, Viscount Maugham holds that the sentences imposed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, "severe as they were, did not depart from the ordinary principles of justice," and that the thirty-two American judges in the twelve trials held in the American Zone under Law No. 10 (enacted by the Control Council of Germany, December 20, 1945, the wording of which Viscount Maugham severely criticizes) "on the whole assumed that Law No. 10 did not compel them to convict any person if he was innocent according to the ordinary ideas of justice of the crime alleged against him." Viscount Maugham's argument therefore is directed not so much against the German war crimes trials as such—although he clearly doubts their wisdom from the point of view of policy and justice—as against the attempt to derive from the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment general principles of international law.

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Viscount Maugham takes strong exception to the *dictum* of the Nuremberg Tribunal that "the Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but . . . it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its [Nuremberg Tribunal] creation; and to that extent it is itself a contribution to international law." The Nuremberg Charter, in his opinion, "was not intended or designed to express international law. Nor could four nations or four judges from those nations create a rule of international law which had never previously been published to the world or agreed to by the concert of Nations." Both the Charter and the Tribunal, according to this view, were Acts of State "in the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which Germany unconditionally surrendered." Viscount Maugham denies the contention of the Nuremberg Tribunal that the Briand-Kellogg Pact (the Pact of Paris, August 27, 1928), which relied exclusively on the sanction of public opinion, provided the legal basis for the prosecution of crimes against peace.[1] "The greatest mistake of the Charter", he writes, "was in making participation in an aggressive war or a war in breach of treaties a terrible crime punishable by the most serious of all penalties." A rapid survey of historical precedents (The Crimea, the Boer War, the First World War) leads him to the conclusion that "it is impossible to be confident that our enemies were the aggressors and that we were totally innocent of that offence." Moreover, the London Conference (1945), which drew the Charter, proved incapable of framing an acceptable

[1] In an illuminating digression Viscount Maugham addresses himself to the crucial question: what is international law? He quotes Sir Henry Maine's observation that "the founders of . . . international law 'though they did not create a sanction, created a law-abiding sentiment.'" Viscount Maugham holds that "except as the result of consent no new rule of international law can be imposed so as to have any binding force on a State merely by the will of other civilized States." By "binding force" he means "the force of universal public opinion among nations. It is not binding in the ordinary sense since it is not imposed by a political superior power, nor is there at present any legal way of enforcing it." The "great body of jurists", in Viscount Maugham's opinion, accept the statement of Sir Frederick Pollock that "the final test of validity must in the case of international law, no less than in that of any other customary law, be found in general consent evidenced by conduct." The failure of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Pact of Paris to prevent war (and, it may be added, the current unhappy experience of the United Nations in Korea) corroborate the above contention. The conclusion would seem to be inescapable that "a rule punishing the authors of an aggressive war could only be enforced by the victors after and during an occupation."

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definition of aggression. The main difficulty, which, according to Lord Hankey, "was not recorded in the proceedings owing to its delicacy, was with the Russians whose 'aggressions' against Finland in 1939 had been solemnly condemned in the swan-song of the Assembly of the League of Nations . . . and whose occupation of the Baltic Provinces, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia were also open to criticism as aggressions in breach of treaty." The principles of the Nuremberg Charter, it is held, are incompatible with Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 18, 1948.[2] Viscount Maugham and Lord Hankey are aroused not only by the technical weakness but also by "the complete injustice of the suggested rule of international law." "I do not see", writes Viscount Maugham, "how such men as Nelson and Wellington could have escaped if Great Britain had been defeated and such an article as 6(a) had existed."

Lord Hankey's trenchant Postscript deals with the broad implications of the Charter and the Judgment. He believes that, from the legal, political and moral standpoint, the trials were a disastrous mistake. "For all the injuries which can be inflicted on a defeated foe," he writes, "War Crimes Trials are the most insulting, humiliating and unsettling." They have established a frightful precedent which other victor nations may well follow. His apprehensions are shared by some of the leading statesmen and jurists on both sides of the Atlantic. "His Majesty's Government have throughout doubted the desirability and practicability, especially in view of the time factor, of the formal establishment of an inter-allied Court by Treaty for this purpose", Mr. Eden wrote to the War Crimes Commission on January 4, 1945. "In my opinion such a procedure is unworthy of the traditions of our people or of the immense sacrifices that they made to advance the common ideals of mankind", said Mr. Justice Murphy in a dissenting judgment (concurred by Mr. Justice Rutledge) in the case of Yamashita in the Supreme Court of the United States (February 4, 1946). ". . . To subject an enemy belligerent to an unfair trial, to charge him

[2] Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal....

Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law in a public trial at which he had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

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with an unrecognized crime, and to vent on him our retributive emotions only antagonizes the enemy nation and hinders the reconciliation necessary to a peaceful world."

Lord Hankey proposes a four-point program: (1) agreement to initiate no more war crimes trials and the speedy release of the persons convicted by reëxamination, " with a view to a universal amnesty in the near future "; (2) avoidance by belligerents of threats of unconditional surrender and war crimes trials that are liable to prolong war and hamper the restoration of peace; (3) limitation of future war crimes trials to charges of breaches of the laws of war, to the exclusion of crimes against peace and humanity; and (4) strict conformity of the trials with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions.

" Revenge is, of all satisfactions, the most costly and long drawn out; retributive persecution is, of all policies, the most pernicious ", said Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on October 28, 1948. " Our policy . . . should henceforward be to draw the sponge across the crimes and horrors of the past—hard as that may be—and look, for the sake of our salvation, towards the future. There can be no revival of Europe without the active and loyal aid ' of all the German tribes. . . .' " Few today would quarrel with this statement which is dictated by the exigencies of the international situation irrespective of any considerations of justice. The harm done by the war crimes trials —if harm it was—cannot be undone, but the trials are over and clemency has been exercised on a broad scale although universal amnesty is not yet in sight. Unfortunately the unhappy situation created by the Charter and the Judgment threatens to be perpetuated as a consequence of the well-meaning activities of the United Nations. A resolution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1946, " reaffirms the principles of international law recognized " by the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment and " directs " the international Law Commission " to treat as a matter of primary importance " the formulation of these principles " in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind." To prevent this resolution from coming to fruition is the principal object of Viscount Maugham's book.

At its first session in 1949, the International Law Commission appointed one of its members, Mr. J. Spiriopoulos, special rapporteur on the subject of war crimes. Mr. Spiriopoulos submitted a preliminary report to the second session in 1950, and a revised and amended report to the third session held in May-July 1951. After examining and rejecting a new set of definitions of aggression, the Commission would seem to have agreed with its rapporteur that " a ' legal ' definition

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would be artificial and insufficiently comprehensive 'since the methods of aggression are in a constant state of evolution.'"[3] Nevertheless the Commission, bound as it is by the terms of the resolution of December 1946 (now six years old) adopted at its third session the "Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind" which follows closely the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment. At this writing, the Code is awaiting action by the General Assembly.

While war crimes trials are little discussed in this country, they have produced a crop of increasingly adverse comments in Great Britain. The proposed Code, many believe, aims at introducing striking innovations in the venerable doctrines of international law. Its soundness and probable implications should be closely scrutinized in the light of the observations offered by Viscount Maugham and Lord Hankey.

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The Theory of International Economic Policy. Volume I: *The Balance of Payments.* By J. E. MEADE. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1951.—xvi, 432 pp. $5.50.

The Balance of Payments: Mathematical Supplement. By J. E. MEADE. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1951.—vi, 156 pp. $3.25.

In this monumental treatise, Professor Meade of the London School of Economics has set himself two main tasks: (1) to combine the Keynesian income approach with the traditional price theory of the balance-of-payments mechanism; and (2) to analyze a wide range of policy issues centering on the problem of harmonizing the requirements of internal and external balance; that is, of full employment without inflation and of balance-of-payments equilibrium without undue trade restrictions.

The writers who in the past ten years have applied the theory of employment to the field of international economics have, for the sake of simplicity, almost entirely abstracted from price changes. A comprehensive synthesis of price and income analysis in this field is the outstanding achievement of Meade's work. The marriage is performed with the help of many simplifying assumptions, but even so the product is highly complex. The price theory used is of the Hicksian type,

[3] *International Organization,* vol. V, No. 4, November 1951, p. 732.

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taking explicit account of both income and substitution effects of price changes. This does away with the dangerous models of partial-equilibrium analysis commonly employed in recent exchange-depreciation literature, in which export supplies and import demands depend solely on price and are treated as quite independent of each other.

Meade's synthesis encounters no difficulty in covering changes in productivity, shifts in demand, and capital movements, as well as deliberate policy changes. Meade himself attaches special importance to his analysis of capital movements, but some of his generalizations on this subject are admittedly rather uncertain. The theory of international investment cannot get very far without distinguishing between countries of different type and at different stages of economic development. On the level of abstraction on which Meade's analysis moves, such distinctions hardly appear at all.

On this level, Meade's model is undoubtedly a powerful and flexible tool of analysis. Some of the assumptions on which it rests are, however, open to question. It assumes throughout that domestic expenditure is not affected by changes in import prices; it assumes most of the time that the balance of payments is in equilibrium to start with and that, in effect, all goods enter into international trade (*Mathematical Supplement*, pp. 17, 46). In one case, the assumptions used are inconsistent (pp. 49 and 67 of the main book). While admiring the ingenuity and patience with which the model is composed, one cannot help feeling that here and there the structure creaks a little at the joints.

Changes in the terms of trade inevitably influence a country's real income in this analysis (e.g., p. 202). The corresponding effects of changes in the balance of trade are not so clearly brought out. In a state of full employment, an improvement in the trade balance has inflationary repercussions at home, and since these must be countered by cuts in domestic outlay to maintain internal balance, it thus affects real income (not consumption alone, as is recognized in a footnote on page 318, but possibly also investment). On page 307, for example, a deficit country, B, restricts its imports, and " to preserve internal balance the authorities in B must adopt a deflationary financial policy. . . ." One misses an explanation of the basic rationale of the " deflationary financial policy " in this situation: namely, the need to enforce the unavoidable reduction in total demand as and when the import surplus is reduced. It is not just a question of internal monetary equilibrium; it is more fundamentally a matter of real resources available for national consumption, investment, and government use.

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Even more characteristic than the marriage of price and income analysis is Meade's constant preoccupation with policy problems. This again distinguishes him from some earlier practitioners of the income approach to international trade. Chapter x on "Conflicts Between Internal and External Balance" is particularly interesting, and much of the rest of his work is directly concerned with the ways and means of reconciling the possible conflicts. Meade's treatment of the conceivable policy combinations, though formally unobjectionable, strikes me as somewhat mechanical, and does not permit a sharp distinction to emerge between the defensive and aggressive uses of such measures as exchange adjustment, changes in money wages and import restrictions (aggressive uses being those promoting internal balance at the expense of other countries). The distinction is fleetingly mentioned in a few places (pp. 154, 226, 306); it does not occupy the central position to which in my opinion it is entitled in any discussion of international economic policy.

Regardless of the formal range of possibilities, however, Meade comes out for exchange-rate variation as the main external equilibrator, relying on fiscal and credit policies to secure internal balance. With this general principle there is widespread agreement. But then there is a further choice to make: between the method of what Meade calls the "adjustable peg", which is the predominant one in the world today, and a system of continually fluctuating exchange rates. The author strongly favors the latter, subject to possible intervention by an international exchange equalization fund. His advocacy of this system may not convince those who are not already convinced, for they may find it a little one-sided. His hypothetical examples all refer to a situation in which a country gets into a "fundamental disequilibrium" that makes exchange depreciation sooner or later, in one way or another, inevitable. Little or no attention is paid to the case where a country, in external equilibrium to start with, experiences a highly favorable balance in one year followed by a big deficit in the next (or vice versa), ending up in equilibrium again in the third year. The comparative disadvantage of the adjustable peg system in the former case is matched by its comparative advantage in the latter. Since one can never predict whether an incipient disequilibrium will turn out to be of one type or the other, I cannot see that the score is all in favor of fluctuating exchanges. Nor can I find any recognition here of the peculiar difficulties that are apt to arise in the way of maintaining internal balance in the face of continually varying exchange rates. Meade implicitly endows the national authorities with an omnipotence

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and omniscience that make some of his solutions, complex though they may be, seem far too easy in comparison with the real world.

There is, moreover, a technical objection to fluctuating exchanges. If the price elasticities of demand in foreign trade are below a certain critical value, an appreciation instead of a depreciation of the exchange rate would be required to remove a deficit in the balance of payments. With a pegged exchange, the peg could simply be raised by an act of policy in these circumstances. With a free exchange rate, however, the deficit would lead to an automatic depreciation which in this case would worsen the deficit and lead to still greater depreciation. All this is clearly explained in the *Supplement* (p. 143), but in the main book I can find no mention of it. Since, as Meade frequently stresses, demand elasticities may be quite small in the short period even though they may be considerable in the longer run, this looks like a serious snag for a system of freely fluctuating exchanges.

The whole work is severely abstract. The only place where a real country (the United States) and a continent (Europe) are mentioned by way of example is a footnote on page 120. Anyone who might conclude, however, that the author is ill acquainted with the real world would be greatly mistaken. When Meade comes to deal with international commercial policy in Part V of his book (pp. 263-332) he proves himself thoroughly conversant with all modern tricks of trade restriction and exchange control. The last eleven of the thirty-one chapters of the book constitute, in fact, a brilliantly perceptive, up-to-date and comprehensive theory of commercial policy in relation to the balance of payments, and are alone well worth the price of the book.

Part VI (pp. 333-425) gives up the assumption of a two-country world which underlies the earlier parts, and is notable especially for its balanced examination of the case for regional trade and payments arrangements involving discrimination against surplus countries outside. The point is that if deficit countries have to resort to import restrictions to balance their external accounts, it is senseless—and unnecessarily destructive of trade—to ask them to restrict imports from one another; what is needed in such a situation is a restriction of imports only from the surplus country or countries. This idea, set forth by Frisch in 1947, is here extensively developed, with due regard to the difficulties in the way of its application. The two main objections to the case for discrimination are found to be: (1) its failure to take into account " the relative essentiality of imports from different sources to different countries " (p. 415)—for example, imports from a surplus

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country may consist of irreducible necessities—and (2) the fact that deficit countries by restricting imports from one another as well as from the surplus country may make more goods available for export to the surplus country.

Meade's discussion of the theory of commercial policy, including that of discrimination, does not in the least obscure his strong preference for free trade and for allowing the fullest possible scope for the price mechanism—mainly through variable exchange rates—to promote international economic equilibrium.

The work appears under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the purpose of which is "to encourage and facilitate the scientific study of international questions." In sponsoring such a difficult theoretical investigation, the Institute has shown courage as well as discernment. This work may not be the last word on every aspect of the subject, but it is, without any doubt, a major contribution to the scientific study of international economic relations.

RAGNAR NURKSE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Economics of New England: Case Study of an Older Area. By SEYMOUR E. HARRIS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952.—xvii, 317 pp. $4.75.

In view of the importance historically of sectional interests in our national life, it is surprising that studies of regional economics have been so long in developing. While by its very nature economics has been concerned with the economics of particular nations which are essentially regional, research in the economic problems of regions within a nation, distinguishable by their sociological, economic, political or cultural conditions, is "only in its infancy" (p. viii). Except for reports of governmental and central banking surveys, this volume represents one of the first attempts to investigate and evaluate the numerous factors that affect the economic status and prospects of a specific geographical region.

In dealing with the economic problems of New England, Professor Harris has had the advantage of participation in the work and deliberations of the New England Committee of the Council of Economic Advisers, which issued its report on July 2, 1951, of the Committee on New England's Economy of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report, and of the New England-New York Inter-Agency Committee established by President Truman. However, in this book he has substantially broadened the topics covered in the re-

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port already published by the Council of Economic Advisers and has redistributed the emphasis in accordance with his own personal views.

The problem to which Professor Harris addresses himself is one of degree. It is not that New England had not made continuous progress economically over the past 200 years. In fact, as Professor Harris points out at many points in the volume, "The miracle of New England is not how badly she has performed, but, in the face of barren natural resources and unfavorable location relative to raw materials and markets, how remarkably she has moved ahead" (p. 7). Nor is it entirely that, as the country has developed, New England has accounted for a declining proportionate share of the nation's population, manufacturing and income—a development which would be natural for an older and already industrialized area. It is rather that New England's losses are larger than they should be, that New England is losing ground too rapidly, that with a downturn in business trends these relative losses will become absolute, and that then the region will be faced with exaggerated problems of unemployment, depressed wage levels, and reduced per capita incomes.

The diagnosis of this condition is developed not only by an examination of the peculiarities of an older economic region, the historical development of the New England problem, and an examination of differences among the states within New England and between New England and other areas, but also by an analysis of New England's balance of payments, of her comparative costs of labor, taxes, fuel and power, and transportation relative to other regions, particularly the South, and of the adverse effects of federal financing and operations upon the New England economy—particularly the impact of federal taxes upon her per capita income, the failure of New England to share adequately in various forms of federal expenditures, and the disadvantages to New England of high protective tariffs.

It is not possible within the limits of this review to deal comprehensively with either specific points in the diagnosis of the New England economic problem or the recommendations presented to overcome the difficulties set forth. There are those who will question the subordination of the importance of taxes and transportation costs to those of labor. It is not made entirely clear on what grounds additional large investments in existing New England industries would be justified in the face of the pessimistic prospects elsewhere set forth. In view of the success, particularly of Connecticut, in developing new and expanding industries, there are some who will view the decline in the shoe and textile industries as the necessary adjustments imposed on

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a region in adapting itself to changing economic conditions. And to many it will seem wishful thinking to expect that New England's problem can or will be solved by the imposition, by the federal government upon the states of competitive areas, of standards for social security and labor and working conditions comparable to those of New England, or by the reform of the tax systems of said states to reduce or eliminate their competitive advantages.

Notwithstanding these unsettled and debatable matters, this book serves to direct attention to the problems of regional economics, to identify the many interrelated factors in these problems, and to suggest many effective uses of already existing statistics and statistical techniques in their analysis.

BENJAMIN P. WHITAKER

UNION COLLEGE

Hobbes and His Critics: A Study in Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism. By JOHN BOWLE. New York, Oxford University Press, 1952.—215 pp. $2.75.

There are certain great thinkers in the history of ideas whose actual positions are quite different from the traditional interpretations which are commonly attributed to them. Hobbes is notably one such. His trenchant language, his fearless opposition to groups in England who were seeking to hold on to hereditary privileges, and, perhaps above all, his frankly, almost defiantly, proclaimed secularism aroused storms of protest. Many writers of the time, like the ten whom Mr. Bowle discusses, hastened to attack him. These writers usually misunderstood Hobbes's meaning, sometimes wrested phrases from context, created a system which may be called Hobbism, and thus initiated a convention (still, unfortunately, too current) of attributing Hobbism to Hobbes and of picturing Hobbes as " the monster of Malmesbury ".

Mr. Bowle's book perpetuates rather than corrects the three-hundred-year-old convention of confusing Hobbes's actual position with Hobbism. Mr. Bowle deals with nine writers who attacked Hobbes directly and with one other whose ideas stand in opposition to Hobbes's. In spite of the subtitle of his book, he does not mention Harrington whose *Oceana* in 1656 was probably the ablest constitutionalist reply to Hobbes prior to Locke, and he includes some critics of Hobbes who are not constitutionalists at all. The ten men he reviews are Filmer, Rosse, Seth Ward, Lucy, Lawson, Hunton, Bramhall, Eachard, Clarendon, and Whitehall. Their works against Hobbes appeared between 1652 (the year following the first publication of the *Leviathan*) and

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1679 (the year of Hobbes's death). The writings are significant for understanding their century. Mr. Bowle has done a service in drawing attention to them. But he acquiesces too readily in viewing Hobbes through these men's eyes.

Among the misunderstandings of Hobbes which Mr. Bowle perpetuates is the allegation that, according to Hobbes, nothing is either morally right or morally wrong until a government commands or forbids it, and that therefore we have no standard by which a government can itself be morally judged. Rosse made this charge against Hobbes (pp. 66, 191), and so did Clarendon (p. 171) and Whitehall (p. 178). Mr. Bowle concurs in this criticism; he writes: "For Hobbes, government created moral values" (p. 186). But actually Hobbes repeatedly insisted that government creates, not the principles of morality, but the conditions which promote the practice of morality. He devotes chapter 13 of *De Cive* and chapter 30 of the *Leviathan* to a discussion of "the duties of them who bear rule." Too often, Hobbes deplored, sovereigns violate their duties but are none the less under obligation. He wrote: "Although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief, and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the natural, moral and divine law" (*De Cive*, chap. 13, sec. 2). Mr. Bowle speaks vaguely of a need for a "mystical sanction" or an "emotional sanction" for government (p. 191). Hobbes's sanction was "the dictate of right reason". But, whether Hobbes's position be sounder or not, he certainly cannot properly be said to have had no sanction except brute power.

Another traditional misunderstanding of Hobbes which Mr. Bowle perpetuates is the allegation that Hobbes pictured mankind as a degenerate rabble. Bramhall used just this phrase (p. 124); and Filmer (p. 16), Lucy (p. 79) and Eachard (p. 141) used equivalent phrases. Mr. Bowle remarks that this interpretation of Hobbes was not merely usual among Hobbes's contemporaries, but "justifiable" (p. 79). In one footnote (p. 58) Mr. Bowle quotes A. D. Lindsay's contention that for Hobbes the state of nature was an abstraction; but he nowhere else follows up this suggestion. But if it was an abstraction, it was a description of one phase of human nature, not a picture of the whole of human nature. Hobbes's critics, from 1652 to our own day, often miss Hobbes's chief problem, namely, that the traits pictured under the phrase "state of nature" are the traits which constantly need control. Constitutional provisions from Magna Carta to the Weimar

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Constitution are not enough to effect such control, as experience amply shows, unless there is also force to back up these provisions. The late Lord Keynes appraised Hobbes more tellingly than the traditional critics. He wrote (in a personal letter to the reviewer on June 19, 1940, during the days of the Blitz over London):

> The events of the modern world are surely a dreadful confirmation of Hobbes' diagnosis of human nature and of what is required to preserve civilization. From one point of view, we can regard what is now happening as the final destruction of the optimistic liberalism which Locke inaugurated. Our age forces us to return to that pessimistic view which the horrors of the seventeenth century impressed on Hobbes.... For the first time for more than two centuries Hobbes has more message for us than Locke.

Hobbes offered his picture of the state of nature, not as a complete analysis of human nature, but as an account of that phase of human nature which makes strong government a preliminary to peace. And in the happy days of established peace, Hobbes believed, men often exhibit generosity, proficiency in the arts of civilized life, and the virtues which his critics vainly try to praise by reading them back into untutored and unrestrained human nature.

STERLING P. LAMPRECHT

AMHERST COLLEGE

Les Partis politiques. By MAURICE DUVERGER. Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1951.—xi, 476 pp. 1,100 francs.

Maurice Duverger, who has written widely on French constitutional history and politics, is a "realistic" interpreter of democracy. He rejects the myths of popular or majority rule, and emphasizes the existence of élites and the necessity for an opposition.

> One has never seen a people govern itself, and one will never see it. All government is oligarchic, which necessarily requires the domination of a small number over a large number.... The simplest and most realistic definition of democracy is the following: a regime in which those who govern are chosen by those who are governed, by means of honest and free elections.... "Western" democracy is characterized essentially by the existence of an organized opposition, "eastern" democracy by its absence (pp. 461, 388, 452).

There is, of course, nothing particularly new or startling in this concept of democracy, but it provides the perspective for Duverger's comprehensive study of political parties—the chief instruments used by organized groups in any democracy in their rivalry for power.

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Duverger, professor of political science at the Universities of Bordeaux and Paris as well as columnist for the internationally known *Le Monde*, builds upon the insights of three important thinkers: Edmund Burke, who viewed parties as the expression of basic principles; Karl Marx, who called attention to the social and class basis of party movements; and Roberto Michel, who, with Ostrogorski, emphasized the anatomy of parties. Duverger develops his analysis of parties on all three levels (ideology, social basis, and internal organization), but his sympathies are clearly with Michel and Marx rather than Burke. As he suggestively comments: "Instead of defining the party as a 'group of citizens united by the same doctrine,' one is led to define it as a 'group of citizens united by the same discipline'" (p. 204).

Duverger distinguishes three major types of electoral battles: a battle without principles, a battle over secondary principles, and a battle over fundamental principles. The United States is in the first category, because the American parties seek only power and are indifferent to questions of theory or principle; indeed, says our author in criticizing the American party system, there is an "absence of all doctrine and all principle in the political parties." Great Britain, Scandinavia and West Germany are in the second category, since there is a doctrinal and social division in these countries, but based on agreement over the fundamental nature of the political régime; that is, the parliamentary system is not itself the subject of controversy. France and Italy are placed in the third class, because their powerful Communist parties refuse to accept political pluralism as a basic principle. The struggle here is not for pleasure or sport, but to the death; democratic government can survive only as long as the totalitarian party does not succeed in winning. Duverger concludes: "In the degree to which the democratic regimes will be unable to hold down and weaken their Communist parties, not by police measures which would be contrary to their principles, but by a transformation of their economic and moral structure, they will remain as disarmed with regard to neo-fascism as was the Weimar Republic with regard to Hitler" (p. 461). This leaves unanswered the crucial question: how are these much-needed reforms to be instituted by a government so weakened by the extremes that it cannot act?

Duverger has organized a vast amount of material concerning the chief parties of the world. As might be expected, he is very good on continental politics but rather weak on American affairs. His argument that "the two great American parties are to the right or in the center according to the parliamentary geography of Europe" is superficial. While socialism as a rigid body of doctrines has never been

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significant in America, the party of *movement* (to use François Goguel's term) has always been powerful—and, in this sense, considerably to the left of the usual French coalition.

Duverger avoids the trap of constitutional formalism, but stumbles into the labyrinth of political party formalism. For example, he dwells at great length upon the differences between the party systems of Britain and America. But is it not more significant that compromise takes place in both societies, even though at different levels of the party and constitutional structures? All constitutional systems depend for their effectiveness on political parties, as Duverger brilliantly demonstrates. But there is a greater society of which constitution *and* party are only an aspect, and this must never be ignored.

BERNARD E. BROWN

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker. Translated by John Andrews. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1951.—322 pp. $3.75.

Memoirs. By FRANZ VON PAPEN. Translated by Brian Connell. London, Andre Deutsch, 1952.—630 pp. 25*s*.

"Memoirs", says Franz von Papen at the beginning of his own contribution to this branch of literature, "are something of a drug on the market these days." Reviewers of post-war German books will doubtless be inclined to agree, although it is questionable whether they object as much to the formidable number of volumes turned out by Hitler's generals and diplomats since the end of the war as to the querulously defensive tone in which most of them are written. Occasionally a book comes along which is written by a man who tells what he knows about the Hitler period without seeming to worry over what his readers may think of his personal behavior during it; the memoirs of General Heinz Guderian are a case in point. In general, however, we are forced to wade through elaborate and wearying apologias which are neither convincing nor informative; and, in the two books to be considered here, this tiresome experience confronts us again.

Ernst von Weizsäcker was a member of the German Foreign Service from 1920 until 1945, serving in his early years in Copenhagen, Geneva and Berne. From 1936 to 1938 he was head of the Political Division of the Foreign Office and, from the latter date until 1943, he was Secretary of State in that organization, second in command to Joachim von Ribbentrop. In the most decisive years of the pre-war

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period, therefore, he occupied a position of great responsibility; and his memoirs might have been expected to make a rich contribution to our knowledge of German diplomacy in that time. This expectation is not fulfilled.

Weizsäcker has furnished a few interesting details concerning conditions in the Foreign Office under Neurath and Ribbentrop: the transformation of that establishment from a body which influenced policy formulation to a purely technical organization which sent and received diplomatic notes; the increasing chaos of foreign policy administration in general as competing agencies were allowed to usurp functions formerly reserved to the professional diplomats; and the progressive demoralization of the foreign service under these conditions. He has also thrown a little new light upon Ribbentrop's attitude during the Munich negotiations and his subsequent behavior in the months that preceded the outbreak of war.

For the most part, however, Weizsäcker merely repeats the arguments in his own defense which he gave during his trial at Nuremberg and which can be read almost as conveniently in the volumes of *The Trials of War Criminals* as they can here. He interrupts his narrative almost on every other page to assure his readers that he had no personal responsibility for the policies adopted by Germany, that he was always a worker for peace, and that his continued service under Ribbentrop was animated, first, by the desire to convert his superior to his own views and, later, by the determination to prevent foreign policy from falling completely into the hands of knaves and fools who would make war inevitable.

The monotonous iteration of these claims will probably not prevent the reader from wondering how a man of Weizsäcker's undoubted intelligence could ever have believed Ribbentrop capable of conversion. It will certainly not disguise from him the fact that the author objected less to Hitler's policies before 1939 than to the methods he used to effect them: that he did not regret the absorption of Czechoslovakia, for instance, but merely deplored the fact that it was managed in a way which stiffened Western resistance to Germany and thus brought war closer. Weizsäcker's labored arguments are not, therefore, very persuasive; and his persistence in repeating them *ad nauseam* makes his book, even for the specialist, a dull and unrewarding one.

Dullness, at least, cannot be charged to the account of Franz von Papen. His book is of absorbing interest, if for no other reason than that it is an incomparable example of sustained literary effrontery. After explaining carefully that this volume is " not written in self-justification ", the sometime *Reichskanzler* and Nazi diplomat proceeds

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to justify and defend every action in his crowded official life from the days when he was serving as military attaché in the United States during the First World War until the end of his term as ambassador in Ankara during the second world conflict. The artistry of this performance is so impressive that it seems almost unfair to criticize it in detail: to point, for instance, to the convenient lapses of memory which permit Papen to leave out essential parts of the story (as in his account of his subversive activities in the United States) or to insist that the bland evasions which characterize his account of the fall of the Schleicher government are a totally inadequate answer to the substantial evidence of his back-stairs maneuvers which are to be found in other and more reliable sources.

Adroitness and obfuscation, however impressive, cannot hide the plain truth that Papen courted Hitler before the Fuehrer's accession to power and that, thereafter, there was literally nothing that he would not do to retain high position in the New Order. Even the murder of his closest associates did not prevent him, in 1934 and again in 1939, from grasping at new opportunities to serve Hitler. His book tells of spectacular grapplings between Papen and his conscience on these occasions; but it is easier to believe that these are products of the imagination of Papen the author than actual occurrences in the life of Papen the politician. Like Weizsäcker's, Papen's attempt to rehabilitate himself for posterity falls of its own weight; and the figure that emerges from behind all the literary embellishments is the same old Papen we always knew.

Princeton University Gordon A. Craig

Moscow, Tokyo, London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy. By Herbert von Dirksen. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1952.—ix, 276 pp. $4.00.

Herbert von Dirksen had very extensive opportunities, if not to influence, at least to observe the development of Germany's foreign policy under the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. However, even with all due allowance for the diplomat's long training in professional discretion, von Dirksen's memoirs are singularly unrevealing for a student of inter-war diplomacy. True, there are a few interesting details of the decline of German domination in the Ukraine of 1918, some useful sidelights on the Soviet attitude toward the Locarno Pacts and on the origins of the Soviet-German treaty of 1926, and some suggestions concerning the effect of the military mutiny of February 1936 upon Japanese foreign policy. The author also provides a date—

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"May or June 1933"—for the termination of coöperation between the Soviet and German general staffs (p. 112). At that time von Dirksen also felt that two groupings, pro-French and pro-German, were contending for control over Soviet foreign policy, and he believes that Hugenberg's London speech of June 1933, calling for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, cast the die for the "pro-French" group led by Litvinov. It did not seem important to him that Hitler's own loudly proclaimed aims could be achieved only at the expense of the territory and the existence of many other countries.

In writing about his short-lived mission to London in 1938-1939, von Dirksen had available a selection of his own despatches published by the Soviet government, as well as the extensive British and German published series of documents. From this abundance of sources his account gains somewhat in detail but little in illumination. In retrospect it is clear that by that time well-posted foreign correspondents were better informed of Hitler's true intentions than were his own diplomatic representatives abroad. Perhaps because of modesty von Dirksen's account (pp. 204-205) of his warnings from London in 1938 does less than justice to his foresight and personal courage. Even knowing that Hitler and von Ribbentrop regarded Britain's "pacifist decadence" as a fact beyond dispute, von Dirksen went to great pains in July 1938 to point out that the range of politically possible concessions by the Chamberlain government was distinctly limited and that the Reich government could not go on piling one demand upon another without driving England to organize a broad coalition to stop Germany's expansion. Whether or not Hitler even read these plainly written warnings, it took considerable backbone on von Dirksen's part to carry out his duty by going against strong and well-known predilections of dictatorial and ruthless masters.

Beyond holding to traditional concepts of "national prestige" and personal "loyalty" it is not clear from these memoirs that von Dirksen had any clear concept of what constituted the "best" foreign policy for his country. While he praises Stresemann for having held open Germany's revisionist claims against Poland, he now feels that Hitler was wrong in attempting to give effect to those claims in the face of Britain's growing resistance. Whether or not von Dirksen was as little responsible, after January 1933, as he claims, for the direction taken by German diplomacy, he successfully conveys the impression that he was fumbling in the dark, without influence over the making of his country's policy.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

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Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By ROBERT H. FERRELL. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1952.—x, 293 pp. $4.00.

This is a very readable doctoral dissertation produced under the auspices of the Yale Historical Publications. The author has written the best comprehensive study to date of the forces which produced the treaty to "outlaw war".

There are various levels upon which the author's work can be evaluated. One can, for example, question statements of interpretation. Thus those who are familiar with Stoner's life of Levinson might very well be surprised at the implication (on page 31) that Levinson went into the problem of war merely because the stock markets were affected in 1914. This, however, is a relatively minor point in comparison with the thesis of this book.

Basically, the book puts most of its weight on the diary of William R. Castle, Assistant Secretary of State for Western European Affairs during the negotiation of the Kellogg Pact. Thus the history of the "origins" tends to reflect the point of view of a professional diplomat.

Before taking up the thesis of this book, it would appear to be necessary for the record to point out some important omissions. Though it has not yet been published, it is fairly widely known, by this time, that the famous letter of April 25, 1927 in the *New York Times* signed by Nicholas Murray Butler, which saved Briand's offer of a Franco-American Pact from dying through neglect (p. 75), was in fact composed by James T. Shotwell.

Though Ferrell is familiar with Pearson and Brown's *American Diplomatic Game* he makes no mention of the statement in that source that Shotwell had given his papers relating to the Pact of Paris to the Yale University Library with the proviso that they not be made available to the public until after Shotwell's death. If such important source material exists, it surely deserves mention. If not, Pearson and Brown's statement should be corrected.

The most important omission is one which relates to the heart of Ferrell's thesis. In following Castle so closely, he impugns Briand's reputation as a "man of peace" (p. 145). This is a noteworthy position because it seems to be at variance with much of the existing record. Since Suarez' biography of Briand stops at the year 1923 and since there is no note that the subsequent papers at Cocherel were examined, one would like further information on this point. Mr. Ferrell neglects to say in his book that the one man who would know the full story of the negotiations, Briand's secretary at the time, Alexis Léger,

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is still alive and lives in Washington, D. C. It would be quite understandable if Léger refused to divulge any information on what might be a delicate diplomatic point, but a study on the subject should make a record of this attitude.

The thesis of this book is that the Pact of Paris was "the peculiar result of some very shrewd diplomacy and some very unsophisticated popular enthusiasm for peace." Thus Briand's offer of a treaty to outlaw war between the United States and France is interpreted as a shrewd move for a "negative military alliance". This may or may not have been Briand's intent, the proof is by no means conclusive, but it certainly was a fear in Mr. Castle's mind. One wonders whether the author might not have questioned this thesis and compared its neurotic qualities with the over-all needs of our international society.

The author then joins the excellent company of people like Mr. Kennan and talks of a "realistic" American foreign policy. This is one word which has been too long abused. Its meaning is purely subjective. Those who advocated the concessions at Munich called them "realistic"—history has recorded otherwise. The word is a personal evaluation and should have no place in a logical deduction.

The same attitude carries over into the following:

> The history of the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact shows that American popular understanding of the great problems and policies of post-1918 international affairs was appallingly naive. Moreover, some of America's most respected citizens, possessing the cherished visible signs of education, proved themselves almost as benighted as the public they sought to lead.

There is little choice but to include in this category both Butler and Shotwell. This is a shaky position to take, especially if one is familiar with the limitations which surround any political formulation. Anyone who is well acquainted with the mechanics of policy-making knows full well the errors and omissions which often obtain in this myopic profession. Scholars also make mistakes in interpreting the history which they study. But the use of a word like "benighted" is certainly unfortunate.

If there was any ignorance, it was due to Mr. Kellogg's policy of keeping the negotiations from the public. Why he did so seems, at this date, to contradict the premises of a democracy. Were his reasons valid, they could have withstood the rigors of a public debate. There is much more to be said upon this question. There is more to be said upon the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a case history of the contest between far-seeing statesmanship and "realistic" diplomacy.

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But to date Mr. Ferrell is to be congratulated for a fine piece of historical research and his skill in painting a living picture of an era which deserves to be remembered—much more than it has been.

HERBERT MAZA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NEW YORK CITY

Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941. By CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1952.—xxi, 690 pp. $6.50.

Most historians who have written about American entry into World War II have taken extreme ground. Some have argued that Franklin D. Roosevelt was altogether right (Perkins, for example, and Rauch). Others have maintained that Roosevelt was altogether wrong (Beard, for instance, and Sanborn). Most books in both categories have two tremendous weaknesses: (1) they are based on published materials only, not on a careful examination of the unpublished manuscripts; and (2) they are violently partisan, too one-sided and unfair to carry conviction to the reader.

By doing a good deal of work in the State Department Archives, Professor Tansill has eliminated Weakness One. Weakness Two, however, remains. *Back Door to War,* which is anti-Roosevelt, is an important, but not a balanced or objective, study. It must be used with great caution—with the same caution that should be present when one reads the pro-Roosevelt volumes.

As Tansill sees it, there has been a bipartisan conspiracy in Washington since 1900, to defend the British Empire. Stupidity or villainy or both took us into World War I in 1917; and the "criminal bungling" of "pseudo statesmen" at Versailles explains everything and justifies almost everything that the Hitler government did from 1933 to 1941. Tansill defends Japanese conquests in China during the 1930's, because Japan was anti-Communist, and for other reasons. All through the book, Tansill suggests that German and Japanese officials acted in a reasonable and proper way. Generally, they did the right thing; when they acted in a regrettable manner, it was because they were forced to such action by the Russians, British, French, Chinese or Americans. The United States, apparently, should have taken an "understanding view" (see, for example, pp. 122, 132) of Japanese and German aggression (though Tansill would deplore the use of the word aggression for German and Japanese policy).

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American, British, French, Chinese and Russian officials, by contrast, seem nearly always to have behaved in a bungling or vicious manner. Wilson was a deceitful Shylock (pp. 10, 14). Franklin Roosevelt was illogical, a boorish liar, a Mad Hatter, a war criminal (pp. 47, 122, 555, 629). Stimson donned his "armor of righteousness", and wanted "perpetual war for perpetual peace" (pp. 101, 103); he was really the architect of war (pp. viii, 97, 103, etc.). "Liberals" are referred to condescendingly (see, for example, p. viii).

Professor Tansill and his publishers suggest that the State Department manuscripts prove all his points. Do they? Hardly. There are hundreds of quotations from State Department manuscripts—very valuable quotations which add materially to our knowledge of the period. But there are few citations to support the central portions of the Tansill argument. As an example, there is heavy documentation from the State Department files supporting Tansill's excellent description of the diplomacy of the Ethiopian crisis (chapters vii and viii especially, two thirds of the citations for those chapters being from State Department manuscripts). But the chapters more closely related to the central thesis of Roosevelt-plotting-war are drawn only in small part from State Department files (about 5 per cent of the citations in chapters xxiv-xxvi are to such materials, and few of the documents used bear on the key points in any significant way). There is no documentation for the first statement in the book ("The main objective in American foreign policy since 1900 has been the preservation of the British Empire"); nor do the 2,000 citations scattered through the rest of the book support that interesting statement. It is much the same at other points. Professor Tansill has provided much significant material, but has not proved his main arguments.

Does this review make me a "Roosevelt-lover" and a "court historian"? Actually, I agree with Professor Tansill that there was much bungling in Washington in the 1930's. I am as ready to condemn the Roosevelt-was-always-right books as to find fault with the Roosevelt-was-always-wrong volumes. The fact is, we shall not get to the bottom of recent diplomatic history by name-calling, or by labeling everything black or white. We must keep working in this field, broadening and intensifying our efforts, and retaining as much balance as is possible in this troubled age.

FRED HARVEY HARRINGTON

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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The American Approach to Foreign Policy. By DEXTER PERKINS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952.—195 pp. $3.25.

Based on a series of lectures delivered at Uppsala University under the Gottesman Foundation, this volume is a topical study of the forces that have shaped American foreign policy. Although the book begins with a brief summary of American diplomatic history, no attempt is made to present a detailed chronology, and the major portion of the work is devoted to an analysis of the influence of economic, social, political and moral considerations on the development of the nation's foreign policy. The author also seeks to assess the rôle of President and Congress in foreign affairs, and in the concluding chapter he discusses the "secular struggle" between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Students of American diplomatic history will look in vain for significant new material in *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*, for this is an interpretative study in which the author uses relatively well-known facts to illustrate and substantiate his conclusions. Charles A. Beard employed much the same technique in *The Idea of National Interest*; but, while Beard placed his major emphasis on economic causation, Perkins approaches the problem of the origins of American foreign policy from a number of different, and often conflicting, viewpoints. On the other hand, he does not hesitate to take a stand on controversial issues. He believes that "Americans have, on the whole, not been an imperialist nation" (p. 83); that industrialists and bankers have had little effect on the formulation and execution of American foreign policy; that "ideas connected with certain moral preoccupations" have been "a substantially important factor in the conduct of American diplomacy" (p. 82); that the diplomatic history of the United States contains "plenty of evidence of a dislike of force and a repugnance to war" (p. 110); and that "to an extraordinary degree" the foreign policy of the United States "comes up from the people" (p. 151).

Although *The American Approach to Foreign Policy* has no overall thesis, it does make a concerted effort to defend the past and present foreign policies of the United States. The author meticulously presents both sides of every question; but, when he totes up the final accounts in each chapter, the United States invariably ends up on the credit side of the ledger. As a consequence, the reader—or, at least, this reader—is often left with the impression that Perkins has weakened his case by overstating it and that his opinions on the wisdom of

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American policies are out of place in a historical analysis of the factors that have determined these policies.

The American Approach to Foreign Policy is a provocative and thoughtful survey of the main forces in American diplomatic history. Not everyone will agree with the author's answers to the questions that he has raised, but no one can deny that he has asked the right questions. This is a major accomplishment that will be appreciated by all those who have spent time wandering in the intellectual wasteland that makes up such a large part of what is euphemistically known as diplomatic history.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY HAROLD C. SYRETT

The Future of American Politics. By SAMUEL LUBELL. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1952.—viii, 285 pp. $3.50.

American electoral behavior is often inscrutable, but attempting to understand it should challenge the reason of any enlightened citizen. This book opens wide vistas of explanation with a trenchant and bright analysis. Mr. Lubell cuts at much of the cant of present-day American politics so effectively that even the amateur (if, indeed, there are any in a presidential election year) will find himself in possession of a vast set of new assumptions and the wise professional will throw away a lot of old ones.

The basic and inescapable fact in recent American history, says Lubell, is that the two out of every three children who were second-generation Americans in 1910 came to political maturity just as the blight of the Great Depression fell upon the nation. This underdog segment of the population, upgraded by the New Deal and the war, became a propertied class with vivid if not bitter memories of being at the bottom of the heap—scorned and forgotten people. Today " this same big-city generation still stands like a human wall between the Republicans and their past dominance." The result has been the transformation of the Democrats into a majority party with the G.O.P. struggling, in a losing battle, against the birth rate. Simultaneously there has been the emergence of class consciousness among native American workers, leavened by the Negro who has engendered new and ambivalent attitudes of tension and tolerance. But, most important, America has witnessed the appearance of a new middle class in the North, conservative like its predecessors but determined to make FEPC the litmus test of its political allegiance.

If this has been the unfolding drama in the North, changes in the

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South have been no less spectacular. Here industrialization has pushed forward to create a new urban class that is decidedly Republican in sympathy and which exerts a growing pressure to join with its natural allies in industry in the North. By mortgaging themselves to the Democratic party, however, many Southerners have come to recognize that they have been unable to restrain the extension of civil rights by the Northern wing of the party.

Mr. Lubell, too cavalierly, perhaps, disposes of what he calls "The Myth of Isolation". Whether one agrees or not, though, his conclusion is suggestive: the most "isolationist" of all groups have been the Russian-Germans who arrived in the wheat country after 1890 and who have been so consistently pro-German that their seeming isolation has in fact been all that remains of opposition to the foreign policies of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. However, nobody will question that, on the Republican side, the real dilemma lies in reconciling the liberal Eastern wing of the party with the conservative mid-Westerners—the "me too but better" men with the economic die-hards who resent every tick of the clock.

Some of Lubell's generalizations are not novel, as, for example, the observation that the New Deal needs one more Republican victory to make itself a permanent part of American life; some are open to dispute, as, for example, the view that Truman, like the Red Queen in *Alice in Wonderland,* has had to run faster and faster in order to stand still; some are spelled out brilliantly such as those relating to the inner dynamics of the Democratic coalition. But there are scores of them here, and it will be a remarkable reader who fails to be enormously stimulated by *The Future of American Politics.* Especially does this apply to those politicians who predicate their actions on a static conception of what they *think* the national political conduct ought to be and who always prepare, therefore, to win the previous election.

HENRY F. GRAFF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Two-Party South? By ALEXANDER HEARD. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1952.—xviii, 334 pp. $4.75.

The quadrennial breeze over a miraculous vivification of Southern Republicanism has reached tornado proportions, thanks to the psychopathic aversion for the Fair Deal nourished in the heart of many a Southern colonel. This situation ought to put Alexander Heard's book on the "must" list for political strategists of both parties.

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The University of North Carolina professor, who assisted V. O. Key in the survey for *Southern Politics* (1949), has done a top-flight job of research and analysis in the first eighteen chapters and appendices. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the last chapter, which contains his conclusions, seems to have been written by a Mr. Heard who was unfamiliar with the data in the earlier chapters. His speculations indicate that he hopes for a political "realignment more along lines of economic class interests, after the manner of the British, breaking down traditional orientations" (pp. 33, 156). These castles in the air are transformed into predictions (pp. 234-249) although his data show that Southern Republican strength is on the toboggan (pp. 16-73, 118).

Heard seems to be in that growing army of Fair Deal academicians who are galled by having to compromise with Southerners in the Democratic party. Like Senator Karl E. Mundt, who apparently objects to compromising with the Young Turks in the Republican party, these academic "liberals" dream of the day when conservative Southern political leaders will enlist in the Grand Old Party and help to mold it in the image of Senators John W. Bricker and Harry F. Byrd, thereby making it unnecessary for the Old Guard to compromise with the Young Turks. When the time for compromise is past, when we take our politics so seriously that we lose our sense of humor and proportion, then is the time to throw in our chips and man the barricades. If the prescription for a two-party South is polarization and strengthening old-guard forces within the Republican party, the treatment is fine but the patient will die.

The thesis of *A Two-Party South* is that the Democratic party will (or ought to?) become an American version of the British Labor party, with the G.O.P. shaping itself into a minotaur well to the right of Winston Churchill's Tories. As Samuel Lubell (*The Future of American Politics*, 1952) and countless others have shown, such a development would freeze the Democrats in power more or less permanently —another thing Heard seems to want. Although he admits that yielding to the Dixiecrats would consign the Grand Old Party to the graveyard along with the Whigs and Federalists (pp. 121n, 164), he fails to realize that his desired or predicted realignment would mean a one-party system not only in the South but in the nation.

An excellent example of Heard's failure to discriminate between wish and probability is his forecast that the Dixiecrats of 1948 are on their way into the Republican fold. Of course, the future is imponderable; but his own statistics show that, in general, the bulk of Dixiecratic strength came from Democratic, not Republican, ranks—from

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areas that stuck with the Democrats even in the face of a threat from Rum and Romanism in 1928.

Chapter 12 is devoted to presenting a case for adoption of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.'s electoral college reform. Mr. Heard does not deny that the Lodge plan would provide the Democrats with every reason to restrict Southern suffrage further since it would give them an electoral vote bonus which would vary inversely with the size of the Southern popular vote (*American Political Science Review,* vol. 44, pp. 94-99); but he predicts that the Lodge plan would increase Southern voter participation (p. 177). At the same time, he realizes that Republicans do not control Southern legislatures and, consequently, cannot enlarge the Southern electorate. He also realizes that Southern Democrats have always employed every legal device to stabilize their advantage (pp. 83-95, 245, 302) but fails to explain how the Lodge plan would effect a change of heart among Southern legislators.

In spite of this confusion between hunch or hope and scientific prediction, Mr. Heard's excellent research, analysis and bibliography should give *A Two-Party South* the wide audience it deserves.

RUTH C. SILVA

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE

Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts. By JOHN C. MILLER. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1951.—253 pp. $3.50.

Although there have been earlier studies of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, notably an excellent article by F. M. Anderson in the *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* for 1912, this is the first book-length treatment of the subject. And it is a good one. Professor Miller has based his study almost wholly upon manuscript sources, contemporary newspapers, pamphlets, memoirs and letters, and has presented his material with a literary skill that makes for first-class reading. Numerous and well-chosen quotations from the sources add much to the colorful and dramatic character of the study.

In the course of his discussion the author brings out clearly the conditions and motives which led the Federalists hastily to push through Congress the Naturalization, Alien and Sedition Acts of June-July 1798, the nature of the Acts themselves, and the reaction of the Republican opposition, culminating in the famous Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions which not only denounced the Acts as unconstitutional, but set forth a theory of the nature of the union potentially far more dangerous to the powers of the federal government than those criti-

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cisms of individuals and the opposition press which the Federalists found so irritating and so alarming. Much of the book is devoted to the several prosecutions under the Sedition Act—no cases ever came up under the Alien Acts—which in the hands of Federalist prosecutors, judges, particularly Justice Chase, and juries went far to justify a rising tide of popular feeling that freedom of speech and of the press was being curbed in the interests of the party in power; that the Federalists, taking advantage of a diplomatic crisis, were attempting to destroy a domestic opposition which not only vigorously opposed their foreign policy but threatened the hold of the "well-born" on government itself. Had war with France actually materialized, it seems probable that the American people might have accepted the Alien and Sedition Acts as necessary for the public welfare. But, officially, war did not come, and the political motivation of the Acts became all too obvious. In the end the Acts undoubtedly played no small part in the downfall of the Federalist party in the election of 1800.

In discussing the background of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the reader might have appreciated somewhat more fully the fears of the Federalists in 1798, had a bit more been said of the popular hysteria over the French Revolution from 1792 on, the excitement over the Genêt mission, the appearance of the Democratic Societies and their suspected part in the Whiskey Rebellion, and the uproar over the Jay Treaty—the point being that the more conservative Federalist minds had been conditioned long before 1798 for the action finally taken in that year of crisis.

Although the author draws no parallels and, with the exception of a few closing comments, leaves the present-day implications of his story to the reader, it would certainly seem that *Crisis in Freedom* must have been inspired, in part at least, by the thought that the United States has found itself recently in a position very much like that which existed in the closing years of the eighteenth century when to many of the people the nation appeared to be threatened by the ideological and military menace of the "Terrible Republic". Ironically, the very laws which hastened the downfall of the Federalist party in 1800 have reappeared in even more drastic form in consequence of German and Russian threats to our security. Necessarily perhaps, but raising again the question of how far the government of a democracy should go, in facing such crises, in curbing the right of the individual and the press to criticize freely its policies and officials.

W. R. WATERMAN

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

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BOOK NOTES

In *The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1952; xxx, 262 pp. $3.50) Irving Dilliard has brought together the off-the-bench writings of the most admired and most influential of living American judges. The thirty-three short pieces which make up the collection are fragments, since the major work of Judge Hand's life is embodied in more than two thousand judicial opinions hammered out during his forty-three years as a federal trial and appellate judge. But these are magnificent fragments and, as such occasional pieces often are, richly revealing of the qualities of mind and character that have made Hand our unique genius at judging. Judge Hand's essential views on the classic problems of political and legal philosophy are all here, expressed with a power and grace of style that defy paraphrase. On the nature and function of the state, " democracy [is] a political contrivance by which the group conflicts inevitable in all society should find a relatively harmless outlet in the give and take of legislative compromise after the contending groups had had a chance to measure their relative strength." The same focus appears in Hand's conception of justice as " a passable accommodation between the vital and self-conscious interests of society " and of law as " no more than the formal expression of that tolerable compromise that we call justice, without which the rule of the tooth and claw must prevail." Hand's theories of the judicial process and of the judge's rôle come out most clearly in several addresses honoring other judges, most strikingly in his comments on his long-time Second Circuit colleague, Thomas W. Swan. To Hand the characteristic and irreplaceable attribute of the good judge is detachment—detachment in the sense of intellectual forbearance. Aloofness from the battle of conflicting interests is the price judges must pay for the maintenance of an independent judiciary. Hand's temper is resolutely pragmatic and experimental: " there is but one test for divergent popular convictions, experiment, and almost any experiment is in the end less dangerous than its suppression." But his experimentalism is completely without the humorlessness and over-pride in human potentialities too often associated with pragmatic philosophies. There is a wry magnificence about the choice of words in his declarations of pragmatic faith: " life is made up of a series of judgments on insufficient

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data, and if we waited to run down all our doubts, it would flow past us" and "any organization of society which depresses free and spontaneous meddling is on the decline, however showy its immediate spoils." No wonder that our greatest working judge could write, at fourscore: "It is enough that we set out to mould the motley stuff of life into some form of our own choosing; when we do, the performance is itself the wage."—HARRY W. JONES, Columbia University.

Richard W. Van Alstyne's *American Crisis Diplomacy: The Quest for Collective Security, 1918-1952* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952; xiii, 165 pp. $3.50) is less an interpretation than a descriptive précis of the course of events from the end of World War I to date. The book presents no new material from original scholarly research, and little in the more limited sense of unpublished manuscript. Of the three chapters, one on the rise of the Pacific as a crisis area, another on the late war, and a third on United States problems since, two are revisions of chapters 25 and 26 of the author's larger *American Diplomacy in Action*. Portions of the third are taken from Professor Van Alstyne's writings for *Current History*. The text is only 142 pages in all. Some fifty-seven are devoted to the backwash of problems which have swept over us since World War II. Approximately the same number is concerned with the war itself. Thirty-odd scattered pages comment on the period between wars—for the most part on the Far East. In addition there are sixteen pages of discursive footnotes and an index. It is tightly, clearly, interestingly written. In his Preface Professor Van Alstyne takes the historians of World War I to task for not having been more careful of their facts and more composed in their judgments. He notes that he himself has "taken pains to draw definite conclusions." The juxtaposition of judgment and statement titillates expectation. Yet this reviewer found it difficult always to determine what were considered facts and what conclusions—that is, there seems no deviation from the aphorism that one historian's "fact" is frequently another's "fiction". Perhaps the conclusions are hidden behind tattletale adjectives. If this is so, there is ample room for personal disagreement. For example, was Allied strategy in World War I "brilliant"? Is it true that "For its China policy the Roosevelt administration ever kept ready its rose-tinted glasses"? It might be argued that the glasses were dark with continuing pessimism. Still, the axe of prejudice is not ground. No sparks of criticism fly. The author concludes in general agreement with the current tenor of Secretary Acheson's thinking on inter-

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national affairs. The book, despite its good qualities, does pose a serious question of common usefulness. It seems to this reviewer that it is too brief to be useful in a college course. He also wonders whether there is anything here to excite the good grey average reader. If the latter is interested in these matters, he knows, or thinks he knows, the material presented here. And it will seem dull fare to one used, as he is, to a spicy diet of revelation, interpretation and proclamation. This is not to say, however, that it is not a book which he could read with profit. Its sober forthrightness recommends it.—EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR., Columbia University Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Mobilization and Inflation (Claremont, Claremont College for the four Associated Colleges at Claremont, 1951; xiii, 98 pp. $2.75), by Frederic L. Simmons, contains three lectures, presented at Claremont College in California. In the first lecture the author stresses the need for increase in defense against Russian imperialism and international communism. The four reasons to justify this need are: enormous potential resources of Russia and her satellites; concentration of dictatorial power within a small group of men; development of long-range weapons; lack of intervening forces between this country and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Simmons is right when he states that in case of war we "must have centralized direction and restrict the range of personal choice and individual decision." It is also correct that "some groups may enjoy inflation and controls as a way of life"—and that "when the time comes we must not exaggerate the difficulties of restoring our economic freedom." The second lecture is devoted to the requirements of defense. The author mentions that we are not self-sufficient in raw materials and that we may have to resort to extraordinary measures to meet the man-hour requirements. These measures are: putting additional manpower to work, increasing the working hours, reducing the production of civilian goods, purchasing goods from abroad on a larger scale. In the third lecture, the causes of inflation are analyzed briefly and the author sums up the remedies as follows: ". . . spending must be restrained, and production should be increased without higher cost per unit"; "Government should reduce non-defense spending drastically"; "taxes must be increased"—"it is absolutely essential that the increased personal taxes extend well down into the range of low income"; "further quantitative restrictions of credit" are to take place; "the support levels for farm prices should be lowered"; "some kind of wage policy must be evolved so that wage rates will not outrun the increase in production." This reviewer

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wholly agrees with the author that the "damage which inflation can do to our economic system . . . may be . . . difficult to avoid." The three lectures contained in the booklet are certainly worth reading and may serve as a guide to further study of the problem, ably treated lately by Seymour E. Harris, Albert G. Hart, Jules Backman, and others.—MICHAEL ALBERY, Boston College.

Professor Ben W. Lewis' account of how the Labor government met Britain's problems and administered Britain's affairs from 1945 to 1951—*British Planning and Nationalization* (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund; London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952; xi, 313 pp. $3.00)—is about as severely factual as anything of its kind could well be. This clearly constitutes his study's chief and very genuine merit. With the aid of travel and study in Britain on a Twentieth Century Fund Grant, and his long experience in the study of British economy, the author, who is Professor of Economics at Oberlin College, compiled an impressive body of useful information, organized it logically, and presented it clearly. He begins with two defining chapters on "Economic Planning" and on "The Issue of Nationalization"—defining not only the general problems but outlining the mechanics of Labor's attempted solutions as well. He ends with some restrained observations "In Conclusion". Between that introduction and the very tentative assessments, he has devoted nine chapters to the Nationalization of Coal, of Transport, of Electric Power, of Iron and Steel, and to Town and Country Planning, the Distribution of Industry, the National Health Service, Agriculture and Housing. A most useful bibliography on each of these subjects is offered at the last. I intend no complaint about this study when I say it is almost as hard to quarrel with the author's findings as to criticize the contentions annually published by the editors of the *World Almanac*. His sources are certainly the correct ones—government and party publications, the *Parliamentary Debates*, and the best of the British press, and he has selected from these with economy, fairness and care; no mean job. The result is a good series of pictures of each major area of the British economy under Labor, all posed to include the pertinent elements. The clarity of the presentation certainly does not derive from the symmetrical nature of the subject itself. As Mr. Lewis frequently insists, Labor's program has been an illogical blend of boldness and caution, perception and blindness, considered measures and improvisations, reminiscent in fact of our own early New Deal. Moreover, he maintains that very little that has occurred, good or bad,

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can as yet be identified as the product of nationalization per se; hence the cautious, colorless tone of his few conclusions. Change is the only constant here, and the author wisely has not tried to take moving pictures with a box Brownie. Indeed, so far from impairing his study's value, Mr. Lewis' self-denying willingness to bring together the facts of record in convenient form, and to stop there, will insure his work's usefulness to students of British government and economy as long as these subjects are worth studying—which should be a long, long time.—KEITH C. CLARK, Ford Archives, Dearborn, Michigan.

Bosworth Monck's new book—*How the Civil Service Works* (London, Phoenix House Limited; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1952; vi, 258 pp. $5.00)—is an admirable attempt to delineate the problems of the English civil service, to offer some solutions to these problems, and, concurrently, to describe the workings of the service and its place in the scheme of government. His general concept—" machinery of government includes the organization and purpose of political parties, the working arrangements of Parliament and Cabinet, the organization of departments and inter-departmental work, and methods of administration " (p. 86)—demonstrates an awareness of the scope of the governing process and the extent of the administrative problem. Avoiding the encyclopedic approach, Mr. Monck holds to his stated aim: " to provide an account of some of the methods by which Great Britain is governed, and the particular responsibilities of the major departments of state " (p. 1). Consequently the first half of the book, four chapters in all, is devoted to a discussion of the civil service, its problems, its personnel, and its relationship to the other organs of government. Of particular note is chapter two, " How the Government Pays Its Way "; here is a clear, concise summary of the overwhelmingly complicated process of financial legislation in Great Britain. The discussions of the Foreign Service, the relationship between permanent and temporary civil servants, and the general problem of recruitment parallel recent discussions in the United States. It seems strange, however, that Mr. Monck has omitted any sustained commentary on the administration of nationalized industries. To be sure, this is not passed over entirely. The general problem of public ownership is discussed briefly (p. 109) as is economic planning (p. 104). Since every element of the civil service, as well as the general character of British government, has been affected by the growth of nationalization and peacetime planning, the brevity of these presentations lends something of an artificial character to this part of the

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book. It is in the second half, however, that one feels the most disappointment. Here, in describing the responsibilities of the departments of state, the author has done little more than present, in prose form, schemes of organization and tables of functions. There is no attempt at analysis, critical or otherwise, in running the gamut from Agriculture to Works. Therefore this section has its value only as an abbreviated handbook. Interesting as it might be, it is of little aid in understanding the dynamics of the civil service or the relationship of the service itself to the fabric of British government. Bearing in mind Mr. Monck's self-imposed goal, it is evident that the shortcomings of the book result not so much from a faulty aim as from a too easy target.—WILLIAM L. ROFES, Norfolk, Virginia.

In one of his last reports United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy announced the successful completion of the Allied "surgical operation to remove the evil of the Nazi regime from the German body." The optimistic conclusions of American officials have been disputed by reporters of the foreign press who have found less to cheer about. In a report on *Germany's New Nazis* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1952; x, 76 pp. $2.75), sponsored by the Anglo-Jewish Association, a well-known British journalist, who prefers to remain anonymous, claims that "the Nazi menace in Germany . . . is a problem of the most extreme urgency" (p. 70). Taking the political pulse of the Federal Republic, the author finds the democratic forces weak and Right-wing authoritarian tendencies growing. He weakens his case by greatly exaggerating the strength of overt neo-Nazi groups. While seven years after the Nazi *Götterdämmerung* numerous ambitious and opportunist demagogues are vying for Hitler's mantle, their slavish imitations of Nazism have been singularly unsuccessful. Since the publication of this pamphlet, the largest group, the Socialist Reichs party (S.R.P.), has shown signs of disintegrating under the combined impact of determined government action to outlaw it and internal factional quarrels. Recalling Hitler's dictum that nothing slowed the growth of his movement as much in its early stages as the indifference of its potential opponents, the neo-Nazis crave such publicity as they receive here. They do not deserve it. To call them "new Nazis" is a misnomer; they are unregenerated old Nazis surrounded by *comitati* of denazification "victims". Only in the last section of his booklet does the author put his finger on the real danger to German democracy —and the defense of the West—the "Trojan Horses" in the body politic. "There is considerable evidence", he writes, "that Nazism

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and extreme nationalism have survived in quarters which are ostensibly democratic. . . . These unobtrusive trends are far more dangerous for being less obvious than the neo-Nazi groups" (p. 71). The cold war has imposed upon the Western democracies the necessity of immediate collaboration with a Germany which is, despite the optimism of United States officialdom, not yet a reliable partner. The notion of a marriage of convenience with Russia and communism entertained by some German nationalists may well be a myth, but a useful one for the enemies of German democracy. The author rightly emphasizes that German democrats need all possible support and encouragement from abroad in view of dangerous manifestations of a possible relapse to authoritarianism.—LEWIS J. EDINGER, Woman's College of the University of North Carolina.

The Scandinavian States and Finland: A Political and Economic Survey (London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951; viii, 312 pp. $4.00) is the result of the labors of a small group designated by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and headed by Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy. According to the Preface, the book owes its existence primarily to the fact that the importance of the Scandinavian countries has greatly increased of late; they have come to constitute a sort of broad dividing zone some 1,000 miles long between the West and the East in Europe. They are no longer mere neutral standees watching from the side lines the frictions and conflicts of their larger neighbors, but potential victims of aggression and participants in any large-scale war. While one might well question whether this particular kind of justification for the survey compiled by Mr. Gathorne-Hardy and his colleagues is really essential, the question can well be brushed aside especially in view of the fact that the authors have brought forth an excellent volume. Incidentally, much of the content of the book ignores the implications of the somewhat awkward title which sets Finland apart from Sweden, Norway and Denmark. In the text, Finland is treated as an integral part of what is called, in these four countries, the North, and what British and American usage has increasingly come to call, over the past generation, Scandinavia. This is as it should be, for any other procedure means an altogether unnecessary acceptance of confusing and misleading distinctions. The fact is, of course, that within the area of the North, Sweden and Finland represent, historically and institutionally, a degree of unity markedly greater than that discernible, for instance, in the case of Sweden and Denmark. The merits of the book can be indicated by saying that

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within the small compass of some 300 pages the authors have managed to present easily the best and most many-sided survey yet available of the social, political, educational, economic and foreign relations developments of the North (including Iceland). The accent is, understandably, on a relatively narrow span of recent years, but the broader, historical background offered is adequate enough for a book of this kind. Some errors of fact and interpretation are inevitably present, but they are minor and do not mar the story. A considerable number of statistical tables and a book list of a half-dozen pages—most of the books listed are in English—add to the value of this excellent tome.—JOHN H. WUORINEN, Columbia University.

David Mitrany's *Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1951; xvi, 301 pp. $4.50) is a thoughtful and scholarly presentation of a "neglected chapter in contemporary social history", the clash between the socialist and agrarian populist movements, with its disastrous consequences for democracy in Eastern Europe. The historical sections are excellent, and the analysis of Marxist agrarian theory generally able. The author disposes deftly of the inflexible predictions that Marx made, on the basis of his reading of exclusively British experience, about the concentration of ownership in agriculture and the fated transformation of the peasant proprietors into a rural counterpart of the urban proletariat. But perhaps the book's prime achievement, apart from its up-to-date survey of populist history, is its examination of the value-preconceptions that Marx, and still more his followers, brought to their "scientific" analysis of the "agrarian problem". Marxism and Marxists are typically urban phenomena, and for all their avowed emancipation from bourgeois prejudice, few of the important custodians of Marxist doctrine have been free of that tribal contempt for peasant life which is so generally ingrained into the culture of European cities. The tribalism cuts both ways, of course, but Mitrany is undoubtedly right in placing the major onus on the socialists. The "separation of the town and country" is in its larger outlines ideological, and even the further growth of communications media will not soon end the tension between two attitudes, the mutual hostility and distrust between what are almost two civilizations. This tension, I regret to say, affects even the author. The weaknesses of his book stem from the fact that his deep sympathy for the agrarian has led him to stand the Marxist stereotypes on their head, and to filter recent history through an idealized conception of the

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peasantry. Thus, it is a puzzle why he should scarify Marx for holding that the peasantry as a class is unable to fend for itself *politically* (p. 25), while conceding that the post-1918 agrarian revolutions in Eastern Europe failed because " the peasants were difficult to organize . . . they were poor and ignorant . . . they suffered from a lack of political leadership and contacts " (p. 128). And even when the Marxist parties are given their full share of the blame, it is surely an uncritical reading of history which blames the agrarian lapses into political and social reaction mainly on " the passage of the workers from Liberalism to Socialism " (p. 5). The same protective instinct leads Mr. Mitrany to beg some vital questions of economic theory. To dispose, for example, of the Marxist analysis of the economics of the small holding, by stating it in terms of the crude formula " the larger the scale the greater the efficiency " (pp. 108-109), is a failure to face up to the real question: Is the ideal of the " sound " 25-35 acre peasant holding compatible with the *optimum* scale of production possible in any given agrarian milieu? If the author slights such questions, it is, I think, because his approach is frankly guided by a physiocratic concern with agriculture as a way of life for the peasant, rather than as a means of life for society. In sum, this is a stimulating and controversial book.—NORMAN ROSENBERG, College of the City of New York.

Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, who has had a principal rôle in the international affairs of Cuba ever since the establishment of the Republic, in *Mi Misión en Washington (La Soberania de la Isla de Pinos), 1923-1925* (Habana, Imprenta de la Universidad de la Habana, 1952; 380 pp.) has told the story of his interest and activity in the knotty problem with respect to the sovereignty over the Isle of Pines. This question was left pending at the time of the withdrawal of the United States from Cuba in 1902. A treaty was drafted but more than twenty years elapsed before it was finally ratified. Dr. Torriente, as Cuba's first ambassador to the United States, had the pleasure of participating in the final steps which brought about the achievement of Cuba's desires in the matter. For this he received high honor from his government and the Cuban people. In the volume he simply relates the account of his participation, with special emphasis on the period of his ambassadorship. He details his relations with the Department of State and other leading personalities, all of which he feels contributed to the ultimate solution of the question. Although he was much concerned over the opposition to the ratification of the Treaty,

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he is ever ready to accord deep gratitude to the United States for its aid and assistance in Cuba's struggle for independence and during the half-century which has passed since that time. The major portion of the volume is devoted to documents, both Cuban and American, dealing with the question of the sovereignty over the Isle of Pines, and the negotiation of the Hay-Quesada Treaty and its final ratification. The prologue consists of a brief historical survey of the Treaty by Luis Marino Pérez. There is also a selected bibliography. Dr. Torriente is to be congratulated upon the publication of *Mi Misión en Washington*, which gives such a complete narration regarding an important episode in the relations of Cuba and the United States.—Roscoe R. Hill, Washington, D. C.

Colombia en la Encrucijada, by Felix Restrepo, S. J. (Bogotá, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1951; 141 pp.) is a collection of lectures given by Father Restrepo and broadcast by the national radio station of Colombia. Although the title of the book seems to indicate that it deals with the current and very serious crisis confronting the Republic of Colombia, in reality it contains eight masterful studies of present-day problems on a universal level and offers an interpretative analysis of the history of mankind and its future, according to the best Catholic tradition. Latin America as a whole offers —in contrast to the Old World—an impressive note of optimism in its present intellectual production. While the writers and philosophers of Europe seem to have drowned in an atmosphere charged with the disasters of war, decadence and moral disintegration, the thinkers and writers of Latin America have been playing a tune of optimism and faith in the future. They are all strong believers in the destiny of Latin America. Philosophers as different as Alfonso Reyes and Luis López de Mesa, or poets such as Mistral and Valencia, agree that the lands south of the Rio Grande are entitled to and will have a position of leadership and promise in the world of tomorrow. Father Restrepo's book is one more exponent of the theory. *Colombia en la Encrucijada* contains also a treatise on political science. It is unfortunate that the part of the book in which the eminent Jesuit presents his ideas about the organization of the state and its functions was the one that received the greater amount of attention and criticism. One may agree or disagree with the author's proposals for a constitutional reform in Colombia, but what one cannot bypass without admiration is his breadth of knowledge, the elegance of his style and the youthful enthusiasm that permeates all the pages of the book. The Republic of

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Colombia has lived during the last few years in a permanent state of unrest and political uncertainty. Only through an unusual talent displayed by the statesmen of the country has Colombia gone through these years without entering into a period of anarchy or armed revolution. The situation has improved considerably during the past few months under President Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, a moderate Conservative, and the country has just finished its most successful financial year. Nevertheless, the conditions prevailing there would seem to indicate that the constitutional reform proposed by Father Restrepo would be very advantageous. The government has already taken steps for the reformation of the constitution, but it has found it difficult to establish a satisfactory working coöperation on this issue with the leaders of the Liberal party, who have expressed their willingness to help in the maintenance of the democratic and legalistic tradition of the country. Recent developments in Latin America prove that Father Restrepo's opinions are as well grounded as his faith in the future of the country that he has served so long and so devotedly, as the reorganizer and founder of the Universidad Javeriana, as one of the foremost Colombian writers and humanists, and in his present position as Vice President of the Commission of the Academies of the Spanish Language in Mexico City.—José María Chaves, New York City.

Of all the international passwords that have been used and debated in Latin America during the last few years, not one has had as much discussion as the concept and implications of the term *Hispanidad*. The reason for the discussion of this subject in Latin America is of a triple character. First of all, Latin America has begun to play an important international rôle not only in the political sphere, but also in the world of letters. This affirmation of what is typically Latin-American—which resulted in the *Indigenista* movement—has led some people to reject the Hispanic tradition and, consequently, to rebel against those proponents of the *Hispanidad* theory. Secondly, the Franco régime has employed *Hispanidad* as a motto that carries the historical continuity of Spain and also denotes the expressed hope of a reconstruction of the empire of Charles V. In the third place, several political parties in the Latin-American countries have taken sides in this controversy and considerably confused the original and true meaning and significance of *Hispanidad*. Carlos Hamilton, a Chilean professor of law, now residing in the United States, has written the first conscientious, impartial and well-documented interpretation of *Hispanidad*. The book—*Comunidad de Pueblos Hispanicos* (Madrid, Edi-

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ciones Cultura Hispánica, 1951; 240 pp.)—traces, in its first part, the development of the relationship between the Spanish colonies and the mother country; beginning with a discussion of the just title of Spain to the conquest and colonization of the New World, Dr. Hamilton surveys the historical developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and brings us to an understanding of the independence of those colonies. The second part of the book deals with the concept of *Hispanidad* which he rightly ties up with the best of the Hispanic tradition, including such names as Vitoria, Loyola, Francisco de Xavier, las Casas, Cervantes and our contemporaries, such as Antonio Machado and Miguel de Unamuno. The latter gave a definition of *Hispanidad* which places it in its perspective: " What we should seek is the eternally Spanish tradition, which, being eternal, is more universal than Spanish." The book ends with an excellent and erudite discussion of the meaning of the various cultures of the Western World and the relationships among those cultures, including the religious element, and giving to the concept of *Hispanidad* the importance that it merits as one of the basic components of the culture of Latin America. Because of its scholarly character and good literary style, Hamilton's book deserves a cordial welcome from all those interested in the history and future of the Hispanic world.—José María Chaves, New York City.

The clearest exposition in brief compass (75 pages) of India's new Constitution which has come to this reviewer's attention may be found in *The Republic of India: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution,* by Alan Gledhill, Volume 6 of *The British Commonwealth: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions,* General Editor, George W. Keeton (London, Stevens and Sons Limited, 1951; xii, 309 pp. £2 5s.; $8.55). This analysis of the Constitution, which American political scientists will find especially valuable, is preceded by an all too brief historical introduction, and followed by a summary of the Indian legal system. The latter will prove indispensable to all lawyers in Commonwealth countries and in the United States whose practice in any way concerns India. Teachers of comparative law will find here, conveniently summarized, the essence of the issues involved in the pending Hindu Code bill which has recently evoked so much controversy in India. This book should receive as warm a welcome in India as in Britain. Had it been published anonymously, identification of the author as a British rather than an Indian member of the Bar would have been difficult. Mr. Gledhill, a former judge of the High Court at

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Rangoon, quite properly confined himself to exposition of the law. To have entered at length into the field of interpretation or into some of the philosophical problems springing from the new post-independence conditions was manifestly impossible. Nevertheless, more indication that such problems exist might have been wise. It cannot be stressed too much that the smooth functioning of Indian government depends as much—or more—on adherence to certain conventions of British constitutional practice as it does on the actual words of written constitution or statute. In the discussion of the provisions of the Constitution, amplification is needed with respect to the position of Kashmir as contrasted with that of other "Part B" states. Mr. Gledhill also might have made fuller reference to the divergence between *de jure* and *de facto* situations in other matters, especially to the tremendous problems involved in making the financial and revenue administration in the former princely states correspond to that in the former British Provinces. This would perhaps have led him to stress, even more than he does, the powers of the central government vis-à-vis the states in the new régime. In his analysis of the section on "Fundamental Rights", the influence of the government's power of preventive detention and the latitude available to the courts in interpreting these rights appears insufficiently appreciated. The comparisons with United States practice are generally well taken, but a few are misleading. The influence of slavery and its abolition on American constitutional history seems not well understood.—Holden Furber, University of Pennsylvania.

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